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Abstract 
 
The roles of certainty and faith have been very much divided in modern times by the 
positions allocated them under an all-consuming positivistic account of human 
processes.  It is ironic that this view, which stems from the Enlightenment period, a 
time of appreciation of the wonderful capacities and potential of the human being, has 
come to neglect so much of the reality of life as it is daily lived out by the person.  John 
Henry Newman and Ludwig Wittgenstein, working from a humanist core, give a view of 
certainty and faith which goes a long way toward restoring the harmony of these 
processes by drawing our attention back to the unified starting point of all our 
enquiries, to what is always already there and functioning in our lived lives.   
What emerges from this side by side reading of Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a 
Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is firstly an organic and holistic 
account of how what we come to reflect on as our beliefs are formed.  Secondly, 
similarities in their ways of seeing support Newman as a philosopher with a significant 
contribution to make to contemporary philosophy.  Lastly, the parallel reading 
foregrounds the wide and often humanist scope of the religious mind-set which has 
the capacity to bring philosophical analysis back to a grounding in the ontological, 
ethical and existential concerns which give it dimension and purpose.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is the fruit of a seed sown some years ago during a module on the 
philosophy of God where I first encountered Newman’s philosophy in an article on An 
Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.  By that time I was already a committed fan of 
Wittgenstein’s work and when I borrowed a copy of GA from the college library in 
order to gain a better understanding of Newman’s thought, similarities between his 
and Wittgenstein’s understanding of key issues in the conception of the human being 
and human life seemed to jump out at me with such frequency and force that it was 
impossible to ignore them.  From this experience there arose a lack of understanding 
as to why Newman did not occupy a more significant place in philosophy generally, as 
well as a resolve to pursue a more detailed observation of links between his thought 
and Wittgenstein’s in order to raise awareness of his potential to contribute greatly to 
both historical and contemporary debates in the fields of epistemology, ethics and 
religion.   
 
The issues which I found to be in common, ranging from the conception of an 
existential quest, through our ways of acquiring and using information, and the nature 
of our reflection into these ways, particularly regarding the role of theory, to the 
manner of our beliefs in God, as they come to light in GA and OC, are explored in the 
following five chapters.  Chapter one provides a biographical sketch of each 
philosopher which highlights personal concerns that impacted on their work as well as 
contextualising the GA and OC within the wider frame of the life and work of each man.  
Chapter two is taken up with an in depth reading of OC and supplies the immediate 
context and motivations behind this work as well as structuring Wittgenstein’s overall 
thought there into topics of key concern to this research.   
 
 
          iii 
Chapter three engages in a similar exegesis of GA.  As will be seen this is a purposeful 
reading insofar as it approaches the text with key areas of concern in mind.  Compared 
to the concise form of OC, one could conceivably spend a large portion of one’s life 
covering all the issues touched on by Newman in this work, and a clear focus on the 
areas of relevance to the question of certainty was necessary to progressing this 
particular enquiry.  Ironically this tactic of leaving to one side issues which are not 
immediately relevant to our purpose reflects one of the several key methodological 
points of connection between the two philosophers which are formally identified and 
explored in Chapter Four. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the issue of certainty and religious belief and applies what by 
that stage has taken the form of a Newman-Wittgensteinian methodology to its 
enquiry into what each philosopher has to say on this topic. If raising awareness of 
Newman as a philosopher of note is the major purpose of this research, this section 
highlights its minor purpose insofar as it works to emphasise Wittgenstein’s religious 
mind-set and so to widen the conception of religious understanding and experience 
beyond the hegemony of both systematic religious and atheistic definition. 
 
By way of methodology, what is applied from the very beginning here is Wittgenstein’s 
own method of ‘perspicuous representation’, that is the laying out side by side of two 
things in order that connections might present themselves to the one looking.1  What 
is from the beginning resisted, is the establishing of any causal links between the 
thought of both men, an approach which should, by the end of this work, be seen to 
be one which would have had the approval of both philosophers.  In addition wherever 
appropriate, biographical information is included in support of interpretative points 
made, giving this research a bio-critical slant.   
 
 
                                                          
1
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In terms of literature the focus has been largely on the primary texts upon which this 
thesis is based and most time and energy has been expended on reading and re-
reading and interpreting these texts in order to maintain a faithfulness to the original 
thought.  Also noteworthy here is the contribution made by the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations on the part of Wittgenstein and the 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua and the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine on that 
of Newman.  The most significant secondary texts drawn on are those by Angelo 
Bottone, Wolfgang Kienzler, Ian Ker, Paul Engelmann, Maurice O’Connor Drury and 
Bob Plant, all of which are regularly cited in the footnotes of the following chapters to 
which they greatly contributed. 
 
Having set out the intentions of this research, discussed the layout and methodology 
and briefly reviewed the literature there remains only to acknowledge a personal hope 
that the words and ideas that follow do some small justice to the works of John Henry 
Newman and Ludwig Wittgenstein, my constant companions over the last two years, 
and with whom it has been a privilege to engage.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
‘Affections, Instincts, Principles and Powers, 
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control – 
So men, unravelling God’s harmonious whole, 
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours. 
 
M. Arnold, ‘Written in Butler’s Sermons’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In the days ahead, you will either be a mystic 
(one who has experienced God for real)  
or nothing at all.”  
 
Karl Rahner 
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1. Towards Certainty: Biography and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The importance of context to understanding is something that will be referred to many 
times in this thesis.  It seems proper then to begin a setting out of Newman and 
Wittgenstein’s thought on certainty with at least a brief overview of the life context 
within which that thought accumulated, particularly when the key works on that topic, 
An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent for Newman and On Certainty for 
Wittgenstein, were produced toward the end of their lives in each case.  With this aim 
in mind this chapter will proceed to give a short biography for each philosopher before 
suggesting ways in which, despite great cultural differences, aspects of their 
personalities and self-understanding impact in similar ways on their work.        
1.2 John Henry Newman  1801 - 1890 
The personal tone to Newman’s writing, the sense of an existential quest, makes the 
inclusion of biographical detail all the more necessary in any consideration of his work.  
An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, in particular, exudes a sense of the painstaking 
personal consideration given to its themes towards the end of a life consistently 
concerned with truth and the nature of religious truth.  Although an introvert in 
Jungian terms, Newman was courageous in taking up controversial positions publicly, 
often risking humiliation and the loss of cherished friendship by sharing his less than 
orthodox view of things political, scientific or religious.   He pursued truth not 
regardless of the consequences, but in the certain belief that these consequences must 
be meaningful by their very relation to that truth.  His position was in the first instance 
that of a foremost public intellectual of his time, with all the responsibilities and 
potential for disesteem that this entailed.  In the words of Laurence Barmann, 
Newman was:  
  …a humanistically educated intellectual who knew philosophy, theology, and 
history, and who used these in strikingly personal literary productions of an 
apologetic nature.  He was a highly idiosyncratic thinker whose personal history 
affected every page he wrote.1 
                                                          
1
 Laurence Barmann, ‘Theological Inquiry in an Authoritarian Church: Newman and Modernism’ in 
Gerard Magill (Ed), Discourse and Context: An Interdisciplinary Study of John Henry Newman. (Illinois, 
1993) p 189. 
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The strong personal interest and employment of rhetorical mode can be used, 
especially anachronistically, as a stick with which to beat Newman2 but as this thesis 
will highlight, after we acknowledge the historical and cultural positions from which 
each of us views the world, the truth becomes a question of what we are prepared to 
fight for, with rhetoric being a suitable vehicle for this passion.   
 
Portraits of Newman combine to give an account of a sensitive and studious young boy 
who from an early age seemed cut out for intellectual life.3  Accounts of earliest letters 
home from boarding school reflect an attention to style and a flair for words that 
seems almost unnatural in one so young.  His progression through the British school 
and college system is marked by the same seriousness, rarely lightened by any of the 
usual extra-curricular activities of student life.  He is different, and is from early on, 
aware of this discrepancy between himself and his peers.4  Whether or not his religious 
beliefs are the sole cause of this difference is a matter for discussion.  Certainly the 
influence of his evangelical tutor and mentor, Rev. Walter Mayers, is marked in 
Newman’s own religious fervour, which gave him a sufficient sense of right to be able 
to stand and speak against certain behaviours of his college friends, not an easy thing 
for any young adult to do.  This ability of Newman’s to maintain a position of 
disharmony with the world at large is exhibited again and again in the series of 
controversies which followed his personal assumption of the role of defender of the 
‘true’ (Anglican) faith against the heresy of the age.  This heresy took the prevailing 
form of a pervasive liberalism, whose reception in the hearts and minds of Anglican 
believers was, as Newman realised, made all the more facile by the insubstantial 
ground of a religion born out of opposition rather than position.  With the 
commencement of the Tracts5 in 1833 he began a journey, as he thought to fill in the 
blanks in the Anglican system so that it might withstand the challenges of the age; 
                                                          
2
 For an example of such criticism see David Nicholls and Fergus Kerr OP, John Henry Newman: Reason, 
Rhetoric and Romanticism. (Bristol, 1991) pps 1-12 
3
 Ian Ker, John Henry Newman. (Oxford, 2009) pps 1-54 ; Brian Martin, John Henry Newman, his Life and 
Work. (London, 2000), pps 9-16; J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, (London, 1994); John Cornwell,  
Newman’s Unquiet Grave: The Reluctant Saint. (London, 2010), pps 21-32  
4
 Newman tells how, upon his arrival at Oxford, he was so fearful that he refused to enter his dorm room 
unless the Headmaster accompanied him. 
5
 ‘Tracts for the Times’, the series of ninety publications by the Oxford Movement that issued over a 
period of eight years from 1833 to 1841.  
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what followed was in fact a personal journey of conversion from one set of certain 
beliefs to another, a breakdown of seeming oppositions in the face of a relentless 
historical and intellectual inquiry into the truths of Christianity.   
 
And yet, perhaps, those first vehement feelings which carried me on, were 
necessary for the beginning of the movement; and afterwards, when it was 
once begun, the special need of me was over.6 
 
In his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Newman tells of ‘a new object’ of occupation that was 
given him following a period of travelling away from England, initially with his good 
friend Hurrell Froude but culminating in a period alone journeying through Italy and 
Sicily.7  He became, during this time of exposure to Mediterranean ‘scenes of beauty’ 
and to the treasures of European history, increasingly averse to the liberal cause and 
was filled with a strong sense that he had a mission to fulfil at home in counteracting 
this cause.8  His sense of a task was only strengthened by a near brush with death 
when he fell ill with a bad fever in Sicily.  During his recovery, he felt even more 
certainly that his life had been spared because there was a mission intended for him 
and it was possessed by this exhilarated spirit that he returned home, filled with a 
sense of purpose and ready to begin the fight.  That he understood his mission to be 
divinely inspired and guided is perhaps best supported by the verses, now famous as a 
hymn, that he wrote on the ship home from Palermo to Marseille, entitled ‘the Pillar of 
Cloud’: 
Lead, Kindly Light, amidst th’encircling gloom, 
Lead Thou me on! 
The night is dark, and I am far from home, 
Lead Thou me on! 
Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see 
The distant scene; one step enough for me. 
 
I was not ever thus, 
Nor prayed that Thou shouldst lead me on; 
I loved to choose and see my path; 
But now lead Thou me on! 
I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears, 
                                                          
6
 Apologia, p 51 
7
 Hurrell Froude was one of Newman’s closest friends, an Anglican Priest and early leader of the Oxford 
Movement who died of T.B.in 1836, aged only 32. 
8
 Newman, Apologia, 1994, p 48. 
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Pride ruled my will.  Remember not past years! 
 
So long Thy power hath blest me, 
Sure it still will lead me on. 
O’er moor and fen, o’er crag and torrent, 
Till the night is gone. 
And with the morn those angel faces smile, which I 
Have loved long since, and lost awhile.9 
 
Newman personally dates the beginning of the Oxford Movement to a sermon given 
by John Keble on the first Sunday after his return to England.  The sermon, entitled 
‘National Apostasy’, is a call to recover the ‘authoritative confirmation of the plain 
dictates of conscience in matters of civil wisdom and duty’ that are central to the Old 
Testament.10  Keble sees a nation in the process of alienating itself from God and, like 
the prophets of old, reminds his listeners of the social and moral consequences of the 
present course of action which ‘separates religious resignation altogether from men's 
notions of civil duty.’  Keble also issues a call for ‘perfect public m[e]n’ like the biblical 
Samuel to remonstrate with the people, a call which resonated with Newman’s freshly 
appointed task.  The twin notions of recovery and remonstration can be seen to be 
central to the Tracts for the Times, the series of publications of the Oxford Movement, 
edited or written in large part by Newman, whose purpose was to strengthen the 
authority of the Anglican Church by recovering strong and reasoned historical links 
with the primitive church.11  Paradoxically, these are among the most confident and 
certain writings of Newman, despite the existence of a discrepancy in what he thought 
they were achieving, a Via Media, and what they actually were communicating.  They 
addressed much of the content of the thirty-nine articles, such as those on Justification, 
Apostolic Succession and the Sacraments, all key issues of the Reformation.12  The 
most controversial was Tract 90, the last tract, entitled Remarks on Certain Passages of 
the Thirty Nine Articles, published in 1841, which openly challenged Anglican authority 
                                                          
9
 http://www.newmanreader.org/works/verses/verse90.html accessed December, 2010. 
10
 John Keble, ‘National Apostasy’, http://anglicanhistory.org/keble/keble1.html, accessed December, 
2010  
11
 Newman, Apologia, 1994, pps 51 – 95.  At least one third of the Tracts, published between 1833 and 
1841 were edited or written by Newman.  Many of these were works by Anglican Divines which he re-
introduced into circulation during this time. 
12
 Statements of Anglican doctrine put together in 1563 under the direction of Matthew Parker, the then 
Archbishop of Canterbury, to mark out the Anglican position relative to Roman Catholic and continental 
Protestant theology.  For a full list of the Tracts see http://anglicanhistory.org/tracts/ (accessed 
December 2010). 
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by questioning the consistency of the thirty-nine articles with patristic literature.  The 
strength of Newman’s belief in what he was doing can be seen by his assumption of 
full personal responsibility for the consequences of his treatises; he accepts the 
rebukes and reprimands from both church authorities and his college, conscious that:  
No great work was done by a system; whereas systems rise out of individual 
exertions.  Luther was an individual.  The very faults of an individual excite 
attention; he loses, but his cause (if good and he powerful-minded) gains.  This 
is the way of things; we promote truth by a self-sacrifice.13 
 
 
This period from the beginning of the Tracts to his conversion to Catholicism in 1845 is 
one of great deliberation and intellectual challenge for Newman.  His extensive reading 
of the Fathers and of the events of the earliest church councils, as well as the works of 
the reformers and Anglican doctors all led him deeper into the maze of Reformation 
thought and principles.  What emerged was an increasing devotion to those earliest 
fathers and defenders, from Origen and Justinian to Augustine, Gregory, Clement and 
Leo, and a progressive commitment to a single religious position that made it 
increasingly clear that the Via Media which Newman sought was not a truth position at 
all.  Rather it was one of those tools acting upon the truth whereby it was hewn from 
all sides in a process of sculpting and moulding that ever moved its substance toward 
its final form.14  In this way the Anglican Church was like the various heresies which 
interacted with the primitive church; their positions were definable only by their 
relation to the greater church and were, in the final account, susceptible to judgement 
by that church.15  This realisation acted as a death blow to the principle of the Via 
Media upon which Newman had been focused, throwing all his key ideas into doubt.  It 
was, as he makes clear in the Apologia, a crisis point, a plateau in the journey from 
                                                          
13
 Newman, Apologia, 1994, p 55. 
14
 See I. Ker, John Henry Newman, (Oxford, 2009) pps 257-315 for an excellent summary of Newman’s 
thought in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. 
15
 In the Apologia (pps 113-117) Newman comes to this realisation during a period of study of the 
Monophysite controversy of the fifth century in which he saw undeniable links to the Reformation 
problems and to the various break away positions that emerged in the following centuries.  He was also 
influenced here by an article by Wiseman that appeared in the Dublin Review of August, 1839, which 
compared the Anglican position to that of the Donatists in Africa.  While Newman dismisses this 
particular comparison on the basis that the Donatist crisis was restricted to the church in Africa as 
opposed to the whole church, he was gripped by Wiseman’s quotation of the words of St. Augustine: 
Securus judicat orbis terrarium – which Newman interprets relative to the church as meaning that the 
universal church is, in its judgements, secure of truth. To quote him directly here: ‘...the deliberate 
judgment, in which the whole Church at length rests and acquiesces, is an infallible prescription and a 
final sentence against such portions of it as protest and secede.’ (Apologia, 1994, p116). 
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where he could first glimpse his destination, although it was still far in the distance.  
According to what can in hindsight be identified as his philosophical method, Newman 
determined to negotiate this distance ‘not by my imagination, but by reason’.16  He is 
ever wary of the influence of personal opinion and feeling on matters that have so 
much more than the individual at stake, and strives in the midst of his own confusion 
and anxiety for a holistic view by incorporating in his deliberations as many 
perspectives as possible.   This method is reflected too in his style of rhetoric which 
always details a clear understanding of his opponents’ arguments before proceeding to 
his own.  It is fair to say of Newman that in the application of this method he 
possessed the quality he most admired in others, that of consistency.  Ironically, this 
made his task of following the truth of his intellectual inquiry all the more personally 
difficult.   
 
Nicholas Lash accurately reflects that Newman ‘never leapt anywhere in his life’ and he 
certainly did not jump into conversion to Catholicism without a lengthy and anxious 
period of inquiry and reflection.17  This was a most significant period in terms of his 
later discussion of certainty, knowledge and truth.  His research into the Anglican 
position led him to reflect upon the continuity of truth more generally in a dynamic 
world and the emerging evolutionary understanding of truth as something constantly 
both in motion and being acted upon from all sides which developed at this time is 
central to his later account of certainty as part of a process of convergence18.  During 
this ‘middle’ period (described above) he becomes more and more inwardly concerned 
about the opinions he is voicing, wondering if silence would not be preferable to a 
reactionary position where he speaks largely to oppose the ‘enemy’.   He is anxious 
about the overall status of opinions relative to creeds, remarking that: ‘Many a man 
will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion.  A conclusion 
is but an opinion…to say that a thing must be, is to admit that it may not be.’19   All 
conclusions occur in a context of doubt, something which has become increasingly 
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 Ibid, p 117 
17
 Introduction to An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, (Indiana, 1979), p 17 
18
 Perhaps the best account of Newman’s dynamic perspective on truth can be found in his 1878 work 
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine; see 
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/development/ (accessed December, 2010). 
19
 Newman, Letter to the Times, 1841, quoted in Ker, 2009, p 211. 
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clear to him.  Creeds, however, born out of faith, are chiefly ethical in their concern.  
They codify the experiences of faith so that they might provide the principles of action 
in life lived in community and Newman remains throughout the course of his life 
committed to this understanding of a faith congruent with a certain kind of life, as will 
be seen in the exploration of GA undertaken here.  His concern to accurately depict 
the fluidity of the belief-action relationship is one of the aspects of his thought which 
makes him so relevant to present day discussion.  It forces us to rethink our whole 
notion of grounds and supports an orbital image of truth based on a series of relations 
rather than any kind of hierarchy or its inverse.  Religious justification in this account is 
inseparable from the ethically fruitful life and from a faith that speaks in deeds.  This is 
not to dismiss the existence of a truth but to realise the limits of our judgement so that 
we resist hiding behind a wholly notional grasp of faith.  This seemingly purely 
theological question is very significant because of its impact in so many areas of 
Newman’s life.  He believed in a truth by which all things had a truth position; he 
strove for objectivity based on this belief.  He believed that through the object of his 
faith, he had a mission and with few exceptions his life was consumed in activities for 
and towards this cause.  His is a position that incorporates distinctions such as 
private/public, immutable/corruptible, reason/experience, intellectual/ethical in a way 
which impinges on his key ideas; on the development of doctrine, for example, or on 
education.  What is true and right is evidentially fruitful and, under the influence of the 
faith that leads to this acknowledgment, we can examine this evidence and make truth 
judgements about the things to which it pertains.  The possibility and reasonability of 
providing evidence for faith is one of the main issues that occupied Newman, both in 
the years at St. Mary’s and with increasing force in his later life.  An Essay in Aid of a 
Grammar of Assent is in part the fruit of his thought on this topic, incorporating much 
that was first raised in his University sermons.  
 
 Before evidence, Newman is clear that ‘Life is for action’.  Action, he notes, requires 
an assumption and ‘that assumption is faith’.20  Certainty pertains to action in an 
immediate, ontological way; to act is to behave with certainty.  Therefore, following 
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 Newman, Discussions and Arguments in Various Subjects, quoted in I. Ker, John Henry Newman, 2009, 
p. 211 
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the link made by Newman, certainty pertains to faith and by faith to creed.  Anything 
that is a conclusion is deduced or inferred from circumstances that are themselves 
subject to change.  Faith, on the other hand, has ‘never been a deduction from what 
we know’; rather it is always ‘an assertion of what we are to believe’ based on 
revelation, ‘no one aspect’ of which ‘must be allowed to obscure[s] or exclude[s] 
another.21  If the fight against liberalism is anything, it is against the rule of opinion, 
which is at base subjective and relative.  What Newman is striving for is consistency, 
which he sees as the measure of reality. This is achieved against the backdrop of a 
constant framework of core assumptions (faith) which can be objectively consulted in 
the formulation of both thought and action but which must be supplemented with the 
variety of perspectives that give any object depth and dimension.  To get to the reality 
of something we must, believing in the existence of that one reality, proceed to build it 
up by gathering in ‘the variety of aspects under which it presents itself to various 
minds’.22  In this view any idea or object can, in its unity, encompass all manner of 
aspects, even those that appear initially as dissimilar or even opposing.  It is the 
Anglican refusal of this potential unity, or catholicity that makes its truth position 
untenable for Newman.   It takes one aspect as the whole truth, forgetting the source 
of the aspect, the object to which it belongs and which gives it life.  It is to this object 
that, after much ‘dismay and disgust’ and exhaustive attempts to reconcile himself to 
the Anglican position, Newman finally turned, upon his conversion to the Roman 
Catholic church in 1845.23  
 
While Newman’s early years in the Roman Catholic Church were, though busy, 
somewhat less controversial, his talents and public persona increasingly led him into 
positions where his opinions were required but where, in voicing them, he always 
risked offending one or another party in the growing disputes within Catholicism 
itself.24  In part, the nature of the separation Newman allows between certitude and 
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certainty in GA reflects the difficulties he experienced with acts of submission required 
by Roman Catholic authorities and the actual thoughts and beliefs he privately held on 
matters of the day.   He is initially clear that upon his reception into the Roman 
Catholic Church he sacrificed private judgment but the very idea is problematic in 
actuality, something he later acknowledges.  The most challenging area of dispute in 
the Roman Catholic Church in the second half of the nineteenth century was the rise of 
Ultramontanism and the n otion of Papal Infallibility.  Newman sees that the ideal of an 
authority which is objective by virtue of its relationship to objective Divine truth is 
unavoidably represented in real terms by flawed and even corrupt human beings.  ‘Nor 
does it follow, because there is a gift of infallibility in the Catholic Church, that 
therefore the parties who are in possession of it are in all their proceedings infallible.’25 
However the dynamic between external authority and private judgment is necessary 
to the emergence of truth as Newman noetically sees it, with church authority having 
as its principal function the preservation of unity which is the movement of the many 
toward the divine One.  This dialectic engagement of private judgment and external 
authority is important to understanding Newman’s view of reason and its part in the 
attainment of certainty.  Newman sees conscience, which is subjective and private, as 
the primary experience of God by which the person intuits a judge and a sense of 
personal duty to a divine authority.26  The church is the bodily presence of divine 
authority in the world and requires the submission of private judgment for the sake of 
the progress of unified truth, but submission to church authority does not disconnect 
the private relationship to God or the responsibilities arising from this which involve 
the personal use of reason to decipher truth and to act in accordance with that truth.  
Though Newman from as far back as his time at St. Mary’s was occupied with the 
philosophical subjects that developed into GA, there is no doubt that the extent of the 
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impingement of authority in the Roman Catholic church in the late eighteen hundreds 
and the kind of inner debates that it prompted for him, acted to increase his 
motivation to write his best known work.   
 
 ‘I consider that Time is the great remedy and Avenger of all wrongs, as far as 
this world goes.  If only we are patient, God works for us – He works for those 
who do not work for themselves.  Of course an inward brooding over injustices 
is not patience, but a recollecting with a view to the future is prudence.’27   
 
Newman shows a remarkable capacity at times to sit with confusion, inconsistency and 
even self-doubt.  As this passage from his diaries shows he rests secure in one sure 
truth at all times; that of the presence of God and of divine order in all things.  
Reflection is proper to human reason but needs to take the form of discernment of the 
Divine will rather than the narrow view gained when contemplation is focused by the 
promotion of personal aims or gains.  This neo-platonic view is consistent with his love 
for the early church and for the theology of the Fathers who incorporated such Greek 
thought into their attempts to understand the mysteries of Christianity.   It involves an 
underlying trust in a unifying good will rather than a detached demand for evidence in 
support of one point of view or another.  The victory of Truth is unquestionable for 
Newman; Truth will out and the Divine order will be realised but things will be fruitful 
in their proper time.  Many a heresy has developed from the ‘unseasonable’ insistence 
of a privately perceived truth.28  Equally the church, when it acts to restrict reason 
completely as in the late nineteenth century, in fact contributes to the suppression of 
Truth.   However as noted, heresy has been indispensable to the progress and shaping 
of the Truth and the on-going conflict between private judgment and Authority 
circumscribes the arena of truth, from which dynamic it is urged indefectibly forward.  
The sequence in Newman’s thought then is that the goal of reason is truth, truth is 
divine order and the power of infallibility in the discernment of this order on earth is 
with the Catholic Church (Authority).  While he advocates patience in acting on the 
dictates of personal reason there is no doubt that on occasion he found this difficult, 
particularly throughout the Ultramontanist controversy and in his attempts to improve 
the status of Catholic education, both in Dublin and at Oxford.   His own view of human 
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reason and his capacity for entertaining seeming polarities based on their contribution 
to Truth was the very opposite of the increasingly fearful and temporally concerned 
position of the church hierarchy during the nineteenth century.   As an example of his 
broadmindedness, on the topic of education Edward Said said of his thought that it 
could ‘undercut any partial or narrow view of education whose aim might seem only to 
reaffirm one particularly attractive and dominant identity...’29   In fact perhaps the 
greatest vindication of Newman’s position is witnessed in the conclusions of the 
Second Vatican Council whose pronouncements on the role of the Laity and on 
Catholic education show that his difficulties with Church policy in his own time were 
the result of his ‘seeing further than they’ and the truths that he intuited then were 
borne out, if posthumously.30   
 
On the negative side, Newman’s is a difficult position to maintain in controversy when 
either one party or another wishes to ‘use’ you for their ends.  He is on occasion 
accused of being deliberately ‘unclear’ and of misleading his readers.31  His Apologia 
Pro Vita Sua, prompted by the Kingsley affair, was written to counteract serious 
misunderstandings commonly held about his opinions as well as to clarify the actual 
circumstances of his ‘turn’ to Roman Catholicism for those Anglican friends and 
followers whose opinion and friendship were important to him.  Newman’s stoic 
patience in controversy and firm belief in the timely victory of truth was (and is) not a 
common quality.  It is possible for a critic to apprehend in this view the inherent 
danger of any set of circumstances being indifferently held as ultimately acceptable.  
However, Newman is clear on the authority of individual conscience which continually 
prompts reason to seek out truth and he never fails to use opportunities, even in an 
atmosphere of constraint, to put across his heartfelt beliefs.  It is also necessary to take 
into account here the apologetic style of much of Newman’s writing, in which being 
misrepresented and used is both expected and considered acceptable under certain 
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gentlemanly conditions.  One is not just making a point but making it in defence and 
part of the aim is to take down one’s opponent in a clash of verbal swords.  Newman 
does wonder at times whether the type of public correspondence in which he engages 
pushes him into saying things that go against his nature and it cannot be denied that 
this Ciceronian style of rhetoric in general goes beyond  purposes of mere 
enlightenment.32  That said, there can be no doubt that the historical bitterness 
between Anglican and Roman Catholic communities is behind the unnecessarily 
offensive nature of some of the attacks on Newman, whose position as a convert left 
him vulnerable to both sides.   
 
Newman never regretted or doubted his decision to convert to Roman Catholicism.  
With regard to Papal Infallibility he advocated patience in the sure belief that the 
initially strong move from authority would, in time, bring about a counter measure 
from among individuals and that a reasonable doctrine would be the ultimate result.  
He never underestimated the power of individuals to prompt change although their 
role was often only acknowledged in hindsight, with the overview that history allowed 
rather than in the middle of change.  Though loyal to the Church and the Pope, he 
famously upheld the prime position of conscience when he allowed that: ‘...if I am 
obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, ...I shall drink – to Conscience first, 
and to the Pope afterward.’33   Ker denotes his ‘general theological position’ as ‘a 
cautious openness, combined with a deference to authority’.34   His philosophical 
position is marked by the same openness to unpredictable contributions to truth with 
deference to a unity which would in time make sense of all positions.  He joined the 
ranks of ‘ecclesiastical hierarchy’, whom he notes in the Apologia were historically 
‘mainly in the right’, when he was appointed Cardinal on 12th May, 1879 by Pope Leo 
XIII, having agreed to accept the honour on condition that he be allowed to remain in 
Birmingham and not be consecrated as a Bishop.35  In his acceptance speech on that 
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day he claimed: ‘an honest intention...an absence of private ends... a dread of 
error...[and] a desire to serve...’ throughout all he had written.  He continued to write 
and publish well into his eighties although increasingly only publicly in response to a 
critic or when the situation pressed him.  He died of pneumonia after a brief illness on 
11th August, 1890, at the remarkable age of ninety.      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
This biographical sketch is intended to form a background to the concerns of An Essay 
in Aid of A Grammar of Assent which will be discussed in detail in chapter two 
hereunder.  It brings to light reasons for Newman’s interest in the process of assent to 
truth.  In addition it shows how, in his case, what is believed with certainty is still open 
to change and that the Truth persists in its cause subjectively through the voice of 
conscience and objectively through the voice of Authority.  It gives an important 
overview of Newman’s idea of Truth as something progressive and dynamic, requiring 
both the action of reason and the voice of authority for its development.  It illustrates 
his noetic ability to entertain the coexistence of opposites and to rest with paradox, 
thus giving a picture of reason that goes beyond traditional syllogistic logic.  Finally, it 
is clear that Newman’s task, as he ever perceived it, was the pursuit of Truth which for 
him was inseparable from the Divine.  Insofar as truth applies to all areas of human 
endeavour, so does God, whose intellect can be intuited in the whole order of creation.  
Following the Christian kerygma, Newman believes in the potential of all human beings 
to be instruments of truth and because of this he embraces the difference which our 
ideals, founded in a notional grasp of human life, often rule out.  The compatibility of 
faith and reason which Newman advocates depends ultimately on his view of Truth 
which calls for a consistent trust in a divine good will for the world and a certain belief 
in the graced capacity of human beings to rationally discern it.  In an era where truth is 
increasingly divided and the divisions pitted against each other, GA recalls us to the 
unity and flow we experience in lived life where all is connected to all with a certainty 
that defies scientific explanation. This concern with unity through variety brings his 
reach into our present post-post-modern world which, following a reign of relativity 
now grapples with the same problem.  
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1.3 Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889 – 1951 
Ludwig Wittgenstein dreaded misinterpretations of his work and there is a definite line 
of demarcation between what he understood he was doing and what the various 
schools of thought that claim him either as their founder or as one of their greatest 
proponents, understand him to have been doing.36  For this reason (i.e. the likelihood 
of misinterpretation) and because his work and his life were inseparable, a 
biographical prelude seems important to any consideration of his thought.  The 
combination of his spirituality and his genius resulted in a rather unique way of 
viewing the world.  G. H. Von Wright notes that he was ‘a most uncommon man’ and 
believed that ‘in his later work he had no ancestors in the history of thought’.37  While 
the second part must remain open to argument, it is hoped that at the very least, his 
distinctiveness will be made evident here.   
Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889, the youngest of nine children of one of 
Austria’s wealthiest families.  The Wittgenstein home was a centre of culture with 
famous musicians such as Brahms and Mahler, and artists counted among family 
friends.  Wittgenstein’s own interest in the arts, particularly music, is well documented 
in biographical accounts as well as surfacing in his own work.  His intimate experience 
of the high culture of Vienna in his youth no doubt increased his dismay at the 
scientific-industrialised culture in which he later found himself immersed.  As Von 
Wright notes, his view of culture as in decay was inextricable from his understanding 
of language and philosophy;  problems in language which caused the seeming puzzles 
of philosophy stemmed from problematic forms of life, something that will be 
discussed in more detail later on.38  He was baptised a Roman Catholic although 
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religion in the home was from a mixed background of Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism with Jewish lineage.  Despite (or perhaps because of) high intelligence 
he did not perform exceptionally in school.  His initial choice of career was in Physics 
and Engineering and on leaving school he went to study Engineering, first in Berlin and 
then in Manchester.  Despite his change of career, throughout his life he remained 
interested and capable in this field.  For example during the Second World War while 
working for a Doctor in Guy’s Hospital he designed an innovative device to record 
changes in blood pressure.39   It was through engineering that he was introduced to 
the philosophy of maths, in particular the work of Frege and Russell, and he eventually 
abandoned his original studies to pursue philosophy in Cambridge, although over the 
course of his life he often struggled with the notion of philosophy as a worthwhile 
career. 40   On arrival there he made himself known to Bertrand Russell who 
immediately took Wittgenstein under his wing in a relationship that was not without 
its difficulties.  Russell notes in his biography how Wittgenstein would call to him for 
intense discussions at late hours and, on occasion, in a suicidal frame of mind.41  He 
describes his student at that time as ‘perhaps the most perfect example I have ever 
known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, proud, intense, and 
dominating.’ 
 
Wittgenstein’s first published work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was a work in 
progress when he left to serve his country with the Germans in the First World War.  
He worked on it, despite the adverse conditions, throughout the war years and went 
to great lengths to get the manuscript sent to Russell from a prisoner of war camp in 
Italy.  Judging mostly by his correspondence at this time it seems he went through a 
kind of conversion experience during the war.  He had on him at all times a copy of 
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Tolstoy’s Gospels in Brief which greatly impressed him and he regularly indicated in his 
letters that he had submitted himself to the will of God and was consequently not 
fearful of anything that might befall him.42  This fervour did not remain with him long, 
although he had a chequered relationship with Christianity throughout his life.  In later 
correspondence he deplores his lack of faith and decency but tempers this with an 
implicit longing for a natural or naïve faith or perhaps more accurately, for a non-
corrupt state.43   
 
The TLP was received as a work of genius and is still impressive, both as a work of logic 
and of ethics, though it became for Wittgenstein by his own definition a ladder which 
was thrown away and moved on from in his later work.  Using what came to be known 
as the picture theory of language it explores the ontological and epistemological 
nature of the proposition; how it is a thought in perceptible form and the complex way 
in which it is related to the world, whose system of relations is itself reflected in the 
grammatical rules by which the proposition makes sense.  As well as appealing to the 
visual, spatial and mathematical capacities of the reader it has an ethical appeal insofar 
as it invokes an awareness of constraint, set by the bounds or functions of language, in 
what can be properly spoken about.  In its analysis of pictorial representation it makes 
a distinction between meaning and truth value, that is, it separates that a proposition 
means from whether what it means is true or false in relation to what it represents.44  
Propositions are pictures of logically possible states of affairs whose truth/falsity is 
decided by their correspondence to actual states of affairs.  The quality of 
representation – that connection with events in the world by which a picture can be 
deemed a picture at all and no more or less than a picture – and its accuracy in the 
particular case, depend of course on a perceiving subject.  While from the point of 
view of logic there is much in the TLP that was later overturned by Wittgenstein’s more 
culturally integrated outlook, for example the belief in the existence of a set of atomic 
propositions into whose ‘facts’ all complex propositions can be analysed, it importantly 
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establishes the indivisibility of language and the world, and eliminates the perceived 
distance between subject and world, as well as initiating a new ground of Philosophy.   
A conclusion of the TLP is that the totality of propositions is the totality of possible 
states of affairs and therefore that the limits of language are the limits of the world.  
The answers to the problems of philosophy must lie within these limits.  At this point 
Wittgenstein believed that if a question derives in the world then the answer will be 
found there or else the question is being wrongly put.  This is not to dismiss the 
metaphysical or spiritual; on the contrary, he is merely drawing a line between what 
lies within the limits of language and what is effected by those limits.  His position is 
summed up nicely in the famous last line of the TLP: ‘Whereof we cannot speak, 
thereof we must remain silent’; the fact that this is not how we behave requires us to 
leave the rigidly logical picture and take a whole new look at language which is what 
Wittgenstein’s later work proceeds to do. 
 
It is clear from the author’s preface to the TLP that Wittgenstein believed that he had 
in fact solved the problems of philosophy.  He claims, with the kind of certainty that 
evaded him in later years, the kind that forgets the ever present possibility of the 
proposition ‘I thought I knew’, that ‘the truth of the thoughts that are here 
communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to 
have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems’.45  With 
characteristic restlessness and a determination to immerse himself in real life he gave 
up his considerable inheritance and commenced training as a school-teacher in Austria, 
eventually being positioned in a tiny rural village called Trattenbach.  This new way of 
life was part of a greater transition for Wittgenstein that is part of the path to his later 
work, and much has been written and surmised about the turn in his thought that is 
evident in that work.  His friend Paul Engelmann gives perhaps the best insights into 
his character to enable us attempt to enter into this conversation.  He is clear that 
Wittgenstein saw life as a task and furthermore as a task which would be the basis of 
an end of life judgment.46  This begs the question of belief in a task-giver and judge, a 
source of ethical and spiritual authority, yet Wittgenstein consistently resists any 
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lessening of his personal responsibility for his life and work.  Engelmann wrote a poem 
which greatly impressed Wittgenstein and which Engelmann believed would give a 
right understanding of the kind of religiosity that was involved in his discussions with 
his friend, which is worth quoting in full here: 
Bidden by death’s sombre Angel 
Flies the Soul through depths nocturnal. 
And he leads her to the Judge. 
 
Through dread night, through sick corruption 
Eye to radiant eye they struggle: 
‘Art Thou guilty? Wilt confess?’ 
 
Guiltless was I, guiltless am I, 
Am as my Creator made me, 
My Creator bears the guilt. 
 
Flung into the deepest chasm, 
Ringed by tongues of angry fire 
Burns the Soul and burns her pride. 
 
And the Soul amidst Hell’s fires 
Says ‘Yet He, up there, has pleasure 
With his Angels and he mocks me. 
 
Could I see Him I would spare Him 
Not a spark of flames tormenting 
Which I suffer free from guilt.’ 
 
Lo, a storm on wings descending 
Flies into Hell’s fiery furnace 
And it bids the soul to come. 
 
Leads her into highest Heaven, 
Where the Angels, veiled and mourning, 
Gather round the empty throne. 
 
‘Speak, where is He, veilèd Angels, 
Does He shun me, is He hiding?’ 
‘No, He burns in searing Hell.’ 
 
Then the Soul woke from her vision, 
And it was a deep awakening 
From the dream she dreamed in Hell. 
 
And amid hell’s raging fire 
Sang the Soul: ‘What sears and burns me 
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Is God’s love, for I have sinned.’ 
 
Sound bursts forth from all the Heavens, 
And my hands are grasped by Angels, 
And they cry, ‘God is Almighty’.47 
 
 
 The absconding of agency through the idea of the Creator, using Divine agency as the 
source of the limits of our responsibility for each other and for the world, is in fact the 
worst kind of pride.  To live with this belief is to comfortably live in an illusion, hence 
the metaphor of the dream.48  The hardest thing, then, to accept is the position of 
agent because this implies a responsibility that is unthwarting.  For one who cannot 
simply eliminate the Divine, one who retains the capacity for awe and wonder, and the 
insight that what leaves us silent speaks volumes, the challenge is great indeed.  He is 
agent insofar as he acts but not insofar as he is.  Therefore his greatest achievements 
are at most the very minimum he has to do to justify his existence, his capacities.  To 
fall into the plan of systematised religion is to fail insofar as it is an escape from self-
leadership and self-belief for one who sees further or with greater clarity than the 
majority.49  In truth, Wittgenstein’s kind of ‘seeing’ necessitates a discrepancy in the 
relationship with self and an increasingly scientific world, a disharmony which he 
clearly felt.  But according to Engelmann the properly religious person also realises that 
the world or ’life as it is’ cannot be blamed for this discrepancy.50  ‘Life as it is’ provides 
the ‘conditions for the task’, while the responsibility for modification resides with the 
person.   Engelmann feels that ‘the one who has achieved this insight and holds on to it, 
and who will at least try again and again throughout his life to live up to it, is religious.’  
However, here he also points out a complication:  what if for a certain type of person, 
part of the task is to modify the conditions of the task?  For a person as conscientious 
as Wittgenstein, this leaves him with an inconsistency; the ‘blame’ for his difficulties 
must lie with him as agent but it just may be that, because of the capacity for seeing he 
has been given, his vision is right and the impairment is in the world.  The task then 
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becomes the overwhelming one of changing the world; but how can one man possibly 
do this?  By, to quote Lichtenberg, ‘work[ing] faithfully and actively on that part of the 
plan which lies before him.’51  That part, for Wittgenstein, was Philosophy. 
 
As already mentioned, Wittgenstein suffered from doubts about what exactly his 
‘vocation’ was.52  His search for work that would be best suited to his task and his 
capacities led him from Aeronautics to Engineering, to pure Maths, to Philosophy of 
Maths and Philosophy proper, to school-teaching and gardening, with further ventures 
into the fields of music and medicine.   Von Wright felt that ‘doubt’ was the ‘moving 
force’ in Wittgenstein’s journey and I believe that it is to this doubt of Wittgenstein’s 
that what he was doing sufficiently justified his talents that he refers.53  Clearly school-
teaching was not the vocation he was looking for either.  In 1921, during his time 
teaching primary school children in Trattenbach, he wrote in a letter to Engelmann: ‘I 
had a task, did not do it, and now the failure is wrecking my life…’54    His recurring 
sense that he was failing in his task was the source of self-destructive thoughts and 
agonising self-criticism.  Even when he was working well he was dogged by a fear of 
pride which never let him become complacent.55   
There is, as McGuinness explains, a view of philosophy expressed by Wittgenstein that 
sees it as an indulgence of intellectual vanity, a striving after ‘an angel’s knowledge’.56  
Wittgenstein subjects the vain philosopher in himself to frequent attacks and by doing 
so learns to resist the temptations to such hierarchical knowledge claims that are 
generally incurred in doing philosophy.  There is a tendency to justify doing philosophy 
by making it essential, foundational to all knowledge:    
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For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth – a universal significance.  
Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences…it is, rather, of the 
essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it.  
We want to understand something that is already in plain view.  For this is what 
we seem in some sense not to understand.57 
 
In fact it is only because we have applied ourselves to knowing how to live already or 
because we stand on the backs of those who have done so that we can entertain 
philosophical thoughts at all.  If we were hungry, cold, under threat of attack, 
uneducated, would we be trying to solve the problems of philosophy?  There is nothing 
essential or foundational about it and Wittgenstein dismisses this rationalisation.  This 
leaves him still caught between the strong sense of his task and the search for the 
ethical justification for where it is leading him.   For philosophy to be ethical it must 
temper reason with ethical will and self-interest must be subjected to some kind of 
good or authority outside itself.  The renunciation of wealth, the attempt at giving 
something to the world by educating poor young children, the brush with monastic life, 
these are all part of a battle with the will for Wittgenstein and while he returns from 
this period to the philosophical life, it is with a changed perspective on things, a 
change which is evident in his work from this point on, particularly in its focus on 
seeing and perspicuity.  Anthony Kenny compares the person’s susceptibility to 
enmeshment in philosophical problems to ‘the Christian doctrine of original sin.’58  We 
unavoidably take in the ‘problems’ as we take in language and thus we are all 
unavoidably in a state of ‘sin’.  What is needed is for us to see the light; for someone 
who has seen the light to shine it outwards into the darkness and bring the errors to 
light by showing us the bewitchments of language by which they occurred so that we 
know how to see properly from now on.  Wittgenstein uses this language of 
enlightenment in the preface to his second great work, the posthumously published 
Philosophical Investigations, where he says: ‘It is not impossible that it should fall to 
the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into 
one brain or another…’59  He has worked to correct his own vision.  Now he wants 
philosophers to undergo a conversion experience; to admit that the seeming 
significance of philosophical problems has been used to promote the great project of 
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domination by reason and to acknowledge the part that individual vanity has played in 
keeping this going.  The PI will attempt to ‘modify the conditions of the task’, to 
change the grounds of philosophy, not by syllogism or proof but by example and 
through participation in a dialogue about the world for those who are willing to engage 
with it. 
 
Rather than coming across as an authority, from the beginning Wittgenstein takes an 
instrumental position in the PI.  He notes in the preface how, despite his desire to pull 
his thoughts together in book form, ‘in an order and without breaks’, he found this 
impossible to do, being ‘unable to force them on in any single direction against their 
natural inclination’.60  Here he is in the position of a facilitator: ‘‘I ought to be no more 
than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so 
that, helped in this way, he can put it right’.61   It is a turn from logical to dialogical, 
from saying to showing, employing a method which Wittgenstein later terms 
‘perspicuous representation’.  Here experiences are laid out side by side in order to 
allow links to present themselves to the one looking.62  His interest in St. Augustine, 
perhaps as a mentor who combined spirituality and mysticism with philosophical 
reflection, is reflected in the early reference to Augustine’s representative view of 
language which, when followed through, shows meaning to be a process of matching 
up inner concepts and external objects in a historically dependent way.63  This view is 
then overturned, as is Wittgenstein’s own previous notion of atomic propositions, by a 
closer look at the actual practices of language.  Language acquisition is not a process of 
learning names or building sentences from combinations of stored name-facts.  It has 
far more to do with willing and intending.  For example he speaks of how a broom has 
its meaning, not by our mentally adding together the concepts of brush and stick or by 
our mentally skipping over this step.64  It is a broom because we require and use it as a 
broom.  A ‘broom’ is what I need, it is what works in this context of housework, which 
is the context in which I have encountered it and in which I recognise it.  Meaning is 
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whole, not a sum of parts.  Equally, numbers are not kept in some kind of mental table 
to which we refer, or which is there but becomes dispensable after a time.  We learn 
to count in the activities of life, in the engagement of intention and object.  Numbers 
don’t mean in themselves.  Meaning is a form of engagement, a dynamic experience 
inextricable from forms of life.  We don’t learn language but we learn to use it through 
immersion in a wide variety of forms of life.  Meaning and understanding occur, not in 
some private realm of the mind, but where articulation occurs; in the public sphere, in 
what Wittgenstein terms the language games.  This is not to completely deny private 
experience, only private meaning and the PI puts forward a distinctive argument 
against the possibility of a private language as well as examining the use (and misuse) 
of the terms of private experience, our psychological language, which will be looked at 
in more detail later.    
 
It would be difficult to summarise the PI but it is important to briefly note how the 
game analogy works and how it leads to a different view of the proposition than that 
of the TLP.  Taking the example of chess that Wittgenstein himself uses, even the 
person who has never played chess encounters the carved pieces of wood as part of 
something meaningful and not as a cluster of carved pieces of wood.  He anticipates a 
purpose in their shape and layout.  He has not played this game but he has played 
games and while the rules for chess are different to the rules of football, for example, 
there is something that is common to all games that as players we recognise or 
anticipate.  This ‘something’ Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblance’ indicating that it is 
not something concrete or fixed but rather the occurrence of similarities in certain 
features.  Just as we do not encounter chess pieces as individual objects so we do not 
encounter words or even sentences in isolation but as purposeful and participatory in 
some wider context in which we are resident.  Even naming has no meaning outside of 
the language game.  It is the equivalent of placing the piece on the board in chess; it 
has this particular identity only in the context of the game: ‘We may say: nothing has 
so far been done, when a thing has been named.  It has not even got a name except in 
the language-game.’65 In this case the proposition describes nothing.  It is merely 
waiting for the game to start.  On the other hand, single words may be propositions 
                                                          
65
 PI, 49 
24 
 
insofar as they are understood as descriptions of relations within a game as, for 
example, one builder shouting ‘Slab’ to another and the other going off, fetching the 
slab and bringing it to him.66  There is no one exact structure of a proposition by virtue 
of which it makes sense.  Instead it is by its connections, and by this we mean 
connections to the game and to the form of life, that it gains its sense.  It is a living 
thing.  The proposition in use is like first person over third person experience.  It is 
intimate with its surroundings and its meaning rests in this intimacy, which passes over 
to the realm of knowledge only in hindsight, in being reported upon, in reversion to 
third party mode.  It is the ontological word over the epistemological word, 
contributing not to knowledge but to being, living.  The possibilities of propositions are 
the possibilities of forms of life; the totality of forms of life makes up a whole culture 
but in both game and culture the boundaries are not indelible, either in time or space.  
There is, therefore, no universal grammar, but universal familiarity with game playing 
and sufficient ‘family resemblances’ to enable the transition from one language and 
one set of games to another.  Wherever we go and whatever we do we are players and 
language is in play.   
 
Interesting to note here is that within particular contexts or games, propositions that 
oppose each other can each make a valid contribution to the game, in the same way 
that a black king and white king contribute to the game of chess.  Lars Hertzberg notes 
that there are some games where equivocality is part of the rules.67  We don’t exclude 
people in a discussion about the nature of love, for example, because their opinion is 
different to ours. This nature of love ‘game’ is one of gathering truth where truth itself, 
we allow, is open-ended.  Correspondence-truth in the later Wittgenstein’s thought 
relates to correspondence to the rules of the game, rather than to objects in the world.  
This requires a significant change in perspective on truth and certainty.  Without 
further complicating things we can note as Lars Herzburg does that we enter some 
games in a different spirit to others, just as we enter some games in a spirit of fun or 
learning as opposed to a spirit of winning or losing.  Misunderstanding the spirit of a 
game is another cause of philosophical problems of which we should be aware. 
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The Investigations moves away from theoretical knowledge, advocating instead a 
return to seeing and doing that ‘heads straight for what is concrete’.68  Commenting on 
the TLP, Engelmann  compared his friend’s position to that of Kraus and Loos in the 
aesthetic world, terming them all ‘creative separators’ who consequently ‘arouse 
fierce resistance, since their endeavour runs counter to the deepest instinct of their 
age, which seeks to overcome division in all fields.’  In the PI, it seems that the 
boundaries that logic sets in stone are seen from a real life perspective as more akin to 
a series of integrated circles.  The game analogy preserves difference and highlights 
how unviable it is to interpret one game in the terms or rules of another; we couldn’t 
possibly play gin-rummy using the rules of chess, for example.  Yet by it we are 
sufficiently aware of resemblance so as to be able to intuit a paradigmatic link or the 
possibility of one.  Wittgenstein manages an intricate balance here of reason and 
ethics which acknowledges what is systematic while making a clear place for difference. 
He openly resisted the very notion of great systems, believing philosophy’s focus on 
the rule as a reality in the world to be one of the chief sources of its misunderstandings: 
‘we are…entangled in our own rules’.69  It is more the case that Wittgenstein allows 
room for the possibilities of cultural engagement and evolution, as well as for the 
interaction of forms of life, that actually occur in the world.  Of course we could make 
this kind of mistake with his game analogy where we dogmatically search for the 
‘hidden’ language games.  Wittgenstein anticipates this, reminding us that ‘The 
language games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw 
light on the parts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of 
dissimilarities.’   Later he refers again to analogies as rulers or ‘measuring rods’, not 
reality.70  The analogy between games and forms of life stands to acknowledge 
resemblance and preserve difference in a way that will rule out all inappropriate 
analogies under it.71    We can say, then, that it is possible to observe an inclusive 
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position which is wholly ethical in the picture of language and culture that is given in 
the PI.  A place in our language is merited by a use in the world.  There are no 
unmerited places.  Neither are there any reserved ones.  
 
Having drawn the reader’s attention sufficiently to the nature of philosophical 
problems, Wittgenstein goes on to look at some of the most bewitching instances of 
language use, such as those which seem to involve accompaniment by unseen mental 
processes or those which refer to ‘private’ experience.   The hidden and the private 
occur in our language with such frequency as to make the misunderstandings springing 
from them some of the most deeply rooted original sins of linguistic human nature.  
Yet the fact is that everything that is articulated exists on a single plane.  Things cannot 
be explained outside the terms predicated of them.  Knowing equals grasping or 
recognising in use.  It is not an on-going carrying around with us in a private mind.  
Regarding private sensations, such as pain, Wittgenstein points out that these cannot 
possibly be privately identified as there is nothing to distinguish them.  The possibility 
of identification is the possibility of distinction; that is of standing out from others.  We 
may experience pain and choose not to articulate it but even in acknowledging the 
possibility of articulation we have acknowledged its public content.  Long ago we were 
taught that what emerged from us as a moan or a groan, a pointing, a grimace or 
clenching of muscles, had a place in our language as ‘pain’.  As soon as we recognise 
our sensation as pain, we have re-entered that public sphere that is language.  But, 
one might think, what of private thought in pictures?  Wittgenstein might reply that 
pictures are always pictures of something.  Do we recognise the pictures as something?  
If we answer ‘no’ here we are left with merely a stream of colours and shapes, and 
even then, we would think of them as certain colours and shapes.  Knowing, 
understanding, believing are all cases of recognition; that is of grasping the right word 
in the right context which is simultaneous with grasping the rule.  The language of 
epistemology is part of the language game that involves showing that we can play 
language games.  
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It would be possible to spend a lifetime engaging with the remarks that make up the PI 
and this thesis will make further references to it.  Questions raised there of private 
experience and the language of knowing and believing as well as that of other states 
such as wishing and expecting, were carried on as a natural component of his work on 
the topic of certainty with which Wittgenstein engaged right up to his death in April, 
1951.  The last remark of what was subsequently published as On Certainty was 
written only a few days before he died.   Wittgenstein’s ‘sustained treatment of the 
subject’ (of certainty) was prompted to a large extent by the desire to respond to G.E. 
Moore’s 1925 essay ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ which attempts to justify the 
certainty applying to truisms such as ‘There exists at present a living human body 
which is my body’.72  Here Moore distinguishes between ‘understanding’ a proposition 
as being able to sensibly use it and rely fully on its truth, and ‘knowing what it means’, 
that is being able to rationally analyse it.  The case of ‘knowing what it means’ involves 
the abstraction of the proposition from use by a particular individual at a particular 
time and looking at it for every case of its use, as if ‘every case’ is an object in itself.  
This case Moore finds ‘profoundly difficult’ while connecting this difficulty to a certain 
type of use of the English language.  The essay deals with matters of verification, 
correspondence and coherence in the attempt to consider and grant truth value to 
propositions in separation from the world.   It points out the endless regression which 
is the outcome of the analytic position and reminds philosophers at large that to query 
certain things such as bodily existence and the reality of space, time, the world, is to 
try to hold a position that is contradicted by the very fact of one’s undeniably being 
presently, bodily, spatially and temporally here doing philosophy in the first place.  
Equally the existence of other human beings, the world and so on cannot be queried 
without claiming some knowledge of these things.  The terms grant the existence, so 
to speak.  Moore goes on to distinguish between mental and physical facts and to raise 
the question of interdependence, either logically or causally, of physical facts on 
mental facts.  The whole idea of correspondence between mental and physical facts 
implies a distance between subject and world that Wittgenstein cannot condone.  
However, there remains the fact that we sometimes speak as if this distance exists.  
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The grounds of facts become a key issue in Wittgenstein’s account of certainty.  
Because of his entirely linguistic approach these matters must be considered on a 
single plane which dismisses the ‘depth’ implied in preferential or hierarchical 
accounts of truth.  Certainty too must merit its place because of its use.  There can be 
no question of dependence in a vertical sense, only horizontally across a field or game.  
Equally there can be no regression backwards or forwards in a temporal sense so no 
proposition can be grounded in historical/causal understanding.  Yet, again, we persist 
in speaking as if knowledge had depth in a hierarchy leading to certainty.  The illusion 
of depth is one of the ‘bewitchments’ raised by OC and looked at in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
The biographical sketch must end with Wittgenstein’s death at the residence of his 
doctor and friend in Cambridge in April, 1951.  That his religious attitude was not 
typical of any systematic religion was evident upon the dilemma faced by his closest 
friends on whether or not to give him last rites or hold a Christian service and burial for 
him.73  Even those who knew him best were unsure of where he fitted in from the 
point of view of faith in God, but the very fact that it was an issue shows their 
understanding that he had a significant faith of sorts and apart from the wealth of 
academic work on Wittgenstein and religion, there are many instances in biographical 
writings which support this.74  His unorthodox religious position when set beside 
Newman’s more classical views makes for an interesting discussion on the topic of 
certainty and faith which is taken up in the last chapter here.  
1.4 Conclusion 
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A life devoted to work, an ethical and existential motivation and focus, a real sense of 
conscience and a view of life as a task which would be in some whole sense judged are 
some of the characteristics shared by Newman and Wittgenstein according to auto-
biographical and biographical material.  These features are not at all insignificant to 
the discussion of certainty that follows, which is permeated in the case of each 
philosopher by a desire for congruency between thought and action, notion and reality.  
Also notable here is the emerging sense of thinkers who were ahead of their time and 
consequently often out of alignment with their contemporary culture, something 
which led in both cases to habits of introversion and self-evaluation so that the 
question of motive for enquiry was constantly being reviewed.  Again, this is 
something that shows itself to have a bearing on their philosophical enquiries.  It is 
worthwhile keeping this sense of the personal in mind as we move in the following 
chapters to a more in depth exploration of the two key works under discussion here.   
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2. On Certainty: Mad Doctors and the Reasonable Man 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The comments of which OC is comprised are in large part a response to two papers by 
G. E. Moore: A Defence of Common Sense (1925) and Proof of an External World 
(1939).1  In these papers Moore defends common sense knowledge as genuine 
knowledge and notes, among other things, how those philosophers who take up a 
contrary position are in fact contradicting their own existence and for that reason 
cannot be taken seriously.  Moore makes a number of points which become key to 
Wittgenstein’s enquiry into certainty.  These are as follows: 
1. He makes a distinction between ‘understanding the meaning’ of a proposition 
such as ‘the earth has existed for many years past’, and ‘know[ing] what it 
means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its 
meaning...The question what is the correct analysis of the proposition meant 
on any occasion...is, it seems to me, a profoundly difficult question, and one to 
which, ...no one knows the answer.’  As well as drawing attention to the 
problem of obtaining unconditional knowledge, Moore also highlights an 
unnatural division that the focus on logic and science has brought about and 
against which Wittgenstein will argue. 
2. He claims that certain propositions are true because he knows them to be 
true, inviting a discussion on the topic of subjective knowledge/authority and 
the Cartesian problem arising from it. 
3. He asserts, at the end of the Proof, that ‘I can know things which I cannot 
prove.’  This statement, for Wittgenstein, brings to the fore exactly what is 
problematic about Moore’s approach.  It poses the two key questions that are 
the subject of OC: firstly, what involved in knowing and can we include those 
things that we take for granted in our lived lives as knowledge?; secondly, 
does knowledge necessarily carry with it the requirement for proof? 
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Wittgenstein takes up the enquiry from his understanding of a world which is in the 
way that we say it is.  By focusing on how we use terms such as ‘I know’, ‘I am sure’ 
and so forth, he makes us aware of the vast, inter-dependent network that is reality, of 
the immediacy of the subject-world connection, and of the failure of the positivistic 
framework to encapsulate truth.  The scientific requirement for evidence and proof is 
not nearly sufficient, in the face of the variety of understanding that takes place in life 
as it is fruitfully lived, to serve as the singular means by which we come to knowledge 
of this world.  
 
2.2 Knowledge and Doubt 
 
That Wittgenstein is responding to Moore is clear from the first comment of OC: ‘If you 
do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.’2  Such a statement is a 
gateway to reality and to know one such fact would be to potentially know them all 
because nothing exists in isolation.  To know is to be able to distinguish and this is 
done in the context of a practice or purposeful form of life.  I only know this is a hand 
insofar as I know it is not a foot or a head, or furthermore that it is not a dog or a 
house.  It can be known as a hand only as part of a paradigm, that of the human body, 
which in turn can only be known in the presence of other existing things all of which 
belong to other paradigms or worlds of use.  To know that here is one hand is equally a 
statement about space and time.  In distinguishing a hand here I presently mark it out 
from all that surrounds it; I grant it a place and time of existence at the same time as I 
grant myself, as speaker, a spatiotemporal location.  The only way that here is one 
hand can be known is by a human being, a human body, in a world of beings that is as 
we say it is.  In addition, to utter this thing as a hand is to know what it is to be a hand, 
that is to say to know how it is used.  Therefore if I know that here is one hand, I have 
experienced it as such and in this way I am granted a past and all that that includes.   
To speak at all is to be immersed in reality.  Whether I say ‘there is one hand’ or ‘I 
know there is one hand’ I reveal the undeniable position from which I utter my 
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proposition, that is to say I reveal a world where everything ‘hangs together’ as a 
package and in which my ‘I’ is firmly anchored.3 
 
In this world that is as we say it is, truth and falsity must be attributed by us, the 
language users.4  The determinants of any proposition are delimited by the meaningful 
use of the words in context.  Where there is meaning and understanding there is a 
world of use which sets limits on the range of experiences that are attributable to the 
terms involved.  These limits are the outermost bounds of the language games and 
emerge in use.  For example take the proposition ‘It is raining’.  The word ‘raining’ here 
includes certain experiences; hearing certain sounds, feeling wet drops on the skin, 
seeing drops on the window pane or earth, the darkened sky and so on.  By choosing 
this word to utter my experience I avail of the word’s limits.  I extricate my experience 
from the limitlessness of all possibilities.  I choose the enclosure for my experience, so 
to speak.  But Wittgenstein is constantly aware that all our enclosures are ‘enclosures 
with holes’.5  The limits that fix the truth of what we say are set within the possibility 
of things being otherwise and so the certainty attached to my choice of word to 
express the truth of my sensible and intellectual encounter – my recognition as – is not 
undone by the subsequent expression ‘It is not raining’.  This marks a whole other 
experience as does the further expression ‘I thought it was raining’.  Each time I choose 
words appropriate to my encounter with the world and in choosing these words in the 
particular circumstances I set the bounds within which the truth of what I say can be 
determined.  The bounds of our language games are enclosures with holes, providing 
both the stability and fluidity required for declarations of truth and falsity in a dynamic 
and dialogical world.  By virtue of the hole in the enclosure, the determinants of my 
proposition can be called into doubt, that is to say challenged by the entrance of a 
possibility that I delimited out in my original encounter but which was always in play as 
a possibility.  It is only in the presence of this possibility of doubt that we can claim 
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knowledge, that we can relate what has been with what could have been within the 
confines of the particular game or world of use. 
 
That knowledge can only be said to occur in a context of doubt is confirmed in the way 
we generally use expressions of knowledge.  I say ‘I know’ in order to clarify or 
persuade, for example in the face of another possibility or opinion.  I know that is a 
Laburnum tree, for instance, only because I am aware that there are very many 
varieties of tree, and even of yellow flowering tree, from within which I make a 
distinction.  Or perhaps my knowing is expressed in the face of contradiction.  You 
think it is a Lime tree and I need to show you that it is something else.  Or again, it 
might be a misty day and the tree is a familiar landmark which I identify from among 
several objects shrouded in the mist.  In all of these examples there is room for the 
possibility of the tree being something else.  But in everyday life there are countless 
cases where we never feel the need to raise the question of knowledge; this is a hand, 
I am a human being, that is a tree, the world has existed for many years past, to use a 
few of Moore’s examples.  The problem with applying philosophical or scientific 
analysis in cases like this is that the desire for knowledge requires us to try and bring in 
doubt where there isn’t any.  Wittgenstein says ‘My having two hands is, in normal 
circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it.  That is 
why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it.’6  This 
certainty that is greater than evidence merits a closer look for sure, because on it rests 
the totality of what is.  We cannot, contrary to Descartes, ‘be in doubt at will’ and we 
cannot have knowledge without a context of doubt.7  To doubt in certain cases is 
inconceivable; for me to doubt a proposition such as ‘this is my hand’ would be to 
doubt everything and doubting everything is not possible.  ‘Would that not be like the 
hypothesis of our having miscalculated in all our calculations?’8  This doubting ‘I’ which 
the knowledge game brings into play is always already a body, occupying a 
spatiotemporal location, a human being, in a world of human beings.  This is the 
position from which I speak and I cannot take up a position prior to it.  To deny any of 
this is to be self-denying which is not possible for a self that continues to sustain itself, 
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look after its bodily needs, and engage with the world, even in the form of trying to 
doubt it.  Even as I doubt, I engage in non-doubting behaviour.  Reality is there before I 
know it and I am at no distance from it.  I can say this because I live it.    
 
2.3 The Private ‘I’ 
 
As well as interposing a division between the real world and the world that is subject 
to doubt, the imposition of a need for verification causes another rift, that between 
the philosophical subject and the ‘I’ that is the player in the language game, the 
utterer, the language using human being.  For Wittgenstein, the subject is the linguistic 
‘I’, the player of the language-games.  The ‘I’ is the point of entry to the games and to 
avail of the linguistic ‘I’ is to utter forth from the framework on which it hinges.  To 
enter the game at all is to be part of a consensus which does not doubt certain things.  
That we avail of our ‘I’ shows that we are anchored to the network that grants us the 
(linguistic) commonality we need to be able to distinguish the objects we encounter in 
the world, and to delimit our experiences from within the realms of possibility we find 
there.  The subject is the seeker and the utterer, the one with the intention to act and 
the desire to speak (think) the world according to its needs.  To avail of the ‘I’ is to be 
in play.  The difference between the ‘I’ as player and the ‘I’ as traditionally conceived 
subject is that in the latter case it would seem that the truth of any proposition is 
arbitrarily subjective, as if we each, in isolation, set the meaning of names each time 
we use them, while in the former it is by availing of particular words in particular 
circumstances that ‘I’ set in place the determinants of the truth uttered by them. The 
subject for Wittgenstein is the subject in play and inseparable from the world with 
which he engages.  ‘I’ have an immediate access to the world that eliminates the need 
for evidential, correspondence and coherence accounts of truth, all of which involve a 
‘tallying’ that Wittgenstein dismisses.  Consequently, when Moore holds up his hand in 
front of him and claims to know that here is one hand we must ask where is the room 
for doubt here?  In the absence of doubt we must query the possibility of knowledge.  I 
have had no experience of doubting that this is my hand therefore the experience of 
knowing it cannot enter here either.  Ordinary life bears this out.  We don’t, except in 
philosophical analysis, say ‘I know this is my hand’ because the distance required for 
doubt or knowledge is unavoidably absent.  In a similar way, I don’t have a body; I am 
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this body: ‘If someone says “I have a body”, he can be asked “Who is speaking here 
with this mouth?”9  There is no correspondence here, no verification can or need take 
place, not because I or Moore know it but because in the case of my hand, my body, it 
simply is.  My ‘I’ is the site of linguistic incarnation.10  But the priority we grant to 
scientific analysis continues to do violence to this unity by thinking and seeking in 
terms of correspondence where none exists.   
 
Our thinking in terms of correspondence that is of judgement and proof, leads to 
another problem with Moore’s claims.  When we speak in terms of knowledge about 
certain fundamental ‘framework propositions’ we are led to seek out the authority 
behind this knowledge.  If I say with Moore that ‘I am a human being’, ‘there exists at 
present a living human body, which is my body’ and so on and then claim that these 
are objective facts precisely because I know them, I am claiming along with Moore that 
my knowing acts as the authority for my knowing, implying some kind of split in the ‘I’ 
that is not evident externally.  It points to the existence of a private ‘I’, an inner person 
secreted within the body presented to the world, by whom we run our experiences for 
the purpose of verification.11  Wittgenstein encapsulates the problem as follows: 
Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)?  Straight off like that, I 
believe not.  – For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused.  And 
through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be 
revealed. (OC, 6) 
 
I know because I know I know cannot be authoritative here unless we accept this 
bifurcation and the resulting inner person for whom we have not a shred of evidence.  
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 Chris Lawn reflects on the reality of the ontological immediacy of the ‘living word’ in his chapter ‘A 
Competition of Interpretations: Wittgenstein and Gadamer Read Augustine’, in Wittgenstein and 
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Much more acceptable is the understanding that what there is here is not knowledge 
in the positivistic sense.  What there is is bodily experience, part of which is the 
capacity to assert this experience.  
  
2.4 There like our Lives: The Question of Authority 
 
If there is a speaking, thinking, writing ‘I’ there is a whole frame of reference on which 
it hinges.  Wittgenstein notes that ‘The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs 
to our frame of reference.’12   They reflect the continuity of existence that is our 
human experience.  This frame of reference is the inherited background against which 
we can speak of truth and falsity at all, the structure in which our chain of questions 
and answers, and our speaking ‘I’, is secured.  The framework propositions have the 
form of the rules of engagement that have arisen out of the dialogue of life.  They are 
the points at which ‘we pass from explanation to mere description’ and recognise that 
‘giving grounds,…justifying the evidence, comes to an end…’.13  In actuality, the way we 
speak shows that some things are just ‘there, like our lives’, not doubted and not the 
subject of knowledge in any evidential sense.14  We inherit the earth but, it seems, 
have difficulty with the meekness.  When we try to subject everyday experience to 
scientific or logical enquiry it appears to fail, although in practice there is nothing 
wrong.  This is because this type of knowledge requires doubt and this requirement 
conflicts with our lived reality.  Our insistence on scientific knowledge creates all kinds 
of pseudo-problems precisely because such knowledge has its own terms and not 
everything can or ought to be subjected to those terms.   Immersed within the 
scientific paradigm we want to point to the grounds that support our propositions.  
When we think of certainty as certain knowledge in this way we cannot avoid the 
question of authority or proof that follows.  Consider the statement ‘I am in Ireland’ 
for example.  I can say this with certainty but why and how?  It is beyond sense for me 
to doubt the truth of such a statement for a variety of reasons.  Firstly because it is ‘I’ 
who knows it; this seems to leave less room for doubt than if someone else said it of 
me; secondly, because I have never had any reason to doubt it and have had 
                                                          
12
 OC, 83. 
13
 OC, 189; 205. 
14
 OC, 559. 
37 
 
innumerable experiences that successfully depended upon it, and thirdly, I know it 
because I have it on very good authority, my parents, teachers, the global media etc.  
But none of these grounds rules out the possibility, however distant, of ‘I thought I 
knew’.  Perhaps some historical discovery will show that the name was mis-translated 
way back in the tenth century or maybe the sea will recede so that Ireland is no longer 
an island but clearly joined with Britain.  What would this mean for my certainty?   
 
The fact is that we have our being in a world where anything can happen but our ways 
of speaking are formed around what normally happens or at least what has shown 
itself to be consistently possible.  Wittgenstein has long been clear that our language 
grows up around our practices and is inseparable from our forms of life.15  The 
expression of certainty is part of this language use and therefore similarly conditioned.  
Those experiences (including the experience of something never happening) that act 
as delimiters of possibility, form the bedrock that supports our knowledge game and 
the possibility of a meaningful expression of certainty.  For Wittgenstein ‘meaningful’ 
relates to meaning which occurs in use.  A meaningful expression of certainty is one 
which is useful and such an expression as ‘I am in Ireland’ has proved to be endlessly 
useful for me.  Our certainty, like our language and our behaviour must be both useful 
and adaptable if it is to remain meaningful.  This adaptability is incorporated in the 
meaningful expression of certainty.  The possibility of exception is always part of the 
rule.  It is not possible to doubt or know everything as this would mean the end of 
experience, of life.  The expression of certainty from the point of view of knowledge, 
then, does not rule out the possibility of the expression ‘I thought I knew’ but rather 
can only be meaningful in a life which includes not-knowing.  Wittgenstein tries several 
expressions, most notably the fact that man could never be on the moon, to locate an 
absolute certainty, an enclosure without a hole, but does not succeed.  The fact that 
the example he chooses is one that has subsequently been overthrown only 
strengthens his ultimate position.  As will be seen this position is not one which 
dismisses the logic of science but which asks us to keep in mind its place and limits.  
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The relation of certainty to use explains why the language game supports both a 
conflict of certainty and a mistake.  In the case of a conflict, two people can say with 
equal certainty that it is and is not raining precisely because they know how to avail of 
the word and its limits in use.  This is the basis of their having a conversation about it 
at all.  That one is subsequently mistaken, that what she felt as rain on her face was in 
fact water from next doors sprinkler system, is made possible by these limits too.  
However, when someone repeatedly says that it is raining when the sun is blazing 
down on a dry day, or if the person in the example given here believes that water on 
the skin from any source is rain, then the limits of the game, the rules, have been 
exceeded and what we have is not a mistake but non-sense due to differing frames of 
reference (different cultures perhaps).  ‘In certain circumstances a man cannot make a 
mistake...if Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he 
declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as 
demented.’16  The authority on which our certainty is based is the authority of being 
able to properly apply the rules of the game as they have been formed in a particular 
culture and context.  There is no hierarchy and no transcendent authority granting one 
culture or context of play superiority over another.     
 
We can, as Moore does, talk about the framework propositions, but our talk doesn’t fit 
the knowledge game because it forms the outer limits of this game.  Can I subject my 
existence to any real question of knowledge when it must be taken for granted in the 
very asking of the question?   It seems, if we follow through the question of how we 
know any of these frame of reference ‘facts’, that we arrive at ungrounded knowledge 
but Wittgenstein notes what is more properly the case: ‘… the end is not an 
ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.’17  Beyond knowledge 
is acting as if.  Not knowing, not being able to prove, does not in any way preclude our 
acting.  In fact, this thesis will show that in Wittgenstein’s view the search for grounds 
can hinder action.18  There is a negative correlation here which is ethically significant.  
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Think of the child; for a long time what lies unquestioned governs how he acts.  By the 
time he gets to question things, experience has filled in many of the gaps, that is to say 
action and result has been a sufficient support for further action.  A totally rigid frame 
of reference (complete knowledge) would negate action by virtue of the fact that all 
outcomes would be predictable and progress impossible.  A totally fluid frame of 
reference (complete doubt) would equally make action impossible through complete 
unpredictability and indeterminacy.  The actual frame of reference facts, those things 
that we don’t call into question and which grant us co-ordinates on the linguistic map, 
become the authority against which the individual experience can be distinct and 
meaningful.  We need rules in order for our lives to have meaning in the same way 
that we need grammar in order for our expressions to have meaning.   
 
It is important to note that the rules are not themselves objects of knowledge.  
Wittgenstein realises that much of the implied depth of philosophical problems comes 
from our mistaken efforts to make the rule part of the subject of the enquiry.  Rules 
emerge in practice and we learn to use them.  That something is called something in 
particular circumstances is part of the rule, the basis of our language game.  If I can be 
mistaken or deceived about certain things then the very meaning of being mistaken is 
under threat:  ‘If this deceives me, what does ‘deceive’ mean?’ 19 That some things are 
the way we say they are is exempt from enquiry.  That we are venturing into the 
endless loop of the rule is evident in our increasing need to imagine seemingly 
impossible situations, such as houses turning into steam or cattle standing on their 
heads and laughing!20  When we try to know a rule, we try to make the denoter of 
truth and falsity itself subject to truth or falsity.  For example that there are no 
earthquakes in Ireland could be said to be a rule.  We don’t act as if there are 
earthquakes likely to happen, we don’t take precautions in building our houses or 
roads, we don’t have special shelters, we don’t teach our children what to do in an 
earthquake emergency and so on.  Can we say that we know there are no earthquakes 
                                                                                                                                                                          
communication, because they will be lived and thus made manifest.  In the future, ideals will not be 
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in Ireland?  Can we say the statement is true or false?  What we can and will do is treat 
the statement as a rule and act accordingly.  Our rules are the unacknowledged 
methodologies of our forms of life.  A rule does not withstand an investigation because 
it can’t be checked; think of the offside rule in football for example, or of the times 
tables in maths.  We can never prove that 12 X 12 = 144 but we can use it to calculate 
and this is what we learn to do.  Similarly we can’t prove in any case that the world is 
the way we say it is but we can and do use it, every minute of every day.21   
 
Contemplating the rule in isolation is a fruitless task, at least from an epistemological 
point of view.  Wittgenstein tells us to ‘...Forget this transcendent certainty, which is 
connected with your concept of spirit.’22  Our certainty is connected to the rule and the 
rule to our forms of life.  This is the immediacy that links common sense and truth.  In 
truth, it seems that in my acting as if 12 X 12 = 144, all the ‘mental’ components, 
believing, knowing and being certain, drop out of the picture altogether.  Like Moore, 
Wittgenstein resists the idealist dependency of truth on consciousness.  In a reality 
that is, by the consensus that is language, as we say it is, existence, degrees of 
existence or the truth of existence cannot depend on different subjective mental 
states.  Whether it is raining, for example, cannot be said to depend on whether I 
believe, know or am sure that it is raining.  The only enquiry possible here is whether 
or not I am able to use the term appropriately, that is to apply the rule.  In use, 
however, these expressions function in an authoritative way.  My ability to use the 
term ‘raining’ is based on my experience of rain and of life in general.  What I say here 
is useful in the sphere of action, perhaps to prompt me to take an umbrella or 
persuade someone else to, upon leaving the house.  ‘There is no doubt behind 
practical doubt’ and the appearance of depth in a psychological or mental sense is an 
illusion to trap those of us longing for a puzzle to solve.23  What Wittgenstein is letting 
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us see here is that an important kind of knowing is knowing what is and is not subject 
to enquiry. 
 
What counts as knowledge according to the rule is also determined by the spirit of the 
game and games are played in many different spirits, scientific, mathematical, 
philosophical, theological, general etc.  Knowledge in one sphere does not necessarily 
rule out knowledge in another.  The judgement of events in one sphere by the rules of 
another is a further root cause of philosophical ‘problems’, something Wittgenstein 
often remarks upon.24  When we conceive of knowledge without conscious thought of 
the spirit of our enquiry, that is in an unconditional sense, we pit the different 
disciplines against each other in competition for what appears to us as the single 
ground of truth; the promised land.  We presume that knowing equals having or in 
some way enclosing the thing that is known and act as if the truth is something that 
can be colonised.  In all cases, the constant possibility of ‘I thought I knew’ shows the 
failure of our projects to actually enclose anything.  What constitutes our reality is not 
founded in this way.  Our engagement with life, our dialogue, takes place only in the 
presence of this possibility.  Our enclosures are all, as already noted, ‘enclosures with 
holes’.  These holes make room for the unexpected which we also come to expect as 
part of life.  Any picture of life that does not allow for this experience of the ‘expected 
unexpected’ is not a picture of reality.25  All that we are and do, is and is done, in the 
space of possible confrontation with ‘I thought I knew’.  It is our source of hope and 
our possibility of redemption.  Through the holes in our enclosures a spirit of humility 
and hope is manifest in all our forms of life:  
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something 
unpredictable.  I mean: it is not based on grounds.  It is not reasonable (or 
unreasonable).  It is there – like our life.26 
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The fact that we continue to use ‘I know…’ even in the face of ‘I thought I knew’ shows 
that our expressions have an immediate, present value.  Knowing has the value of 
confirming our recognition of something as a tool within the game.  Knowing how to 
say is knowing how to use for the purposes of whatever game we are immersed in, and 
that is the immediate concern, at least in non-philosophical circumstances:   
If I say ‘Of course I know that that’s a towel’ I am making an utterance.  I have 
no thought of a verification.  For me it is an immediate utterance.  I don’t think 
of past or future.  (And of course it’s the same for Moore, too.)  It is just like 
directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having 
doubts.27   
 
The sureness that is implied in my claim to know here relates to the function of the 
towel and my capacity to use it in the present situation.  The mistake we make is in 
thinking of knowledge as an object to be had so that ‘I know’ equals ‘I have the 
knowledge that…’ for once and for all, as if this knowledge is something that is stored 
in some invisible secret part of the human being.  Our knowing can and does let us 
down but we choose action over paralysing doubt.  I may when lost in the mist say ‘I 
know that is the old oak tree.  If we turn right here we will come to the house’, and it 
may later turn out that I wrongly recognised the tree, but action was necessary and 
preferable to non-action and from that perspective my use of ‘I know’ was fruitful. We 
don’t rest in possible states of affairs.  In the end there is only knowing how to say and 
knowing how to do, in accordance with what it is that we want to presently achieve.  
Saying ‘I know’ can never prove anything.  The kind of knowledge that is functional 
recognition is the basis of the language game.  Such knowledge has its particular value 
within our whole system of saying and doing.  Its authority lies within the remit of the 
authority of the living word.  Wittgenstein asks by way of clarification ‘Does a child 
believe that milk exists?  Or does it know that milk exists?  Does a cat know that a 
mouse exists?’28  We can similarly ask do we teach a child that a chair exists and then 
get her to sit on it?  That something is a chair is the rule in the same way that 2 x 2 = 4. 
What a child learns is not the existence of things but what we do with them.  It is in 
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this doing, in our practices, that the language game, and our knowledge claims, begin 
and end.29   
 
2.5 Justification by Works 
 
We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know...?”  For it is not 
a question of mental processes or mental states.  And that is how one must decide 
whether something is knowledge or not.30 
 
Neither ‘mental states’ nor what we, as a consequence of the unnatural division we 
have created, speak of as ‘objects in themselves’, provide grounds for certain 
knowledge.  To know is to intuit and to be able to apply the rules that spring from our 
experience of lived life.  In some cases, the rule is very much in the foreground; in 
mathematics, for example, we have almost pure rule with verification playing little or 
no part.  In other cases the rules merge into the background.  Psychology, for example, 
operates according to a rule that presumes a formless entity called ‘mind’ which is in 
some way separated from the body and capable of being investigated, but most often 
this rule fades into the background where it lies as the forgotten ground of all our 
subsequent psychological ‘discoveries’ and knowledge claims.  So much in life that was 
‘once disputed’ is long since ‘fixed...removed from the traffic...shunted onto an unused 
siding.’  These things that ‘give[s] our way of looking at things, and our researches, 
their form...for unthinkable ages...ha[ve] belonged to the scaffolding of our 
thoughts...’31  Wittgenstein wants us to see in a new way, that is to see how the rules 
are kept in their pivotal place by the consistency of our behaviours.  In this way we can 
observe that ‘agreement with reality does not have any clear application.’32  With this 
in mind, he turns his attention to the part played by expectation and intention in our 
knowledge claims.  He observes how our finding is conditioned by our seeking.  We 
look for something where experience has taught us it is likely to be found and we learn 
from experience not to look for or expect something in a place where we have not 
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encountered it before.33  We don’t, for example, open a drawer to check for a book 
and when it is not there, open the drawer again every five minutes to check if it is 
there now.34  That we look and the way we look is evidence of our expectation that 
something will be where and how we expect it to be.  Our enquiring is like the focusing 
of a telescope; we adjust it to look at the moon and when we look, we find the moon.  
Quelle surprise!  Wittgenstein highlights here the paradigmatic nature of our 
knowledge.  The way we live sets the paradigms within which our enquiries take place 
and according to which we claim to find things out.  ‘Strange coincidence that every 
man whose skull has been opened had a brain!’35  Or that water boils at one hundred 
degrees Celsius.  Our certainty comes from a reality where how we speak is how things 
are and this immediacy is beyond epistemological justification.  What changes a 
paradigm is living, that is to say experience, not any kind of ‘mental’ act of induction or 
deduction.  What we know is there to be known within the systems we build around 
what we do.  What we do comes first and does not rely on these systems: ‘The squirrel 
does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well.  And no 
more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.’36  
 
Wittgenstein is adamant that the connection between logic and the world ‘…is not of 
the form “I know”’.37  All logical propositions depend on empirical ones.  This 
impossibility of separation is not new.  Logicians from Aristotle to Lotze have put 
forward various theories all of which attempt to account for a divide between first 
thought (awareness of/as) and judgement (knowing) that in practice we don’t 
experience.38   In large part it is only when we come to the Phenomenological 
tradition, in particular Heidegger, and separately from this to Wittgenstein, that we 
find the focus on intentionality, on how our seeking impacts on what it is that we find.  
In OC this is combined with an account of reality that insists on the immediacy and 
unity of subject and world (in forms of life) which makes any idea of correspondence 
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inconceivable.  For Wittgenstein, the mind is not a blank slate, it is not a slate or table 
or filing cabinet at all.  It is the bodily subject, which is part of the world.  The 
connection between awareness, conscious thought, knowledge and this body is 
purpose.  Purpose is focused and this focus is like the analogy of the telescope used 
earlier.  It puts a frame around what it is that we are seeking out; it foregrounds the 
world according to our intentions and our expectations.  A man’s certainty therefore is 
not connected to his knowing in the sense of what he can prove but to the way in 
which he seeks, to his ‘attitude’.39  This is the difference between the philosopher and 
the ordinary man when each is saying ‘I know that that’s a …’  The goal of the 
philosopher is to determine something, that of the ordinary man, to avail of it and this 
amounts to literally a world of difference. 
 
As soon as our philosophical enquiry turns to ‘mad doctors’ or maleficent demons for 
its justification we should hear warning bells.  These are signs of philosophical 
doubting behaviour.  In truth, that certain things are in deed not doubted is essential 
to our enquiries and Wittgenstein wants us to be aware when our talking is 
contradicted by our doing; for example the person who argues that water boiling at 
one hundred degrees is merely a probability, even as he makes himself a cup of tea.  
The fact that we can question things is the surest sign that we are secure in our life.  I 
look, therefore there is a world to look in and something to be found.  What we know 
emerges in our ways of intending and expecting.  Far from being a judgement or 
decision, our knowledge is a reflection of our readiness to act as if things are a certain 
way.  When we say ‘I know’, that is when we use it, there is not the depth present that 
our analysis of the statement implies.  The analysis moves the statement outside the 
language game.  In the loss of context there is a loss of recognition and our words 
become veiled and unfamiliar to us.  ‘Knowledge is in the end based on 
acknowledgement.’40  That is to say it is a response to or recognition of something 
done.  If we take it beyond this we are merely constructing layers around it, so that we 
might have something to penetrate.  Life in no way depends on everything that can be 
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doubted being doubted or on everything that can be known being known.41  What lies 
unsaid, for example that there is not a trapdoor opening unto a lake under where I am 
sitting right now, does not equal what is unknown but what is not useful.  Everything is 
connected to everything else but these relations do not sit about in the waiting room 
of conscious mind.  To bring one thing to the table is to bring everything and this is 
what happens in every act, in every utterance.  This is the daily task of incarnation 
where the desiring human being participates through the word in bringing forth the 
endless stream of life.     
 
It is clear then that our expressions of certainty do not come into existence only in the 
arena of knowledge as traditionally understood.  Neither is there any correspondence 
involved; being certain does not involve claiming certainty.  Rather, ‘certainty is as it 
were a tone of voice in which one declares how thing are, but one does not infer from 
the tone of voice that one is justified.’42  The only justification for our certainty is a 
fruitful life.  This is all the justification we need.  We can curse those trees that don’t 
bear fruit, not pin all our hopes on them.   When we think in positivistic terms of 
knowledge we are forced to accept with Wittgenstein that: ‘The difficulty is to realise 
the groundlessness of our believing...’43  The judgement that such knowledge demands 
requires an overarching judge or authority that shows itself to be absent when we 
search for it.  The form of our lives, however, is one of engagement with each other, 
with the world, based in action and result.  Here, our experience is sufficient ground 
for further experience and for all that we can say about it.  ‘Language I would like to 
say – is a refinement, “in the beginning was the deed”’44  Wittgenstein is on Moore’s 
side here; he wants to defend common sense and resist Kant’s reduction of all things 
to subjective mind.  He goes a step further than Moore by leaving the question of 
proof aside altogether and appealing to a greater authority, that of use.  In the end 
fruitfulness, a holistic human flourishing, is the proper measure of knowledge; the case 
of certainty is a case of justification by works.   
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 See OC, 392 here: ‘What I need to show is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible.  That 
the possibility of the language-game doesn’t depend on everything being doubted that can be doubted.’ 
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 OC, 30. 
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 OC, 166. 
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 Wittgenstein, Culture & Value, (Oxford, 1998), 36e.  Wittgenstein quotes Goethe here, Faust, Part I (In 
the Study).  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Moore makes a distinction between understanding the meaning of a proposition and 
knowing what it means.  This distinction is intended to separate the ordinary usage of 
a proposition from its philosophical analysis, where the latter attempts to know in an 
unconditional and therefore ‘profoundly difficult’ sense what the words mean.  
Throughout OC, Wittgenstein returns to this distinction between understanding and 
knowing, where the former refers to words in context and therefore in use, and the 
latter to philosophical and logical analysis.  He shows that the attempt to make 
unconditional knowledge claims is intricately related to ordinary usage or meaning, but 
confuses the rules that set the limits of that use with objects of enquiry themselves.  
These rules have arisen in our practices and are inseparable from lived experience.  
Central to our misconceptions about what we can know with certainty is a confusion in 
the attitudes shaping our enquiries.  We don’t always look in the same way and our 
tendency to put scientific methods ahead of other forms of enquiry has intensified the 
philosophical confusion around this subject.  Wittgenstein shows how verification does 
not happen in the way that this paradigm sets out and that the games of language 
brought about in accordance with human activities involve no correspondence, but 
rather an incarnate immediacy of word and world that belies all our philosophical 
divisions.  Finally he consistently makes clear the egalitarian nature of a reality that is, 
as he understands it, a level playing field, in opposition to the hierarchical structure 
encouraged by the ideals of pure logic.  In Wittgenstein’s world all walks of life 
contribute to the meaning of life in a holistic way.  This perspective makes way for an 
apophatic philosophy that utilises the wonder of the new and the inexplicable as a tool 
by which to constantly re-interpret tradition, so keeping our enquiries as close as 
possible to the source of their inspiration.      
 
By making certain knowledge an object that can be abstracted from life we conspire in 
making it a weapon of submission and continue a project that draws our attention 
away from all that can be really fruitful in human life.  Wittgenstein’s ethical- 
epistemological emphasis is on using up rather than storing up what we know.  As the 
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next chapter will show this is precisely the focus Newman urges in An Essay in Aid of a 
Grammar of Assent, and with Wittgenstein’s arguments freshly in mind we now turn to 
this work to explore its motivations and themes in the treatment of the topic of 
certainty.    
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3. Newman and the Question of Assent: The Law and the Law that 
is Written on our Hearts. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine Newman’s account of the manner by which we arrive at 
certain belief as it is given in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.1  The GA is in one 
part Newman’s response to Hume’s charge of anti-rationalism against religious belief, 
and to the increasingly positivistic culture which was developing throughout 
nineteenth century Britain and progressively undermining the place of faith in lived 
life.   In another part it is the more personal fruit of Newman’s thought on the topic 
over the course of his life and is inseparable from his personal experience of adapting 
through difficult changes in that life, both in an interior and exterior sense.   Like 
Wittgenstein, Newman wants neither to enthrone logic nor to scientifically legitimise 
common sense.  His concern is with finding a rational space which accommodates the 
emotional and ethical activity witnessed in human life.  His heart is in GA as much as 
his head and it is both of and to the real, rational, emotional and devotional human 
being that he speaks.  The GA is much less concise than OC so while this section covers 
the same concerns to the topic of certainty that were marked out in the previous 
chapter, it does not use the same section headings as to do so would have been to 
force one reading on the other.  Taking for granted Newman’s strongly Christian faith 
which is part of the framework of his understanding, no less than Wittgenstein he 
emerges here as a thinker who is ahead of his time. As well as highlighting links to 
Wittgenstein this chapter endorses Newman’s appeal for the post-modern world in 
terms of his treatment of difference and his understanding of the hermeneutic 
essentiality of our prejudices.        
 
 3.2 Knowledge and Doubt 
‘To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to 
apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded.  The latter is the 
conservative principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its 
advancement.  Without the apprehension of notions, we should forever pace 
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 J. H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, (Indiana, 1979).  From here on references will 
be to GA. 
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round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we shall 
waste ourselves in vague speculations.  However, real apprehension has the 
precedence, as being the scope and end and the test of notional; and the fuller 
is the mind’s hold upon things or what it considers such, the more fertile is it in 
its aspects of them, and the more practical in its definitions.’2  
This early passage on the nature of knowledge foregrounds many of the divides with 
which the GA deals in its attempts to enquire into the structures of human belief: the 
real and the notional, the universal and the particular, the theoretical and the 
practical, the mind and the body.  These are assumptions from within the tradition of 
propositional discourse from Aristotle to Locke, a tradition founded in a representative 
understanding of language which necessarily results in a split process of understanding 
where words stand for things, either ideas or objects, and meaning is a process of 
matching up that takes place in the mind of every subject.  Once the logical sense of 
the proposition has been grasped then it is judged in that same mind to be true or 
false against the background of subjective experience.3  We can loosely say that for 
Newman the first process is one of apprehension, the second one of understanding.  
He distinguishes between apprehension and understanding on the basis that 
apprehension is ‘simply an intelligent acceptance of the idea, or of the fact which a 
proposition enunciates’ while understanding involves the ability based on experience 
to be able to conceive of the proposition in use and therefore in a more connected 
way.4  Newman tells us that apprehension can occur without understanding, although 
it is clear that in both cases, any apprehension either logical or contextual, must 
depend at some point on experience.   He says little more about understanding by way 
of definition but during the course of GA, understanding as it is explained here is taken 
over by ‘real apprehension’ which is discussed in great detail.  While Newman starts 
with the divides of the tradition it is precisely his prioritisation of the contribution of 
real experience to knowledge that results in the much more unified and contextual 
account of meaning that is gained from a reading of the GA as a whole.   
 
                                                          
2
 GA, p 47. 
3
 Here the proposition logically apprehended plays the role of a possible state of affairs that gains its 
truth value via the measure of its correspondence to what must be a non-linguistic reality.  This picture 
is very similar to Wittgenstein’s view of the proposition in the TLP, a view which, like Newman’s, 
becomes altered by an increased focus on lived experience.  
4
 GA, p 36. 
51 
 
If by knowledge is meant obtaining the truth of an experience, GA stresses two ways in 
which the subject acquires knowledge: Notional Apprehension and Real Apprehension.  
Insofar as it is possible Newman deals with these separately.  Notional apprehension is 
part of the intellectual processes by which we work with our experiences in order to 
categorise and conceptualise them: 
‘In processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but 
mainly as they stand in relation to each other.  We look at nothing simply for its 
own sake…without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides.’5 
Newman notes how notional assent is characterised by a move away from ontological 
experience and toward a rational generalisation that loses sight of the real and 
particular.  Consequently what we claim as knowledge from within this sphere is often 
‘gratuitous idealism’ or the result of a tendency to ‘draw the individual after the 
peculiarities of his type’.6  However, Newman’s experience is that notional assent no 
less than real assent is immediate and unconditional, not part of a process of inference 
or deduction, and he has to struggle to make the fluidity of the real life process clear 
against the traditional account which isolates the ‘notional’ proposition from its 
connection to particular events.7  By his separation of assent and inference he is trying 
to establish that our assent does not depend solely on logical evaluation but arises out 
of ontological commitments from which we are never detached.  These commitments 
are the equivalent of the natural prejudices and passions which Husserl through the 
emerging project of phenomenology would later devote himself to removing.  
Newman does succeed in positing a negative correlation between inference and assent 
which is significant to the overall discussion of certainty, noting that ‘…when inference 
is clearest, assent may be least forcible, and when assent is most intense, inference 
may be least distinct…’8  This ties in with the personal and passionate nature of assent 
as Newman understands it and as life exhibits it.  We are rarely certain because we 
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 GA, p 44 
6
 GA, p 45-46 
7
 Wittgenstein experienced similar difficulties in the TLP, which told of atomic facts or stand-alone basic 
propositions into which all complex propositions could be broken down.  He revised this view of 
language in his later work (Philosophical Investigations) which relates meaning to context and admits 
the impossibility of any proposition having independent meaning.  
8
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have worked something out by syllogism and are most often certain of the things we 
set out to prove.9   
 
Our notional propositions are formulaic in character, providing us with the rules for 
our descriptions of the particular.  Because by their nature they are a generalisation of 
the particular, when it comes to their application in an individual instance they will 
always be found to be to some degree inexact.  This is the ‘economy’ of truth 
necessary for unpredictable human life at the real and individual level.10  We must 
acknowledge the ‘catachrestic margins’ of our systematic reductions while 
acknowledging that this ‘is, and ever must be, the popular and ordinary mode of 
apprehending language.’11  It is also, according to Newman in a pre-figuring of 
Husserl’s ‘naïve attitude’, the scientific mode.  As already noted, he refers to how it is 
that we see only aspects of things.  Our notions or rules are built on these aspects and 
consequently, not embodying the fullness of things, they allow for the coming together 
of seeming incompatibilities on this plane of abstraction.  They also make room for 
mistakes.   Newman uses the example of our saying that straight lines cannot enclose a 
space, commenting that: ‘I have defined a straight line in my own way at my own 
pleasure; the question is not one of facts at all, but of the consistency with each other 
of definitions and their logical consequences.’12  While we should have to query the ‘in 
my own way at my own pleasure’, what is being acknowledged here is that in our 
seeming agreement with rules set at a general level, there is always room for 
difference at the level of the particular.  Our assent to the rule is our 
acknowledgement of consistent behaviour.  From it we derive the logical tendency to 
look where we expect to find, within notional bounds set by our experience, but this 
does not rule out the unexpected and unique altogether.  The rule carries within it the 
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 Tallmon, J., ‘Newman’s Contribution to Conceptualizing Rhetorical Reason’ in Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 25 (1995): 197-213) notes that this is Newman’s own starting point for his enquiry into 
certitude – i.e. he is confident that human beings do hold with certainty many things in spite of  a lack of 
scientific proof. 
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 GA, p 56.  Newman borrows this term from Theology, where it means a less than whole but sufficient 
for use picture of something; an approximation at something that cannot be fully pinned down.  
However, in relation to the study of probability it is meaningful also.  The 18
th
 Century mathematician, 
Thomas Bayes, set out a law dealing with this distance between notional or statistical accounts and real, 
particular situations which developed into Bayes theorem.  Baysian mathematics influenced Hume but 
also Ramsey who in turn was a noted influence on Wittgenstein.   
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possibility of exception; thus our logical mode of reason exhibits its attachment to our 
emotional and practical modes and our notional assent is kept subservient to real life 
experience.  Again, in terms of sight, Newman is noting how any account of the world 
or the object given from the calculations of any one single mode of reason will 
necessarily have a blind spot.  This leaves room for imagination, faith and (as in 
Wittgenstein’s account) trust, to play a role in real and less than predictable human 
life. 
 
That we do have faith in many circumstances seems to be the case.  Under the heading 
of ‘credence’ Newman speaks about ‘spontaneous assent’ in the case of all those 
things we don’t question or doubt in our daily lives; what he calls ‘the furniture of the 
mind’ and the ‘rich and living clothing’ upon which we build the rest of our 
discussions.13  The phrase ‘spontaneous assent’ in such a context seems paradoxical, 
another anomaly forced upon him by the divisions of propositional logic.  In a similar 
way under the title ‘presumption’ he includes all those things that we don’t question 
about our reasoning processes such as their aim at truth, their reliability and so forth.  
He makes an important point here when he says ‘It seems to me un-philosophical to 
speak of trusting ourselves.  We are what we are, and we use, not trust our 
faculties…our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or assent.’  As 
Wittgenstein put it some things are just there like our lives.  There are many things 
into which we don’t enquire but as acceptance of them seems necessary to the 
propositional chain it becomes necessary in Newman’s account to include a category 
of assent to cater for them.14  He is clear that he is speaking about things commonly 
understood to be the case;  he makes the point that such assents ‘… are, in each of us, 
not indeed personal, but national characteristics’.   However, the means by which we 
move from private and personal judgment to ‘mutual understandings’ and the ‘means 
of co-operation’ between men and women at this cultural level is not explained.  How 
is it that we all agree in our private judgement?  In the end he categorises such 
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 All references in this paragraph are from GA, pps 60 – 75. 
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 Because he maintains, to a degree, the divisions associated with the tradition, Newman’s 
understanding here resists complete relativism and the all-encompassing view of the subjective 
hermeneutic that comes into being with Heidegger.  See C. Larmore, ‘Tradition, Objectivity, and 
Hermeneutics’ in B. R. Wachterhauser, Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, (New York, 1986) pps 
147-165, for a detailed discussion on the hermeneutic/historical watershed.    
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information as knowledge-in-use in a way that implies it is knowledge in hindsight 
rather than knowledge held in our mental store, for want of a better expression, while 
still claiming it under notional assent.  It is an example of the kind of struggle involved 
in the unnatural separations warranted by the methods of traditional logic.  There is 
firstly the separation of object and subject from their unifying context.  Secondly, 
reason is split into abstract and functioning reason which then in a third division gives 
the appearance of two kinds of knowledge; knowledge why (theoretical/causal) and 
knowledge that/how (practical).  That knowing how to proceed in lived life does not 
evidence the kind of jarring implied by the mental steps in the logical account secures 
the problem with this account that Newman will seek to overcome with his proposal of 
the illative sense.     
 
If notional assent pertains to the categories and limits of knowledge then real assent is 
concerned with what we do.  In the processes of real assent as Newman treats of them 
separately, we are dealing with the becoming of the rule.  Use makes things real.  
Having a consistent place in life concretises notional objects and gives them dimension 
according to Newman.15  Life and action promote acceptance of our beliefs in a circular 
way.  Life converts us to the object; for example a piece of poetry or scripture or 
political ideology that we could perhaps have quoted by heart, can become deeply and 
poignantly meaningful in certain life contexts: ‘But let his heart at length be ploughed 
by some keen grief or deep anxiety, and scripture is a new book to him.’ (p 80)  I may 
grasp the sense of the proverb ‘a stitch in time saves nine’ but an experience may bring 
it home to me in a very real and meaningful way.  Real assent is wholly subjective, 
involving will, passion and most importantly, imagination.  Reality is the engagement 
of subject with world in a process of refraction that is no guarantee of truth.  No 
matter how vividly we apprehend something it still may or may not be the case: ‘A 
proposition, be it ever so keenly apprehended, may be true or may be false.’16  There is 
still something untouchable about the world here that is in keeping with the empirical 
tradition and which we can recognise in the early Wittgenstein.  Hence Newman’s 
correlation of real assent and imagination, where imagination is the ability to conceive 
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of the possibility of something being true without it necessarily being so.  This is 
creative imagination, which can stimulate the passions and prompt actions.  It is 
knowledge not held passively in the mind but directed to action on the strength of 
consistency and probability, but without recourse to law. 17   In Newman’s 
understanding logical or causal predictions based on an appeal to experience are in the 
end only equivalent to hypotheses accounting for the lack of experience.  ‘The 
confusion is a fact, the reasoning processes are not facts.’18  We must beware, in our 
desire to systematise, not to double up on the confusion by treating the rules as 
objects in themselves.   In what is essentially a Humean view, Newman stresses the 
power of imagination to describe or image the object on the basis of experience rather 
than to ascribe to it reasons and so subject it to laws and criteria of causation.19  
Through imaginative reason we do encounter the particular, albeit still within bounds 
set by subjective experience.  But as already noted these bounds are soft margins 
which can and do make way for the new and different.  What better to make way for 
the new than the unique subject?  Real assent may be given in an individual situation 
and conflation that may never be accounted for statistically.  This is the advantage of 
Newman’s essentially private and historical subject over the still to come nameless and 
faceless Dasein of the hermeneutic turn.20 
 
While he tries to maintain the line between real and notional propositions, real and 
notional objects, real and notional apprehension and assent, Newman encounters 
continual difficulty with finding the boundaries on each side.  Part of this problem rests 
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 St. Paul’s distinction between ‘the law’ and ‘the law that is written in our hearts’ (Romans, 2:14) 
springs to mind here.  Wittgenstein also read St. Paul with interest (e.g. Culture and Value, 1998, p 35) 
and there is in both accounts of certain belief this tendency towards the laws that are inscribed on us by 
life as it is lived by the whole person, in community, over those that are systematically imposed on us 
and to which we pay lip service only.  For an interesting discussion pertinent to this weighting of reason 
see Denis McManus’ soon to be published article, ‘Heidegger, Wittgenstein and St. Paul on the Last 
Judgment: On the Roots and Significance of the “Theoretical Attitude”’, forthcoming in the British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy.   
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 Newman reminds us that our understanding of causation and the laws of nature are in the end 
founded in ‘assumed analogy’ – that this intuition of likeness is the extent of their (seemingly scientific) 
reliability (GA, p 74).   
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 Actually Heidegger is closer to Newman than this sentence implies, positing as he does a strong link 
between Dasein’s creative freedom and the acceptance of what he calls his ‘heritage’. Both have a sense 
of the essential-constitutional element of the historical-temporal location of the human being. See M. 
Wheeler, ‘Historicality and Historizing’ in ‘Martin Heidegger’ (SEP, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/#HisHis accessed Oct, 2012. 
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in the high dependency on personal experience; he admits that what is grasped as 
notional for one man may be ‘really’ understood by another and that an individual may 
quite often apprehend the same proposition in both ways at the same time.  It is 
impossible, then, for Newman to say what portion of our certitude actually resides in 
what is represented by the words of the proposition; what is verifiable, objective fact 
in any particular case.  Consequently he is keen to stress the greater strength of real 
apprehension, a strength which is measurable by results.  Real apprehension and 
assent leads to real action and consequences.  Life is the test of knowledge and the 
denouncer of ‘vague speculations’.21  Consistency of experience becomes the chief 
measure of reality for Newman.  Those objects that most regularly and repeatedly 
impress themselves upon us literally leave an impression upon us that is true to their 
nature and being; in this way we can come to know them in themselves, or really. So 
experience gives depth or concreteness to our apprehensions by affirming them as 
dependable representations of the way things are. 22   Assent, defined as our 
unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true, is in this way grown into rather than 
logically arrived at, and really only comes to our awareness in hindsight, in a notional 
process of enquiry.  
 
In Newman’s way of conceiving the process, knowledge is the subjective apprehension 
of objective truths;  hence the distinction made by him between certitude and 
certainty, where certitude is an (epistemic) state of subjective mind in relation to a 
particular proposition while certainty is a property of the ‘external’  or objective 
event.23   However, Newman recognises that the subject is always partially sighted, 
limited by the operation of his senses and the accidents of his experience to 
apprehending only aspects of things.  Consequently, subjective knowledge always has 
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 Again, as in Wittgenstein’s account, we encounter the problem of depth which is characteristic of the 
failure of ontological difference to, to quote Heidegger, ‘protrude … in the linguistic form’ (Heidegger in 
McManus, 1995, p 19). 
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 GA, p 162.  Here Newman makes the following distinctions: ‘…let the proposition to which the assent 
is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces is to be, that is, objectively true as well as 
subjectively;- then the assent may be called a perception, the conviction a certitude, the proposition or 
truth a certainty, or thing known, or a matter of knowledge, and to assent to it is to know.’  Tallmon is 
clear that for Newman ‘…certitude is a subjective perception about the truth of a proposition and 
certainty is an objective statement about the truth value of a proposition.’ See Tallmon, J., ‘Newman’s 
Contribution to Conceptualising Rhetorical Reason’ in Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 1995, 25:197-213, p 
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margins for error.  This is part of a proto-phenomenological discourse on sight that 
runs through GA, referring to the fact that our seeing is always limited to aspects in 
time and place and conditional upon personal experience.  Complete knowledge/truth 
in this view is always beyond us and greater than us, fulfilled only by an omniscient and 
transcendent God, whose presence is naturally made known to us through the 
workings of conscience.24  By acknowledging the limitations of our possibility of 
knowledge Newman makes it conceivable that our assent to the truth of propositions, 
our certitude, can be wholehearted and complete even though we have previous 
experience of what we believe whole-heartedly being later overturned.  
 
Newman’s inheritance from Locke is clear throughout GA.25  However he does dispute 
with him on one specific point on the nature of certain assent.  Locke ties inference 
and assent together suggesting that certainty is built up by logical degrees, that is by a 
series of little proofs adding up to big proofs, while Newman insists on the 
unconditional and often spontaneous nature of assent as given by rational human 
beings in everyday life.26  The question being left out here is of course whether in 
many cases we have a process of assent at all.  Newman tries to move away from 
Locke and from logic to rhetoric but in the end he still allows the bounds of 
propositional logic to restrict the discourse.  Unconditional and spontaneous 
acceptance of a proposition leaves no room for the two-step process of apprehension 
and judgement which logic seems to require.  We are left with an ontological versus 
epistemological time delay, when what happens ‘forward’ is examined backwards.  
What is needed is a framework within which to speak of ontological knowledge or 
knowledge in play.  Newman is closer to Wittgenstein than to Locke here by 
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 The role of conscience is discussed in more detail on pages 97-113  of this thesis. 
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 Newman says of Locke’s view of assent that ‘…he affirms and sanctions the very paradox to which I 
am committed myself.’ (GA, p 137)  For a detailed comparison of the views of Locke and Newman on the 
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acknowledging that the grounds we assume upon reflection don’t appear to operate in 
life.  There is an immediacy that pure logic cannot adequately explain.  Even the word 
‘assumption’ signifies a thought process or step that is not evidently taken in the 
everyday situation.  This ontological knowledge is essentially what Husserl is looking 
for also and what Phenomenology tries to describe but which can never be a prejudice 
free, ahistorical perception.  The position Newman adopts in the GA uses the terms of 
recognition, namely consistency, probability and spontaneous assent, to loosen up the 
bonds of logic coming from Locke in order to let us see past the mode of reason that 
insists on the steps of pure logic.  He brings us toward an ontology of reason itself, we 
might say, where practice evolves the bounds of theory from the inside.  Newman says 
as much against Locke’s theory which declares the strength of an assent to be 
positively related to the strength of the inferences leading to it.  Locke rejects as 
irrational assents that go beyond inferential evidence but Newman introduces a 
perceptible shift in grounds by insisting that ‘The practice of mankind is too strong for 
the antecedent theorem, to which he is desirous to subject it.’27   
 
Newman wants to clear spontaneous assent of rationally negative connotations of 
mere mimicry or repetition while keeping to the fore its unconditionality.  This 
unconditionality is not just cognitive but contextual.  He tells us that ‘the 
circumstances of an act, however necessary to it, do not enter into the act itself.’28  
There is an analogy to be observed between the way that an act rules out every other 
possibility of being/doing and the way an act of assent rules out every other possibility 
of believing.  What is present in our belief is not ‘a positive resolution in the party 
believing never to abandon that belief’ – assent explicitly rules out a resolution of this 
kind.  What is present in the state of believing is ‘the utter absence of all thought, or 
expectation, or fear of changing.’ 29   These are the subjective conditions of its 
unconditionality.  Belief in the truth of something is characterised by this fearlessness.  
We can go so far as to say that for Newman, fear is the ontological opposite of truth, 
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falsity being its logical opposite.30  Squaring this un-conditionality with truth on an 
objective level brings new difficulties.  Our certitude is no guarantee of certainty, and 
here we begin to weave through the difficult distinction between truth and knowledge 
in Newman’s account.  Certitude is ‘…the perception of a truth with the perception 
that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing as expressed in the phrase “I know 
that I know…”.31  Certainty refers to what is objectively there and unassailably true in 
its holistic existence but which we perceive only in aspects.  According to Newman 
‘…what is once true is always true, and cannot fail, whereas what is once known need 
not always be known, and is capable of failing.’32  Newman’s picture ultimately rests on 
subjective belief in a transcendent consciousness that guarantees the objective and 
infallible truth position.  Consequently he draws throughout GA on natural theology, 
making an analogy between the methods of Natural Theology which reveal aspects of 
God through our sense of conscience and of awe and wonder, and those of Empiricism 
where aspects of the truth of how things are in the world are revealed through the 
encounter of the senses with objects in the world.33  It is humanity’s essential 
blindness to the thing in itself, where the empirical tradition meets the Gospel 
tradition, that makes it possible for each of us to be personally convinced of differing 
truths.  Knowledge, therefore, is truth curtailed by the limits of subjective perception.  
Certitude is belief in a particular truth to such a degree that we will act as if it is true 
and that we are prepared to defend it as knowledge.   
 
It is appropriate before finishing this sub-section to see what Newman has to say about 
doubt.  Very early in GA, he makes a place for doubt as one of three mental acts or 
attitudes toward a proposition.34  Doubt is the mental attitude related to inference and 
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conclusion and thus part of the process of logical reasoning, and Newman summarily 
dismisses it as surplus to his requirements in this work which will focus on ‘concrete 
matters’.  For Newman, the closer we get to the concrete, the further away we are 
from doubt.   Philosophical doubt can happen at the level of abstraction but not in 
midst of experience.35  Later on in speaking of self-doubt he dismisses this too with the 
practically wise statement that ‘…we use, not trust our faculties…’36   In lived reality 
such scepticism has no place – our being and doing has an immediate, functioning 
truth that cannot be proved, denied or doubted.  Newman is aware that in order to 
doubt something we must have already acknowledged its presence; our doubt stands 
on top of something that is already there.  Equally, to be certain implies that we have 
acknowledged the room for doubt: ‘To say that a thing must be is to admit that it may 
not be.’37  In going beyond doubt in this way, certain belief shows itself to be more 
than a calculation from evidence; it combines reason and passion.  It is this latter 
dimension of certitude that makes it difficult for us to categorise doubt as it’s opposite.  
The relationship is asymmetrical and while Newman does speak of not-doubting as an 
inverse form of assent he also makes a distinction between being ‘merely without 
doubt’ and being certain, the nature of which is captured by the addition of the word 
‘merely’ here.38  Being without doubt is poorer for a lack of devotion or impassioned 
commitment, despite the equality that might exist at the level of logic.  Newman the 
empiricist relies on warm-blooded experience to dispel abstractions from common 
sense.  In the majority of cases doubt is not an issue for the engaged subject and 
although he doesn’t go so far as to say it, there is no other kind.  Philosophical 
scepticism is evidence of a certain kind of life which in the end overturns it.  Newman 
makes the noteworthy point, in a later distinction between investigation and inquiry, 
that doubt is no more than part of the methodology of logical investigation, where we 
argue from belief for the purposes of persuasion or in the face of contradiction.  We 
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tend to understand doubt as calling the object into question when in fact it represents 
a challenge to our belief which, for Newman, leaves the truth of the object untouched.  
Genuine doubt, if we can allow such a term, belongs to the province of inquiry which 
stems from the not-knowing or wondering subject as opposed to the sceptical one.   
 
3.3 Justification by Faith in Action 
The difficulty with the mix of heart and reason that Newman wishes to cater for is 
perhaps most evident in his discussion of justification.  To assert that certitude is 
justified belief while also maintaining the claim to the unconditionality of assent is a 
task that would frighten anyone less than an accomplished theologian, comfortable 
with paradox!  He has already made it clear that certitude is assent that has been 
reflected upon so we may take this self-consciousness of knowing as the first condition 
of justified belief.  The reflection occurs after the initial acceptance of the truth of the 
proposition and is concerned with investigating that truth.  Most of our assents are 
simple and are our responses to our environment as ‘emotional and moral’ 
creatures.39  They are immediately concerned with our acting and doing – Newman 
calls them operative – and this requires of them that they be immediate and 
unquestioned.  He stipulates that certitude requires a further conscious judgement 
upon these simple assents in order to satisfy the intellectual component of our nature.  
Reflection necessitates a time delay between doing and judging that is evident in 
Newman’s two step account which puts the doing (the real) first.  Therefore the 
judgement never quite touches reality but relates to the propositional picture of it that 
comes from our reflection.  As a combination of both operative assent to a state of 
affairs, and reflective assent to the truth of that first assent, certitude draws real and 
notional, instinctual and logical, together in a mutual and dialogic process of 
justification which reflects the unity of actual human life.  To use one of Newman’s 
examples, the proposition ‘the cholera is in the midst of us’ understood and acted 
upon serves very well as a principle of action.40  The proposition ‘that the cholera is in 
the midst of us is beyond all doubt’ is strategically different, compounding the state of 
things and rational confirmation of the state of things in a way that implies checking 
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has taken place.  It is an interesting example in light of what Newman, in a way that 
may be interpreted as pre-empting Wittgenstein’s warnings against bewitchment by 
language, subsequently says about the negative correlation between action and 
notional assent.  The logical demand for justification may have us changing what were 
‘realities for our imagination’ into ‘little more than notions’ and we may find ourselves 
‘hampered by involuntary questionings, as if we were not certain, when we are.’41  The 
more attention we give to the notional and justificatory process, the less we actually 
do and the more rigid we become in a world that requires us to be flexible.  Here the 
first proposition may have us running around effecting what we can to protect 
ourselves and our community.  In the time spent coming to the conclusion reached in 
the second proposition the cholera may have already claimed us!  Of course one could 
say that without the second we may act rashly and under false understanding and so 
waste our time, energy and resources; either way there is a serious ethical question at 
the heart of this seemingly semantic discussion.  Ultimately we need both the 
imaginative capacity to grant that events are a certain way and the logical capacity to 
reflect upon and investigate the truth of those events.  When one or other takes over 
we hinder effective ethical action, either by a premature demand for justification or by 
rash and wasteful action.   
 
This section of GA highlights what will be discussed in the following chapter as a key 
concern of both Newman and Wittgenstein, which is the development of an ethics of 
enquiry.42   Newman observes our tendency, in light of the promotion of reason, to 
‘throw ourselves out of our habits of belief into a simply dispassionate frame of mind’ 
thereby throwing the door open to ‘vague antecedent improbabilities…merely what is 
strange or marvellous in certain truths, merely the fact that things happen in one way 
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and not in another, when they must happen in some way’.43  The resulting seeming 
strangeness disturbs us and we endeavour to interpret it through the framework we 
naturally have by forming comparisons and analogies where none are actually 
appropriate.  If we focus on what actually happens rather than spending ourselves on 
over-analytic reflection upon all those things which we can conceive of as potentially 
having been the case, we could avoid the deep and enticing labyrinths of false 
systematisation and return ourselves to the sphere of ethical action.44  It is in this 
sphere of the present event that our certitude gains what upon logical reflection 
seems impossible: its infallibility.  Newman tells us that ‘A certitude is directed to … [a] 
particular proposition, it is not a faculty or gift but a disposition of mind relatively to a 
definite case which is before me.’45   It carries us along in the flux of life where we 
cannot rest in possible states of affairs, promising ‘nothing as to the truth of any 
proposition beside its own.’ 46   Our certitude inextricably relates to existing 
circumstances which require of us a commitment, rather than to any and all 
circumstances.   Existing circumstances place us ‘upon the shoulders’ of ‘our 
forefathers’, Newman notes, meaning in the midst of things taken for granted.47  In an 
example very similar to Wittgenstein’s one of walking in the mist, Newman asks if on a 
moonlit walk, our realising that what we were certain was a man is in fact a shadow, 
ought to make us question our certainty that what we are presently perceiving is a 
shadow.  He goes on to refer to this type of mistake as ‘functional disarrangements of 
the intellect’ but this seems unfair. There is an undeniable truth in our perceiving and 
responding in each case on the basis of the wealth of our experience, which is beyond 
justification.  This is how we live.  The question remaining is: is this act-basis 
commitment to a truth position to be called knowledge?  Newman notes that this type 
of certitude marks out the bounds within which we can have such a discussion at all, 
providing us with ‘the landmarks of thought’.48  We have to have a position in order to 
reflect upon and investigate our position!  It is won for us ‘indefectibly’ by our grasp of 
things based on our situation and experience to date which lead us in a certain 
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direction and eliminate other paths without our really reflecting at all.   While our 
certain commitment happens proposition by proposition (or event by event) in 
forward time it is only when looking back that we are aware of the dots being joined.  
Experience does not equal cause but rather relationship which is what I believe both 
Newman and later, Wittgenstein, (following Hume here) are trying to establish.  If 
knowing we know is the basis of justified belief and therefore knowledge, then in this 
account, in our continuous present we know nothing but stand related to countless 
things, which is to say nothing more than that our position is one of constant 
engagement with the world, and that knowledge and belief are established on a kind 
of trust which comes through praxis.   
 
In making the distinction he does between assent and inference Newman re-
emphasises this engaged position as the real and meaningful one.  Inference and 
inferential argument is the expression of logic, its form so to speak.  It is less than real 
insofar as it excludes, by a process of generalisation through comparison, the living 
context in which meaning takes place.  The art of logic can be said to have ‘stripped 
them [words] of all these connatural senses, to have drained them of that depth and 
breadth of associations which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their 
historical life…’49   Inference is concerned with finding the scientific formula for the 
event; it chooses the scientific over the historical and consequently floats above real 
life in the process.  The world of logic is one, Newman notes, which leaves us 
‘unanswerable’.  Its detachment from historical concreteness is also a detachment 
from personal, ethical responsibility which can never be realised in the world of logical 
probabilities.  The further we rise in our reasoning above historical conditions the 
further we are from ever proving anything, despite the impression that things are 
otherwise, that this is where proof lies.  The best we can do is to arrive at first 
principles, which are the logical boundaries delimiting possibilities to a generalised 
range of interpretation that shows us where we might begin to look for answers to our 
particular questions.   For Newman, we must ‘let units come first, and so called 
universals second…’50  In a discussion which would not be out of place in twentieth 
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century phenomenology he stresses the absolute indivisibility of the real and particular 
thing which can never, ‘by any calculus of logic, [admit] of being dissected into all the 
possible general notions which it admits, nor, in consequence, of being recomposed 
out of them;…’51  All created beings are, like their God, ultimately incommunicable, 
and while logic can try and resist the communication of nonsense it cannot claim to 
‘…be the measure of fact.’52  Logic and scientific reason have their place in our 
inquiries.  In our less than systematic lives the epistemology of how we live depends on 
imaginative reason to move us from experience to experience.  Perhaps logic was 
never meant to be the subject of inquiry that it has become.  Newman says ‘we think 
in logic as we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so.’  Wittgenstein had a similar 
understanding about our tendency to confuse the rules with the subject matter of our 
inquiries.  Logic is not the aim of life but a kind of mapping device that helps us to 
picture it.  The relationship incorporates an apophantic/hermeneutic difference that is 
essential to human functioning rather than something to be overcome.53  Later 
thinkers, Wittgenstein included, find that this relationship is properly mirrored in the 
way language works and point us there to find the proper way of seeing our problems.  
Newman’s sense of the real, historical and unique human being is far too strong to 
relinquish it to this philosophical middle ground.  
 
3.4 The Subject and The Illative sense 
In Newman’s account, to extend the map analogy, logic provides the ‘as the crow flies’ 
route which, on the ground, is of little or no assistance.  Logical connections are 
nothing in the face of ‘those pre-existent beliefs and views, in which men either 
already agree with each other or hopelessly differ, before they begin to dispute and 
which are hidden deep in our nature, or, it may be, in our personal peculiarities.’54  
These peculiarities of time, place and personal experience are the ineluctable roads we 
travel in our groundedness and it is on this question of grounds that twentieth and 
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indeed twenty-first century philosophy turns.  What is degraded in the turn to 
language, the unique reality and authority of each historical human subject, becomes 
the problem that hermeneutic-linguistic philosophy ends up striving to overcome.  In 
Newman’s rhetorical approach each and every subject is persuaded to truths, moved 
in the direction of truths to which she herself will commit and try to convert others, by 
the effects of living and engaging with the world.  From the wide breadth of this 
experience reason in its various modes gathers-in perspectives on truth to gain an 
organic view of the way things are in a functioning process Newman terms ‘informal 
inference’.55  This process which he builds into what he will call the ‘illative sense’ not 
only considers the paradigmatic breadth of the particular fact or event but also the 
experiential, historical and emotional depth attaching to it.  Its informality refers to its 
instinctual and non-directed operation perfected in and through use.  As Wittgenstein 
also noted, we do not sum up all that has gone before and use it to weigh up what is 
likely to happen; rather our reason converges upon what is logically only ever going to 
be a probability.  According to Newman here, the mind is ‘unequal to a complete 
analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion, and is swayed and 
determined by a body of proof, which it recognizes only as a body, and not in its 
constituent parts.’ 56   In a discussion that bears considerable similarities to 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of family resemblance Newman highlights the 
importance, in this gathering and converging process of reason, of its capacity to 
recognise likeness.  We are inexplicably aware of similarity in difference; of familial 
belonging in an understanding of meaning that rests wholly in relationships rather 
than theoretical paradigms.  The premises of informal inference are at their widest the 
cumulative probabilities of words in context; in Wittgensteinian terms they are the 
limits of the language game, whose ‘laws’ in Newmanian terms are never more than 
‘generalised facts.’57  The only real law, he posits, is this correlation between certitude 
and implicit proofs, both of which depend on refraction through a historical subject.  
This is supported by ‘the language in common use, [which] when concrete conclusions 
are in question, implies the presence of this personal element in the proof of them.’58  
Language stimulates and persuades in accordance with the conditions of the particular 
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subject such as, level of intelligence, education, culture and so on.  In terms of 
meaning, the subject cannot be equalised out of the equation.  
  
The framework within which certain acceptance comes about is, from a positive 
viewpoint, the convergence of what experience shows to be likely and possible, or 
from a negative viewpoint, the outermost limits of what experience rules out, what lies 
beyond even the expected unexpected.  These boundaries which for Wittgenstein are 
indicated within language in play, stemming from practice, are for Newman intuited in 
the experiencing subject in an on-going way.  The process of proof as the ‘limit of 
converging probabilities’ goes on, he tells us  ‘as much without words as with them’, by 
which he makes the point that certainty has its being in effect and action as much as in 
any discursive display.59  He is keen to stress the implicit and instinctual nature of this 
process which shows ‘as a simple act, not as a process, as if there were no medium 
interposed between antecedent and consequent…’  and which is carried on with a 
seeming  ‘intrinsic and personal power’ that makes it akin to a kind of ‘divination’.60  
He is still, caught in the bounds of the tradition, positing an invisible step which must 
take place although it has the appearance of not doing so, but the discussion 
unwittingly says as much against this step as it does in favour of it.  In the end Newman 
aligns the reasoning process leading to certitude with that of moral and aesthetic 
judgement, making it depend to a large degree on subjective ‘sight’ and the individual 
capacity for ‘read[ing] what comes before them…’61  The authority at work in and 
through this process of interpretation is a kind of trust rather than rule; that is a trust 
in ourselves and our experiences and in those others who possess the right to judge by 
virtue of ‘long acquaintance with their subject’.62    
 
 ‘In all of these separate actions of the intellect, the individual is supreme, and 
responsible to himself, nay, under circumstances, may be justified in opposing 
himself to the judgment of the whole world; though he uses rules to his great 
advantage, as far as they go, and is in consequence bound to use them.’63 
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Newman is clear that no criteria for objective judgment can overthrow the authority of 
individual judgment, an authority which is exercised through the ratiocinative faculty 
which he names the illative sense.  The illative sense concerns itself with what is 
immediate to life, to the present and particular circumstances of this or that individual 
in making this or that choice on how to proceed.  It is the reasoning faculty that 
displays the elasticity necessary to the natural order, working where theories fail us, in 
the particular case, where the authority of the individual is ineluctably supreme and 
the hypothetical is of no consequence.  As a faculty of judgement, Newman tells us, 
the illative sense works in various distinct subject areas, but always according to the 
same method.  Ultimately, its sanction is that of complete trust in our being and way of 
life as founded in experience.  It is by virtue of this continual link with experience that 
Newman on occasion speaks of it as a faculty of mind that somehow surpasses 
language: ‘It is the mind that reasons...not any technical apparatus of words and 
propositions.’64  There is a sense in which, in deciphering the limits of converging 
probabilities, one is involved in the limits of language itself in a non-verbal way.  The 
illative sense is at work in the informal process of limit setting and the 
creation/intuition of what in later philosophy will be referred to as the hermeneutic 
horizons or world-hoods of inquiry.   For Newman however these horizons are subject 
to the complete personal authority of the illative sense: ‘It is a rule to itself and 
appeals to no judgment beyond its own...’65  Furthermore as a ‘personal gift’, it cannot 
supply any ‘common measure between mind and mind’, appearing to leave us with a 
locked-in, self-sufficient and solipsistic subject.  But this criticism is based on a view of 
judgement as discourse and it is possible to see in GA a different understanding of 
judgment; an existentialist and somatic account that is comprised of seeing and acting, 
where choosing involves the unified person, physically and mentally together turning 
away from a variety of possible responses and toward a particular one, in a lived bodily 
version of Derridean différance.  The fact is, and Newman is determined to begin with 
what we take for granted, we each have distinct points of view from which and for 
which we are prepared to argue.  We each see the world in a slightly different way as a 
result of our experience, environment and intellectual make up.  This seeing is our 
personal ground of truth and from this position we may hold fast to a judgment that 
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pits us against the whole world.  It is our first and last resort; the position from which 
we set out on our enquiries and, as we saw with G. E. Moore, where we return when 
logic fails: ‘I can know things which I cannot prove’.   
 
Newman frequently parallels illative functioning with sight.  The illative sense is bound 
to act in the way that the eye is bound to see.  It is ever intending and engaging with 
the world.  Its judgments are founded in ‘aspect’ and ‘view’, in ‘seeing as’, 
incorporating the personal context that this brings.66  He puzzles over the variety of 
ways in which people see such things as lines as convex or concave, or figures as 
looking to the right or left, putting one in mind of Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit here.67  
He speaks of ‘family likenesses’ and how they are so variously interpreted, and equally 
of our capacity to make mistakes in identity.68  The fact that we defend our way of 
seeing indicates our belief that an objective truth is validated by one position or the 
other, but this objective reality depends for its unified existence on ‘a Power, greater 
than human teaching and human argument…’ by comparison with which, as 
individuals, we are but partially sighted.69  We see things, and rule things out, in the 
light of what has come before, and our arguments and discussions are made possible 
by the delimiting function of the illative sense.  We begin neither from a place where 
everything is considered nor from a place of universal doubt, but from natural 
assumptions reflecting experience and culture.  Because of the nature of philosophical 
inquiry this seems as if we are beginning on level two, which stands on top of level one 
which contains all those things we don’t bring into our enquiries, such as whether or 
not we who are asking the questions exist.    However, it is this kind of thinking that 
both Newman, and to a greater degree Wittgenstein, are challenging.  Level one is this 
three dimensional point from which we enquire.  Again, in keeping with the imagery of 
sight and seeing, the question of depth arises here.  Newman speaks of ‘antecedent 
reasons’ and ‘antecedent probabilities’ but is aware that our being is uninterrupted by 
either, in the same way that our vision is a flow of ceaseless seeing.  When we think in 
terms of knowledge or judgement we are necessarily looking back at the events under 
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question.  In the present, the event catches us up and it is on this un-investigated level 
that life happens:  ‘…the great discoverers of principles do not reason.  They have no 
arguments, no grounds, they see the truth but they do not know how they see it; … it is 
the second-rate men, though most useful in their place, who prove, reconcile, finish 
and explain.’70 There is a clear priority given to seeing here and a clear link between 
seeing and truth before knowing and truth, a link which will be a mainstay of the 
Phenomenological tradition.  Newman is making a distinction (which Wittgenstein also 
makes) between our believing, and our subsequent believing the grounds of our 
believing.  Do we see the event in itself as it happens to us in our personal history, or 
do we see it notionally as part of a linked sequence of events by which it obtains a kind 
of universal inevitability that gives us power to justify it and thus make it a measure by 
which to judge?  In the distancing from ourselves that happens in the second case our 
concern moves from judging ourselves to judging others.  In the first case we are 
justified by our response, by praxis; our lives are wholly an ethical dialogue with the 
world.  In the second we are justified by theory and ethical engagement becomes 
optional and may be set aside.  For Newman, following Aristotle’s ethics of personal 
engagement, the first position is the one that is in accordance with our nature and 
being.  The second is an instance of being ambitious beyond our nature.  We find in 
Wittgenstein a very similar ethical understanding.71   
 
3.5 On Probability: Newman, Ramsey and Hume                                     
From a more positivistic aspect, the illative sense works on the basis of the strength of 
truth-probability occurring in the event of the convergence of various streams of 
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be, to cherish a distrust of my powers, and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself.’ 
Wittgenstein too is concerned that we match our enquiries to our actual needs, something which is 
discussed more fully in the next chapter.  Also, as already pointed out, he is ever wary of being 
ambitious for a way of being that goes beyond our actual ways, seeing it as a kind of vanity which is to 
be avoided.  What Newman anticipates here is the twentieth century focus on ‘a renewed poetics of 
philosophy’ which essentially questioned our questioning from an ethical point of view.  This quote is 
taken from R. Shusterman, ‘A Renewed Poetics of Philosophy’ in Practicing Philosophy, Pragmatism and 
the Philosophical Life, (London, 1997).  Shusterman gives an overview of our purposes in doing 
philosophy (pps 1-16) and points to the Western world’s ‘depersonalization of knowledge’ and its 
relegation of the practice of self-examination and redemption to the sphere of religion, as causes for the 
direction it has taken in Europe.   
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probabilities, none of which alone has the strength to bring us to certain assent, each 
arrived at by a mode of reason working with experience in a process of historically and 
culturally conditioned interpretation, yet together carrying the possibility of a unique 
conflation which makes room for the truly new.   It provides, for Newman, the bridge 
he needs between notional and real, universal and individual, statistical and particular 
and potentially, scientific and religious.  He gives priority to the role of experience over 
rational calculation in the delimiting functioning of probability in day to day life and his 
account is not a million miles from that of the Cambridge mathematician and well 
documented influence on Wittgenstein, Frank Ramsey.  What Ramsey does is to switch 
our emphasis on probability from a purely rational conception to one focused on use, 
thus grounding it in human life rather than in anything transcendent.   He notes that 
our belief that a particular relationship (aRb) exists, rests in the fact that certain 
actions of ours are useful only if aRb.  From this we can say that aRb is true if these 
actions are in fact useful.72  In other words, Ramsey linked belief to activity in such a 
way as to show that what we believe is made true by the usefulness of the actions by 
which these beliefs are interpreted.   That I return to the house to grab my umbrella, 
for example, is evidence that I believe it is raining or is going to rain.  This particular 
action is useful only if that is the case.  My regular use of this course of action 
evidences the success of my belief.  True belief evolves from that which is seen to be 
reliable in our experience.  Reliability is key to Newman’s account of knowledge and of 
our illative functioning, as reflected by his frequent stress on consistency.  For 
Newman knowledge is a dependable historical relationship.73  Ramsey’s essentially 
pragmatic theory is founded in the belief that what we conceive of as universals and 
particulars are different linguistic constructions from the same set of practical 
constituents, so that whether we say that Socrates is wise, or that wisdom is a 
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 See http://www.nilsericsahlin.se/ramsey/index.asp accessed October, 2012.  Ramsey was influenced 
by Bayesian mathematics, as was Bishop Joseph Butler whose influence is keenly felt in Newman’s work.  
Newman was very open to evolutionary understanding, commenting in a letter on 22
nd
 May, 1868 that:  
‘As to the Divine Design, is it not an instance of incomprehensibly and infinitely marvellous Wisdom and 
Design to have given certain laws to matter millions of ages ago, which have surely and precisely worked 
out, in the long course of those ages, those effects which He from the first proposed. Mr. Darwin's 
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never studied the question, and I do not [see] that “the accidental evolution of organic beings” is 
inconsistent with divine design — It is accidental to us, not to God.’ J. H. Newman, Letter to J. Walker of 
Scarborough, 1868, in The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, (Oxford, 1973). 
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 A. Bottone, The Philosophical Habit of Mind, (Bucharest, 2010), p 140: ‘Knowledge, in its broader and 
deeper sense, means to put in relation’ i.e. to recognise relations within the whole system. 
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characteristic of Socrates, the difference is in the linguistic form, not in reality.74  
Variations in this form are not divisive of reality.  While Newman doesn’t eliminate the 
notional/real divide, his understanding of probability as a bridge between universal 
and particular pre-figures Ramsey’s and Wittgenstein’s stress on the symmetrical link 
between probability and use, expectation and fulfilment.   
   
 It is through the link between probability and use rather than probability and 
explanation that Newman diverges from Hume.  While Newman is in agreement with 
Hume on the formation of natural laws via consistent historical experience and 
testimony, he resists Hume’s basis for challenging the occurrence of miracles.  In 
Hume’s account, that something is a miracle is the least plausible explanation for its 
occurrence based on reasoning by antecedent probabilities.75  However, this is based 
on the understanding that a miracle is an occurrence which violates a natural law.  
Newman is aware of the flexibility granted by the Humean account of natural law and 
is clear that the term includes, alongside historical experience, the possibility of the 
occurrence of something that has not been experienced before.  Because of our illative 
functioning the accounts of various modes of reason may converge on an explanation 
for an event which will contradict the historical experience under any particular mode.  
The edges of our interpretive enclosures blend into each other and there are openings 
for different possibilities.  Where these openings lie rests in each case in the unique, 
interpreting subject, where hermeneutic limits (including existentialist interests) and 
historical forces (including ethical call) interplay.76   Newman finds Hume to have 
underestimated the strength of current belief to override what in scientific measure 
seems implausible; he makes the point that current belief can pitch considerable 
                                                          
74 See D. H. Mellor, (1998). Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved November 03, 2012, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD056SECT6F.P.  
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 D. Hume, ‘Of Miracles’ in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, extracted from Enquiries 
Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (London, 1902 2
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 Ed) via 
internet, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm#section10, accessed October, 2012. 
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 Newman is ahead of his time here in terms of the development of hermeneutic principles.  Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Hermeneutics and Universal History in Watcherhauser, B., Hermeneutics and Modern 
Philosophy, (New York, 1986) pps 111-146, discusses the way in which historical concerns became 
subordinate to hermeneutics for a time, being understood to be ‘behind the text’ and capable of being 
identified from the text.  However the Post-Modern approach – Pannenberg in particular discusses 
Gadamer – has been to recognise that the historical is embodied in the interpreting subject too and so is 
an inseparable part of any process of interpretation.  Newman is already clear on this point.    
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weight against evidence which speaks in favour of a position that contradicts it, as can 
personal reputation in the case of a witness.   Hume tends toward a scientific account 
of probability while Newman is anxious that it should retain its own particular place 
among the modes of human reasoning.  Both Newman and Wittgenstein agree that 
this place is a meeting point of theoretical and practical, universal and particular that 
shows life to be a dialogue of both types of understanding rather than a competition 
between them.    
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This review of Newman’s account of how we hold things to be certainly true has 
required the weaving of an often winding path through An Essay in Aid of a Grammar 
of Assent.  It has proceeded on this path by putting aside some of the obstacles which 
would be insurmountable in a positivistic review; this is not Newman’s method.  When 
we take GA on its own terms as a personal enquiry and apologetic, a number of things 
come to light which locate Newman in a much more philosophically significant position 
than is generally acknowledged for him.  Consider his complete acceptance of the 
historical subject, for example; his acknowledgement of the role played by difference 
in maintaining flexible horizons of understanding; his multi-modal view of reason and 
its connection to the emotional and devotional aspects of the human person; his 
appreciation of the groundlessness, in scientific terms, of our knowledge and finally 
and perhaps most importantly, his ethical concern to maintain a link between enquiry 
and real need or use in our philosophical endeavours.     
 
This reading provides many points of convergence with Wittgenstein’s understanding 
of certainty as set out in the previous chapter and an exploration of these links, against 
the background of existential concerns set out at the beginning, forms the basis of the 
following chapter.  
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4. Newman and Wittgenstein: Seeing Connections 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having set out side by side and in some depth the thought of Newman and 
Wittgenstein on the topic of certainty it is now feasible to explore connections 
emerging from these readings.  Comparisons in this section are made by way of 
descriptive rather than causal links with an overall focus on how both philosophers 
contribute to an ethically centred view of knowledge and meaning.  The threat to this 
core of human meaning posed by the less than practically real methods and demands 
of science is felt in a similar way by Newman and Wittgenstein and the resulting 
concern shows itself in the suggestion of an ethics of enquiry which takes the form of 
looking and looking and seeing with fresh eyes how we think, speak and act on a daily 
basis; by using real life to hold theoretical life up to the light.  The comparison with 
Wittgenstein brings out in particular how much Newman‘s thought has to contribute 
to current debates in epistemology, ethics and hermeneutics, recognising him as a 
prophetic philosopher who ‘anticipated modern and postmodern concerns and themes 
and who explored these in an original fashion.’1 
 
4.2 Style 
I had a task, did not do it, and now the failure is wrecking my life… 
 
God has created me to do him some definite service; he has committed some 
work to me which he has not committed to another.2                
 
In the case of two thinkers for whom the question of depth or dimension – of life 
investment – is so significant, it is fitting that there has been a wealth of biographical 
material written which makes a positive contribution to the interpretation of their 
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 I. Ker and T. Merrigan in Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman, Ker, I., and Merrigan, T., (Eds) 
(Cambridge, 2009) Introduction.  See also W. Jost, ‘Philosophical Rhetoric: Newman & Heidegger’, in 
Magill, G., Ed., Discourse and Context, (Illinois, 1993) p 72.  Jost notes that ‘Even in Newman, who from a 
distance can appear so classically conservative and reactionary, modernist and even postmodernist 
consciousness has emerged, though it remains in and of itself unexplored.’ 
2
 Wittgenstein in P. Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, (Oxford, 1967) p 41.  
Newman, Meditations, Part III, Meditations on Christian Doctrine, p 301, (internet, 2012), accessed 
21.06.2012.   
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philosophical work.  It is precisely on this question of life investment that similarities in 
their background are most apparent.  As has been discussed, biographical accounts of 
each philosopher document a strong sense of a task, a life’s work for which they are 
destined and upon which they will ultimately be judged.  This sense of a final 
judgement adds a dimension of conscientious self-awareness which is evident in the 
rhetorical style of both writers.3  The GA and OC evidence a personal caring for what is 
being said which draws the reader in; a kind of leading by example that will separate 
those committed to the enquiry from those for whom it is an exercise in argument 
which will ultimately make no difference to their lives.   For Newman and Wittgenstein, 
this sense of a last judgement and of a personal mission acts to foreground the ethical 
and to consistently prioritise the real over the theoretical in their work with the 
resulting awareness that a purely theoretical approach acts to draw us away from the 
responsibilities arising with our being.  Newman’s chosen motto from St. Ambrose, 
‘non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum’, ‘It did not please God to 
save his people through dialectic’, fits this point well.  In the case of Wittgenstein it is 
evident in his determined refusal to be led away from the way things are said and 
used.  Newman, too, keeps his focus on our very real and ordinary experiences of life.  
Certainly the use of very ordinary and practical examples along with a non-systematic 
approach is a trait of both works.4  The attempt to keep the discussion of language tied 
to the ways it is used places both Newman and at least the later Wittgenstein in the 
‘expressive’ camp of philosophical thought about language according to Taylor’s 
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 It is interesting to remember here that both men had brushes with death early in life.  Regarding 
rhetorical style, A. Bottone, The Philosophical Habit of Mind, (Bucharest, 2010), p 77, notes that: 
‘Rhetoric, in fact, as study and practice is not less concerned with the human person than ethics.  If, for 
Newman, logic totally ignored the personal dimension of knowledge, rhetoric represented to him a 
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thinking and trains of thought, similar to our own, leading them on by their own independent action, not 
by any syllogistic compulsion’ (GA, p 245), alongside this one from Wittgenstein’s preface to PI: ‘I should 
not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking.  But, if possible, to stimulate someone 
to thoughts of his own.’  See also here B. Plant, ‘Seeing the world aright: Wittgenstein’s Rhetoric’ in 
Wittgenstein and Levinas Ethical and Religious Thought, (Oxon, 2005)  
4
 W. Kienzler, ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman On Certainty’, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 71, 
2006, p 127 and A. Bottone, ‘Newman and Wittgenstein After Foundationalism’ in New Blackfriars, 
86:1001, Jan 2005,  p 68 both suggest that Newman’s habit of giving very detailed and practical 
examples is one element of GA which appealed strongly to Wittgenstein.    
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classification.5  The fact that they arrive at this place from strongly analytic beginnings 
is another point of common ground between them, a point which highlights their 
contribution to a holistic account of language and of the human being which 
philosophical meddling has caused us to forget.6  It is also fair to say that both operate 
within a ‘hermeneutics of belief’ rather than of suspicion, that is to say they equally 
recognise that ‘doubt comes after belief’ and that we use our faculties and all that is 
given before we ever think about trusting or believing in them.7   This position is 
reflected in the move from logic to rhetoric, from a notional place where everything is 
subject to enquiry to the real life place where only certain things are.    
 
4.3 Sight, Seeing and the Problem of Depth 
 
“I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see”…I know is 
supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition 
(like “I believe”) but between me and a fact.  So that the fact is taken into my 
consciousness.  This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an 
outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the 
consciousness…And this picture does indeed show how our imagination 
presents knowledge…8  
 
In processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but 
mainly as they stand in relation to each other.  We look at nothing simply for its 
own sake…without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides.9 
 
 
An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent and On Certainty explore the links between 
seeing, knowing and believing.  Newman, anticipating Heidegger’s horizonal approach 
to contingency, is sensitive to knowledge as a kind of ‘seeing as’, viewed out of a 
particular framework.  This applies to both the general area of enquiry and first 
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 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1, (Cambridge, 1985), pps  248-292 
brought to my attention via a discussion by Chris Lawn, in his book Wittgenstein and Gadamer: Towards 
a Post-Analytic Philosophy of Language, (London, 2004) pps 1-18.   
6
 Bottone, 2010, notes: ‘…[Newman] links the proper organization of the sciences to the way in which 
the human mind conceives reality.  This has its basis not in a transcendental subject but, on the one 
hand, in the structure of reality and, on the other hand, in the intellectual dimension of the person.’  (p 
63)     
7
 This is a distinction made by Ricoeur and cited by A. J. Crowley, ‘Theory of Discourse: Newman and 
Ricoeur’ in G. Magill, (Ed), (Illinois, 1993) pps 81 – 91 
8
 OC, 90 
9
 GA, p 44 
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principles adopted, for example science, theology, mathematics etc., what Newman 
terms ‘primary conditions’, and to the more subtle individual ‘assumptions’ coming 
through our culture, background, education, class, age, religion and so on.10  Like 
Wittgenstein, (I am specifically thinking of the duck-rabbit here), he discusses our way 
of seeing in aspects, our view driven by the focus of our enquiry and our particular and 
present life need.  This proto phenomenological approach allows for certain beliefs 
while at the same time allowing for the possibility of change and even reversal of belief 
that happens in the dynamic contexts of real life.  The never ending variety of aspects 
which our lives present mean we are constantly challenged to review, extend and 
incorporate elements of our experience into our existing conceptual and linguistic 
framework, our way of seeing.  The account of reason that is appropriate to this view 
of things, and which Newman puts before us, is necessarily multi-modal and flexible, 
and both GA and OC draw on life as it is to challenge the confining notion of universal 
reason presented by the positivistic view, whose failures in application give us pseudo 
problems to solve.  In the case of Newman the focus is on the seeing/knowing 
individual.  He is a man of his time in his assumption of the Cartesian split and the 
existence of private mind.  Therefore, a strict analysis of his view would highlight the 
consequent problem of solipsism and the incompatibility of this with the linguistic 
subject of Wittgenstein’s account.  However, Newman’s reluctance to let go of the 
historical and individual subject is invaluable to the hermeneutic quest.  An account of 
meaning that reflects its foundation in experience must allow for the prejudices 
attaching to the unique ontological location of that experience; the seeing place.  The 
formation of the subjective view/prejudices then becomes another issue under the 
hermeneutic umbrella.  Although Wittgenstein’s focus in the PI is on the 
communitarian nature of language and on the misunderstandings that lead us to the 
idea of private thought/language, it is less so in OC.   Here he is very interested in the 
expression ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ and its special epistemological (though for want of a 
better word), status:  ‘I would like to reserve the expression “I know” for the cases in 
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GA, p 217.  W. Jost, ‘Philosophic Rhetoric: Newman and Heidegger’ in Magill, G., (Ed), Discourse and 
Context, (Illinois, 1993), p 59, groups Newman, Heidegger and Wittgenstein together in his discussion of 
‘seeing as’.     Crowley, 1993, p 82, discusses Ricoeur and Newman’s understanding of the importance of 
this element of personal paradigms within the hermeneutic circle, citing Ricoeur as follows: ‘This means 
that the conditions of an authentic appropriation, as they are displayed in relation to texts, are 
themselves paradigmatic.  Therefore we are not allowed to exclude the final act of personal 
commitment from the whole of objective and explanatory procedures which mediate it.’  
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which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.’11  He stresses the role played by 
subjective expectation, itself an ontological interpretation of probability, in the way we 
look and see.  Our finding is conditioned by our seeking so that how we see/look for 
any event has a prevenient element that comes from our experience and delimits the 
possible results of our enquiry.  This speculative sphere applies both in a 
communitarian way, within the workings of the language game, and individually as 
part of the impact of our personal experience on our framework.   Wittgenstein’s 
allowance that the parameters set around our interpretation are not rigid; even the 
‘bedrock’ sometimes erodes, makes way for the possibility of something new or 
different showing itself.12  In this way nothing is ruled out, while our knowledge claims 
are based in what usually happens in practice, what is, to use a favourite phrase of 
Newman’s, consistent.  It is this consistency that leads to recognition as and as 
Newman notes it is not usual or necessary most of the time to analyse the truth of this 
first seeing.   
The problem of depth perception is a by-product of this discourse on knowledge as 
sight.  It is possible that Newman’s struggle with the divides of a still representational 
understanding of language highlighted for Wittgenstein the dimensional gap apparent 
when we try to square ontological dimension with propositional flatness.  It could be 
said that this was Wittgenstein’s problem with the TLP too.  There is no conversation 
paradigmatically possible between framework and body because there is no gap; there 
is only relationship.  The relation of rule to language is rooted in an ontology that 
makes them impossible conversation partners at least without incorrectly (and 
bewitchingly) expressing one in the terms of the other.  Wittgenstein points out that 
there is no failure of language, no possibility of language not being adequate.  What 
we have are two incomparable, because inseparable, things, being and language, and 
the mistaken idea, rooted in a lingering representational understanding of language, 
that we can make them match.  As noted earlier, Newman said that ‘we think in logic 
as we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so.’13  Wittgenstein would agree that our 
‘aiming’ at logic was precisely the problem with most of contemporary philosophy. We 
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need to see and treat of the rule in a different way to the general objects of our 
enquiries if we are to rescue philosophy from the depths of its own making.  
When answers to life questions are pursued in a positivistic way we are consistently 
faced with, to paraphrase Heidegger, the failure of being to protrude into language.14  
Wittgenstein notes how propositional logic forces us to locate, or substantiate, the 
missing dimension that comes with living experience via the interposition of some 
third step that must be taking place below the surface of our language.  This we do 
either by the admission of a private ‘I’, the inner person who checks all of our 
experiences for us, or by the imagination of further propositional layers behind what 
we say, so that we can evidence some form of judgement behind or under our final 
assertions.  In both these cases our imagined step gives the illusion of depth and with 
it the illusion of consciousness, supplying a doing/being that is lacking from our 
propositions.   Newman too criticises the perplexity caused by this pursuit of grounds 
where none are ultimately to be found.  Scepticism is the result: ‘in the lowest depth a 
lower deep’ as he puts it rather sarcastically; as he points out elsewhere, in the end 
scepticism is the position most unlike our lives and therefore most unbelievable.15  It is 
the attempt to remove all value and all power structures from our interpretations but 
all our doubts and investigations spring from a place of belief and a life both valued 
and variously committed.  It is towards this ‘what is there’, not what is underneath 
that both Wittgenstein and Newman wish us to turn our attention.  Like the later 
phenomenologists they favour description over explanation in terms of capacity for 
enlightenment.16  What is amazing is already present, not hidden under any layers or 
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 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, (Indiana, 1982), p 212, cited in D. McManus, 
‘Heidegger, Wittgenstein and St. Paul on the Last Judgment: On the Roots and Significance of the 
“Theoretical Attitude”, forthcoming in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, (obtained by 
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15
 Newman, GA, pps 90-91: ‘Resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyse 
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 W. Kienzler, ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman On Certainty’, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 
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importance of not treating the rule – ‘the order of nature’ as a ‘physical necessity’ (GA, 298).  Elsewhere 
he asks that we ‘instead of devising, what cannot be, some sufficient science of reasoning which may 
compel certitude in concrete conclusions’ should ‘take things as they are, and resign ourselves to what 
we find.’ (GA, p 275) One of his criticisms of Locke is that ‘The practice of mankind is too strong for the 
antecedent theorem, to which he is desirous to subject it.’ (GA, p 137)  Finally he points out that 
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hovering above us in another realm.  Its life context gives it the only justification it 
needs. 
 
4.4 On Doubt 
‘ “We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them 
all.”  Wouldn’t it be more correct to say: “we do not doubt them all.”  Our not 
doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.’17  
 
‘…there are writers who…have gone far beyond this reasonable scepticism, 
laying down…that we ought to begin with a universal doubt.  This, however, is 
of all assumptions the greatest, and to forbid assumptions universally is to 
forbid this one in particular.  Doubt itself is a positive state…and thereby 
necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines all its own.’18  
 
Wittgenstein and Newman are equally clear that the Cartesian exercise of universal 
doubt is in fact an impossibility, firstly because our calling anything into question is 
based on our having prior experience/knowledge of that thing, and secondly because 
we are always enquiring from some ontological location which necessitates the 
existence of the very things we are trying to doubt.  Newman is clear that this type of 
doubt belongs to our methodology and pertains to the form of our logical enquiries 
rather than to any real questions of our existence.  Later on, in speaking of self-doubt 
he makes the point that ‘We are what we are, and we use not trust our faculties.  To 
debate about trusting in a case like this is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing I 
had had a choice if I would be created or no…’19 In a similar way, Wittgenstein makes 
clear that ‘…doubt comes after belief.’20  Neither life nor philosophy begins with the 
suspension of belief and scepticism is a luxury resting in a life that has its basic human 
needs already in hand. 
With regard to our expressions of certainty, again both men agree that our certainty is 
most often expressed in a situation where other possibilities are intuited or suggested 
by events, where a mistake and therefore a doubt is made possible by the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
repetition ought not be mistaken for cause and used to rule out possibilities of experience (GA, pps 73-
75).  We need to keep in mind the ontological distinctness of what is there before us. 
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 OC, 232 
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 GA, p 294 
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paradigmatic enclosures delimiting the language game.  However, because a doubt is 
theoretically possible does not mean it has to be considered in life.  ‘What I need to 
shew is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible.  That the possibility of 
the language-game doesn’t depend on everything being doubted that can be 
doubted.’21  If Newman and Wittgenstein have anything in common it is a desire to 
move us away from the counterfactual ‘what ifs’ of the sceptic and the scientist and 
back to what is actually happening in the life of the ordinary human being.  As 
Newman notes real life situations involve more than this cold rationality.  Our certainty 
in acting a particular way is a development of heart as much as reason and depends on 
our devotion, commitment and trust  in the particular case.    It is fair to say that both 
philosophers are aware of the asymmetrical nature of certainty and not doubting.  
Certainty belongs to lived life; doubt to a philosophical analysis of life.  They cannot be 
suitably squared off in any way.  
 
4.5 The Ethics of Enquiry 
 ‘The sentence “I can’t be making a mistake” is certainly used in practice.  But 
we may question whether it is then to be taken in a perfectly rigorous sense, or 
is rather a kind of exaggeration which perhaps is used only with a view to 
persuasion.  We might speak of fundamental principles of human enquiry.’22  
 
When the enquiry into certainty is formulated against the foreground of our life 
practices as it is in the case of both Newman and Wittgenstein what begins to emerge 
from a comparative reading is a methodology for ethical enquiry more generally.  Key 
points in this regard are discussed hereunder. 
 
4.51 First Principles: From Practice You Came and into Practice You Shall Return 
Wittgenstein and Newman have several points in common to make about the 
formation and role of our ideals.  Our First Principles are not, Newman reminds us, 
‘elementary truths prior to reasoning’ as the scientific view makes us inclined to think.  
They are, rather, abstractions from particular events, which act to mark out the limits 
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of our experiences to date in the arena of a particular practice.  They act as honing 
devices which taper our enquiries according to particular areas.  They direct us to a 
relationship, to elements in a set.  Where Newman talks of First Principles and 
personal prejudices, Wittgenstein speaks of rules and framework propositions.  The 
rule is the wider culturally accepted limit which interacts with the outermost edge of 
the operations of the individual or particular view.  If I am looking for a book, to use an 
example from Wittgenstein, at a personal level there are certain places where I will 
look; in the drawer in my bedroom, on the bookshelf in my office, in a particular bag.  I 
won’t look in my washing machine but there is conceivably an individual who might 
choose to keep his book there (so his cat can’t get at it perhaps!)  What is not 
conceivable (or considered) in any account is that the book might have vanished into 
thin air.  That this cannot be is at the level of natural law or first principle but 
Wittgenstein is doubtful about the analytic understanding of this concept: 
‘But do we not simply follow the principle that what has always happened will 
happen again (or something like it)?  What does it mean to follow this 
principle?  Do we really introduce it into our reasoning?  Or is it merely the 
natural law which our inferring apparently follows?...’23 
 
Newman uses the image of an octagon within a circle, whose edges blend with the 
circumference of the circle surrounding it, to try and capture the wholly engaged way 
in which these principles are formed and function in real life.24  Both men are keen to 
expose the organic as opposed to the scientific nature of the rules which bound the 
paradigmatic enclosures of our beliefs about the world.  Both are keenly aware of the 
measure of flexibility afforded by these enclosures due to their on-going formation in 
our practices.  They are as Wittgenstein notes ‘enclosures with holes’ accommodated 
by our holistic and imaginative capacity to think, say, believe, and act in context.  It is 
to this holistic awareness that Newman refers when he talks of the illative sense which 
reflects the elasticity of multi-modal reason, the various strands of which gather in the 
possibilities of experience to form a definite conclusion of the particular thing or event 
as that thing.  Experience most often confirms our paradigms, sometimes alters them 
and occasionally shifts the very bedrock granting them their place, for example man 
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landing on the moon.  Whatever the rule says, in practice anything can change.25  
Newman and Wittgenstein show that our first principles properly interpreted 
accommodate experience rather than dictate how it must be.     
 
Newman acknowledges the influence of tradition in determining the bounds of our 
enclosures. He notes that there are historical and other forces such as popular opinion 
all the time influencing our paradigms and the ideals we construct from them.  A 
purely logical account fails to incorporate these influences. Wittgenstein’s account of 
meaning in use realises this too.  These historical cultural forces are embedded in our 
language games and incorporated in their evolution in a non-systematic way.  In the 
scientific view our first principles and framework propositions appear to function as 
laws directing the way things are.  Newman and Wittgenstein encourage us to see that 
the way things are incorporates a past way things were and conditions a future way 
things will be without strategy.  The strategy comes always a fraction behind, as part of 
our reflective practice and suggests the possibility of biases, of inferior and superior 
positions, of an overarching system at work.  An important part of our contextual 
functioning stressed by both Newman and Wittgenstein is our capacity to intuit 
likeness while still maintaining awareness of the unique event.  In life we gain meaning 
in a way which preserves difference, a fact we tend to lose when we analyse this 
practice. 
 
On the role of our ideals Wittgenstein asks us to remember that: 
‘The only way namely for us to avoid prejudice – or vacuity in our claims, is to 
posit the ideal as what it is, namely as an object of comparison – a measuring 
rod as it were – within our way of looking at things, and not as a preconception 
to which everything must conform.’26  
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while Newman warns against ‘gratuitous idealism’ and the tendency to ‘draw the 
individual after the peculiarities of his type’.27  There is always room for difference at 
the level of the particular and each and every act contributes to the rule.  Newman 
notes that: ‘the confusion is a fact, the reasoning processes are not facts’.28 When we 
treat the rules as facts we create a new and bewitching problem to solve, something 
Wittgenstein regrets about the nature of philosophy.  It is in this confusion of rule 
(bottom up) and law (top down) that we move from description and image to causal 
understanding which narrows our account of human reason and propagates the kind 
of tyranny of the majority that philosophers like Levinas worked to redress.29  A proper 
understanding of the formation of the rule via experience will keep us humble in the 
face of marginal positions that may, feasibly, become majorities someday.  There is, 
however, another form of ideal which is also a kind of transcendence to an unreal 
realm and which the Newman-Wittgenstein view asks us to re-consider; that is our 
tendency to counter-factual thinking.  Wittgenstein notes that ‘Pretensions are a 
mortgage which burdens a philosopher’s capacity to think’; Newman expresses 
exasperation at our ‘intellectual waywardness’ by which we set out to consider all the 
strange and unlikely possibilities of an event rather than going directly to where our 
instinct and reason immediately lead us.30   This belief that things could have been 
otherwise creates another seeming form of depth that impacts hugely on our 
understanding and judging.  By insisting on the level of the embodied given they 
remind us that not everything is relative.  Relativism is another ideal ill used by us 
insofar as we give it the strength of reality when we factor ‘could have beens’ into our 
judgments.  In Wittgenstein and Newman’s picture there are immanent absolutes.  
That is to say that our language games include an element of meaning-determinism 
insofar as they allow for a determinable position that takes account of the ontological 
situation.31  For Newman these absolutes are ultimately subjective insofar as they are 
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held with certitude by those believing them; for Wittgenstein it is harder to say but 
they rest in what can perhaps be called an evolutionary essentialism.   So there are, 
working with our ontological position as beings constantly engaged in a dynamic 
process of interpretation, certain points which must be exempt from a kind of 
questioning which would push them through to transcendence in one or the other 
direction.  That we can imagine that things could have been otherwise is not to say 
that they actually could and Wittgenstein and Newman both constantly ground us in 
what is there in order to show us what we are doing, in other words as a kind of cure 
for this tendency to notional relativity which we exhibit.  To manipulate Bishop Butler, 
things are what they are and not other things, and both philosophers employ a form of 
naturalism in the way they agree that certain things are just ‘there like our lives’, 
beyond the bounds of enquiry.   They show that anti-foundationalism does not 
necessarily imply relativism.32   
 
 
4.52 An Ethics of Need 
‘…it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom 
of the language-game.’33 
 
‘Life is for action.  If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to 
action…’34  
 
Wittgenstein tells us that our enquiries must be ‘rotated around the fixed axis of our 
need.’ Similarly Newman is clear that our quest for knowledge is properly based in use.  
We want to use facts and are ultimately concerned with effects.  Our enquiries are into 
our way of life and not merely into ‘the apparatus of words and propositions.’35  
                                                                                                                                                                          
with our natural, naïve attitude to epistemic disagreements.’  This links with Newman’s understanding 
of certitude as a position we are prepared to defend on the basis of consistent, lived experience.  
Ultimately while from an epistemological viewpoint we can hold in our understanding two different 
views of what is true, (Kusch uses the Wittgensteinian example of two tribes, one of whom believes man 
can travel to the moon and one who believes this to be impossible), we tend to move beyond 
epistemology at this point into heart felt persuasion.  
32
 In other words, what is exempt from doubt and proof is exempt from counterfactuals too.   
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Equally Newman stresses the need to enquire ‘sui generis’ or after the form of the 
object of enquiry in each case, resisting the encroachment of the scientific or any one 
method where it does not apply.  Our rational modes and methods are as numerous 
and varied as are the circumstances and motivations behind our enquiries.  This is a 
pragmatic and an ethical move closer to the world of difference that we encounter and 
does justice to the perspectival account of seeing and knowledge at the centre of post-
modern thought.  Proof and doubt have a specific function in a particular method of 
enquiry that is applied in certain areas – mathematics and physics for example.  This 
method does not naturally extend into the human and social sciences.36  Here, doubt 
becomes wonder, proof, a working relationship.  Newman picks up on the negative 
correlation between the application of logical methods and fruitful living when he 
warns us against ‘being hampered by involuntary questionings, as if we were not 
certain, when we are.’37  Life is for action, and we are rational for use.   
As part of the focus on need, both GA and OC seek to establish what is and is not 
contingent in the world as we find it.  As Newman puts it: ‘Unless we had the right, 
when we pleased, of ruling that propositions were irrelevant or absurd, I do not see 
how we would conduct an argument at all…’38 In this regard Wittgenstein asks what is 
rightly to be shunted onto an unused siding, Newman, what is to be used in trust and 
what is ‘beyond reason’.39  Our areas of enquiry set within consistent experience 
exclude certain lines of questioning in an evolutionary way which affects not only what 
and how we enquire but also what and how we expect to find.  What we expect then 
becomes an inextricable part of how we look and conditions what we find in a circular 
way.  Awareness of the effective bounds of enquiry will keep us concerned with what 
can be effectively changed.  All of our enquiries come from an established place.  We 
are not bound by laws from above or beyond but by expectative rules arising from this 
ontological place, where the ongoing experience of human beings like and including 
ourselves dictates what we find most likely and most impossible.  There is no 
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‘dispassionate state of mind’ or of being and this understanding is the basis of 
rhetorical method.  Walter Jost defines rhetoric as ‘the power to interpret 
indeterminacies persuasively.’40  Newman and Wittgenstein by helping to define what 
is and is not indeterminable in the practical sense, also define the scope of our 
rhetorical functioning and show it to be far wider than the scientific approach to 
reason would allow.  Broadly speaking the rhetorical refers to the natural function of 
the subject within the hermeneutic project and it is fair to say that both Newman and 
Wittgenstein are primarily concerned with natural human functioning insofar as their 
work continually holds up contextualised human practice as a light against theory, 
rather than the other way around.   
 
4.6 The Being of Probability 
 
‘…probability does in some sense presuppose and require the existence of 
truths which are certain.’41  
 
‘If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain about the meaning of 
your words either.’42 
 
Both Newman and Wittgenstein approach Probability from the ground up.  In other 
words it is not understood as a kind of abstract rational prediction or calculation but as 
a pattern of consistent behaviour which conditions other expectative behaviour. 
Probability is not a deliberation of mind but an expectation based on what usually 
happens.  ‘If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain 
place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.’43 Our practices 
give rise to the paradigmatic expectations by which they are interpreted and re-
enacted or adapted.  The epistemological enquiry into certain belief will always 
struggle with the ontological priorness of this effective reality, which leaves it to deal 
only with what will have already become test cases.   It is this ontological 
understanding of probability that I believe is most central to the Newman-
Wittgenstein account of certainty.  Newman’s Illative sense is a kind of phronetic 
drawing on life events to form a cumulative probability focused by the present need to 
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actively respond to the particular event requiring attention.  It is not a thought before 
an action but an action incorporating previous experience through habit, body 
memory, spatial awareness, desire and all holistic features of rational human living.  
For Newman it is the subjective force which generates belief and effects action.  He 
struggles to make this ontological picture understood within the terms of propositional 
logic.  It forces him to speak of ‘latent and antecedent grounds’ where there is no real 
need to evoke a purely mental step at all.44  Living with Irish weather has taught me to 
take a coat when I am leaving the house, even in the middle of summer.  When I reach 
out and take my coat I don’t reflect or calculate.  There is whole-body fluidity about my 
action, a sense of everything coming together in its focus.  This is the illative sense in 
action.   
 
Wittgenstein, influenced by Ramsey, has a very similar evolutionary interpretation of 
how probability works.  The language games are the linguistic arenas around our 
practices; our words in use display our experiences and our expectations arising from a 
particular practice. That we act in a certain way reflects the sequences and successful 
effects of our actions as they have up to now shown themselves within this sphere of 
experience. Equally our not acting in a particular way highlights the uselessness of 
some possible ways of doing things.  Either way the seemingly prior fact or truth, 
positive or negative, which our actions display does not lay there as a rational object to 
be appropriated in isolation from those actions.  As the practice evolves so do the rules 
which count as the measure of the truth of what we say about it.   As noted both 
accounts of probability depend on our ability to recognise familial links.  Our 
incorporation of previous experience into present experience depends on our ability to 
see where the present experience belongs.  The probability of something being a 
certain way is wholly related to our finding it familiar, of intuiting its belonging to a 
particular group of experiences while maintaining awareness of its ontological 
distinctiveness.  And this is how we do operate; in the end cumulative probability is 
another expression of consistency and consistent relationships.  Both the language 
game and the illative sense explain our certainty by way of consistent practice and 
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experience, that is to say by way of our established ways of life.  These are our most 
certain truths and our facts. 
 
4.7 Justification and Grounds 
This reading of Newman and Wittgenstein together contextualises the comment in OC 
which mentions ‘H Newman’ as referring to John Henry Newman.  Wittgenstein says:  
If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.   
When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that 
does not mean that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any proposition 
can be derived from other ones.  But they may be no more certain than it is 
itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman)45 
 
Newman is certainly clear that the proofs in which our certainty rest are not the 
propositional proofs of logic which fail to touch the world.46  The search for this type of 
grounds only leads to endless regression or nominalist tautologies.  The fact that we do 
attain certainty is evidenced by our acting and founded in our consistent experience of 
the way things are.  Both Newman and Wittgenstein converge on this understanding 
and both agree that it is not scientific proof but a kind of trust in our ‘throwness’ to 
borrow from Heidegger that grounds our certain beliefs.  The lack of scientific grounds 
does not indicate that our beliefs are irrational.  Newman and Wittgenstein focus on 
our practices and re-present us with a holistic account of reason where what is rational 
is what is reasonable to think, say and do in our experience of life.  
Our certain beliefs in this account are fruitful.47  Our certainty springs from our 
practices and returns there to contribute to their continuing success.  While we can 
and do reflect on it, it does not belong in the sterile observation tower of logical 
thought but has life and the power to move us to action.  Therefore, as Angelo Bottone 
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notes, both Newman and Wittgenstein are anti-foundationalist in the rationalist sense 
insofar as they show that our certain beliefs are not calculated by scientific methods or 
supported by evidence in a way that meets scientific standards. 48  They rest, rather, in 
an ontological commitment to our forms of life, a commitment which is sustained even 
as we enquire into it.  As a commitment it is on the one hand undeniably individual.  As 
a process of interpretation which is to be ‘carried out into the realities of life’ it is 
bound by the traditional and cultural horizons which are the backdrop to the individual 
framework or seeing place.49  As Newman notes it is possible to believe what one 
cannot understand and what one cannot prove.50  This kind of belief is witnessed in 
our readiness to act as if, to participate in a form of life without being bound to explain 
it.  While at first glance it seems that this type of belief only refers to an area such as 
religious faith this is not the case.  Just think of the number of people who drive cars 
without fear of them falling apart on the road, despite no understanding of how they 
operate and no logical working out or gathering of data relating to instances of such 
things happening.  This separation of certainty from its epistemological conception as 
certain investigated/evidenced knowledge is something both Newman and 
Wittgenstein conclude on; the enquiry into certainty necessarily draws our 
understanding of knowledge and reason into question.   
The search for certain knowledge, Bottone notes, is related by Wittgenstein to our 
desire for a ‘safe condition’.51  The realisation that no proposition can be ultimately 
proved ranks our scientific conception of knowledge on the same level as faith, which 
Newman points out is the basis of all our assumptions, or as the ‘trust’ that 
Wittgenstein concedes is at the bottom of the language game.52  Bottone tells us that: 
‘The main thesis of On Certainty is that what man finds impossible to doubt is 
not what he knows for certain, but what he takes as certain or what he treats 
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as certain, or what plays that particular role for him.  Consequently there is no 
reference to the question of knowing.’53 
 
Without the reference to knowledge it becomes a case of justification by works which 
is what we find in both GA and OC.  Newman stresses the fruitfulness of our certainty 
in a way which can be compared to the Aristotelian concept of flourishing.  In 
Wittgenstein’s work this concept takes on an evolutionary bent; that what we are 
most certain of is what works best for us in our life practices.  This view of certainty as 
justified by works makes sense in its universal application to the hermeneutic worlds 
which make up our world; it supports truth functioning within the various hermeneutic 
circles, ethnic, national, cultural and personal, in which human beings have their lives. 
 
4.8 On the Believing Subject   
Dmitri Shalin traces in post-modern philosophy’s move from the disembodied to the 
embodied subject, a parallel move from a purely discursive (or propositional) 
hermeneutic, through a pragmatic hermeneutic, and toward a bio-critical 
understanding that highlights differences between discursive and affective life as the 
source of humanity’s ethical call.54  Any theory that purports to close this gap, and this 
has been the focus of philosophy for centuries, therefore attempts to delete the 
ethical and along with it the source of enquiry itself.  Bridging this gap is a life’s work, 
or as Shalin notes ‘an ontological condition’ which happens person by person.55  Shalin 
is speaking from the cutting edge of post-modern philosophical and sociological 
culture, yet it is a discussion in which Newman could comfortably be a participant.  For 
him, the reasoning that reaches out beyond what is purely logical is moral precisely 
because of the personal element involved.  While GA and OC both display a 
faithfulness to human nature and to the part played by the whole person in what is 
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knowledge/belief understood primarily as a commitment to a way of life, there are 
distinct differences in approaches to the role of the subject; Newman upholds the 
unique position of the choosing, historically located subject and respects the 
existential power of that subject, who can passionately commit to a position which pits 
him against his whole culture.   For him ‘Moral evidence and moral certitude are all we 
can attain’ because life calls us to apply ourselves to constant decision making which 
we do on the ontological basis of a history, a point of view and importantly a 
conscience.56  While on one hand Wittgenstein’s view seems to subordinate the 
subject to the consensually governed terms he chooses, on the other his 
(Wittgenstein’s) own lived example aligns him with Newman’s position.  Evolution 
itself depends on individuals who are committed to living and thinking in a different 
way.   He rightly acknowledges that language evolves in community and that it cannot 
fail in its task; everything that can be said can be said.  But this saying is not the world.  
There is an essential existential gap which is not a lack in our language but the space 
for our doing.  Here, in the pass-over into silence, the answers to our enquiries into 
what we can know are manifested in what we subjectively and individually do.  What 
we do is the source of all change and Wittgenstein’s ‘holes’ in our paradigmatic 
‘enclosures’ evidence his allowance of space for the determining subject.  
 
Wittgenstein does allow for the contextual immediacy of our certainty and for the fact 
that it derives from our frameworks.  Much of OC is an investigation into his own 
frame of reference: ‘I know that I have never been on the moon…’, yet he also 
acknowledges the wider cultural framework which acts as an authority for the 
individual: ‘…water boils at 100 degrees Celsius.’ 57   Challenges to the cultural 
framework can only come from the individual; insofar as the choice to act one way or 
another is made by him/her, the individual holds the possibility of the new.  This is 
something with which Newman is in agreement.  He speaks of the arena of truth as 
being that area where individual belief rises up against orthodoxy in a challenge which, 
like the heresies in the early church, can culminate in a positive contribution to the 
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truth position.58  Although the stress is communitarian in Wittgenstein’s account both 
men acknowledge the role of the individual and his/her unique experience via an 
acknowledgement of the relationship of knowledge to the ontological frameworks 
attaching to the ‘seeing as’ position: 
‘Or they may be compared to a landscape as drawn by the pencil…in which by 
the skill of the artist, amid the bold outlines of trees and rocks, when the eye 
has learned to take in their reverse aspects, the forms or faces of historical 
personages are discernible, which we catch and lose again, and then recover, 
and which some who look on with us are never able to catch at all.’ (G p 249)  
 
In this passage which mirrors Wittgenstein’s understanding, we are made aware of the 
difference in seeing between individuals and of the continuous possibility of another 
point of view, a vision that is surely at the heart of post-modernist understanding.  
 
What strengthens Newman’s case for the distinct role of the individual in certain 
knowledge is his overt and absolute acceptance of conscience as a source of personal 
authority.   For Newman this inner dialogue goes beyond language to become ‘word’ 
with all the religious connotations this word carries.  As he sees it, this inner word 
relates so directly to will as to give it a force of authority which can all but compel us to 
believe and act in a particular way; this may be in a way that contradicts appearances, 
outward authority or the general view.  It is by conscience that we are aware of the 
misalignments between discourse and practice, between things as we know them to 
be and as we intuit they should be.  It is the ethical source of our knowing that we 
know.  That Wittgenstein had an understanding of conscience is evident from 
biographical evidence.  Engelmann, Drury, Monk, Malcolm all give us a picture of this 
man who was at times ‘wretched’ with feelings of inadequacy, in dread of not being a 
‘decent’ enough human being and about being ultimately judged on this.59  He worried 
about his capacity for ‘seeing farther than others’ and about the personal 
responsibility that this capacity brought to him.  He was constantly aware of 
discrepancies between what he believed was important in life and what his culture 
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emphasised as important.60  He tells us that ‘…”consciousness of sin” is a real event… 
and so are despair and salvation through faith’.61  The question of Wittgenstein and 
religion will be taken up in detail in the following chapter.  Suffice it to say here that 
what he says on this topic shows him to be a naturally religious person who wanted to 
stay apart from anything that would endanger or corrupt this tendency by the 
dominating desire to explain and own.62   Newman, following Butler, posits the 
experience of conscience as well as that of a sense of awe and wonder at the natural 
world, both also characterised as experiences of God by Wittgenstein, as the chief 
sources of natural religiosity.  While Newman sees our capacity for natural religious 
experience as a preparation for revealed religion, to the end he champions this original 
and personal interaction with God.63  Conscience is more than mere reflection but 
functions to prompt change.64  It is where the religious and the ethical come together.  
Bob Plant, who writes on Wittgenstein and Levinas, believes this ‘bringing [of] the 
ethical and religious spheres together’ to be a definite orientation within 
Wittgenstein’s striving.65  It is undoubtedly part of Newman’s; the religious believer in 
the GA is a devotee who lives a certain kind of life and whose beliefs are evidenced by 
what he does.   There is something undeniably personal about the disquietings of 
conscience.  Newman’s attention to it within the hermeneutic framework prefigures 
Heidegger and Gadamer as well as Wittgenstein.  The difference is that he doesn’t 
need to struggle with the religious understanding of the concept; he takes it for 
granted.  This is interesting in view of the way in which philosophy over the last 
century has been taken up with the pseudo problem of talking about what is 
essentially religious experience, without naming God, something which will be 
discussed in the last chapter.   
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In the consistent relation of knowledge to ways of seeing and ways of seeing to ways of 
doing there is necessarily a move towards an embodied view of both reason and the 
person which is anticipatory of how philosophy would develop over the next century 
and a half.  However, although he pre-figures Wittgenstein’s rational anti-
foundationalism, Newman does not dismiss tradition.  Shalin accuses Heidegger of 
‘taking a linguistic turn’ on the road to disembodiment.  On the path from 
disembodiment to embodiment perhaps Wittgenstein can be said to have taken a 
linguistic turn on the road to embodiment; neither linguistic position is sufficient to 
human experience and ultimately not a satisfactory alternative to the Cartesian 
picture.  Although so much of GA is an analysis of propositions Newman somehow 
manages to resist this turn.  He maintains what he sees to be there in life; the 
ontological difference which Heidegger notes fails to ‘protrude … in the linguistic 
form’.66  Again, we are not talking here about any inadequacy of language.  Rather we 
are pointing out that language is not meant to equal being; thinking that it is creates all 
kinds of ‘depth’ problems as we try to locate the missing dimensions of experience in 
what we say.   Newman sees that the experiencing subject cannot be equalised into the 
terms he uses.  In the post-modern over-determination to embodiment, itself in part a 
resistance or sublimation of the name of God, philosophy has again forgotten the way 
things are.  We talk about our minds, our thoughts, our hopes and our potential and 
we do not hesitate to use the grammar of possession.67  This awareness of self is 
intimately entwined with the natural experience of conscience, part of what is for 
Newman (and I argue Wittgenstein and Derrida) the naturally religious person, already 
there as part of the given, beyond the bounds of enquiry.  Newman holds on to this self 
for dear life, not because he unwittingly falls into a Cartesian trap, but because it is an 
unquestionable part of what is experienced as ‘there like our lives’.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter brings together those connections that present themselves in Newman 
and Wittgenstein’s discussion of certain belief in this reading of An Essay in Aid of a 
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Grammar of Assent and On Certainty.  There are some places where similarities in 
thought are quite remarkable, for example our way of seeing in aspects and from 
within cultural and personal frameworks, or the use of ‘family resemblance’ as an 
analogy to explain our non-systematic intuition of belonging.  There is a strong affinity 
too in both men’s understanding of the place of doubt in our enquiries and the need 
for a clear separation between what can and cannot be subject to doubt.  They both 
warn us to pay attention to the nature of our universal concepts and to our use of 
counter-factuals in order to keep our energies and intellect focused on what is 
ethically essential for our life.   This section has also commented on stylistic parallels 
with particular reference to the use of rhetorical method.  From a wider perspective 
the connections between GA and OC point to a methodology for ethical enquiry that 
focuses on real need and away from the pseudo-problems created by the 
misapplication of logical-scientific method.  This is in keeping both with Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of philosophy as therapy and with Newman’s stress on belief which is 
justified by deeds.  It is a method which has potential to draw the ethical and the 
religious together and opens up interesting links with thinkers such as Levinas, Derrida 
and Gadamer, links which highlight the significance of Newman to contemporary 
philosophical discussion. 
Finally the connections explored here merit a discussion on the topic of religious belief 
which is made all the more interesting by the different religious backgrounds of 
Newman and Wittgenstein.  To view them side by side is to place the belief system and 
ethics of revealed religion alongside those of an unsystematic and interior spirituality, 
in a way which makes it very much a debate for the present time.  This discussion 
forms the basis of the final chapter which will look at the ways in which Newman and 
Wittgenstein’s views on certainty impact on religious belief.  
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5. On Certainty and Faith: Living with the Reality of God. 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter considers the authors’ objectives in their treatment of the topic of 
certainty and explores the contribution made by GA and OC to understanding religious 
belief, particularly in the context of a response to the challenges of Hume and the 
resulting temptation for believers to enter the proof game.  It notes how the religious 
and the ethical are unquestionably linked in the thought of both Newman and 
Wittgenstein and discusses how the bounds of ethical enquiry, which emerged in the 
enquiry into certainty generally, apply in the case of religious belief. Finally it will 
discuss how their approaches to God divide into revelation for Newman and what can 
be referred to as ‘manifestation’ for Wittgenstein, and briefly consider the implications 
of these two ways in the context of conceptions of a secular world.  
 
5.2 Religious-Ethical Objectives 
 
‘If you and I are to live religious lives, it mustn’t be that we talk a lot about 
religion, but that our manner of life is different.  It is my belief that only if you 
try to be helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God.1  
 
It is not the belief of this writer that An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent or On 
Certainty are primarily focused on epistemological concerns.2  At least, insofar as these 
concerns are present, they are subsumed by the greater ethical interests at the heart 
of a personal quest for meaning.  These are end of life works for both Newman and 
Wittgenstein and as enquiries are pursued firstly as part of an existential-ethical-
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 Wittgenstein in O’Connor Drury, The Danger of Words and Writings on Wittgenstein,  (Bristol, 1996) p 
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religious quest for personal understanding, and secondly as a possible means to 
enlighten others which is a responsibility felt to arise out of this quest.3  To talk of 
either or both works purely in terms of reformed epistemology is not accurate either, 
although there are those who read Wittgenstein in this way.  Chrisopher Hoyt explains 
the difference in terms of the way a hinge proposition is understood.4  A reformed 
epistemologist like Plantinga, for example, sees belief in God as a hinge or basic 
proposition which acts as a foundation for all other beliefs in the system.  
Wittgenstein’s relational understanding is that the ‘force’ of the hinge proposition is 
achieved only through its place within an already working system of which it is part 
rather than basis.  Life brings us to believe in God.  Newman perhaps walks a finer line 
than Wittgenstein here but as we have seen he has a similar anti-foundational 
approach to belief in general and therefore a more Wittgensteinian understanding of 
how basic propositions become basic in lived life.  It is this focus on lived life as the 
given place from which all our doubts and enquiries spring that gives the ethical centre 
to the work of both men.  Newman asks: ‘Why am I to begin with taking up a position 
not my own, and unclothing my mind of that large outfit of existing thoughts, 
principles, likings, desires, and hopes, which make me what I am?’5  We cannot get 
before this position and an epistemology which asks us to suppose that we can is 
unethical by virtue of its unreality.  Hence both works inherently reject the 
Enlightenment position and strive for one which does justice to the real thinking, 
feeling, human being.   It is with the recognition of this ethical base that the rest of this 
chapter proceeds to discuss the contribution made by GA and OC to understanding 
religious belief.  
 
As a believer and prominent member of the Catholic Church, Newman’s investigations 
take place from within a believing framework which finds God at the centre and at the 
                                                          
3 Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, Understanding On Certainty, p 1, gives a very good picture of the 
personal journey that is On Certainty, noting that: ‘Upon opening On Certainty, the reader is abruptly 
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acknowledges the personal nature of his quest: ‘ Is it not wonderful then, that , while I can prove 
Christianity divine to my own satisfaction, I shall not be able to force it upon anyone else.’ (GA, p  321) 
4
 Christopher Hoyt, ‘Wittgenstein and Religious Dogma’, in International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, 2007, 61:1, pps 39-49. 
5
 GA, p 330 
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outermost ‘enclosure’ of meaning.  Neither the notion of meaning or of ethical 
obligation is problematic for him as God provides the absolute upon which both 
ultimately depend.  This is not to affirm Newman as a purely classical theist; there is 
much in his focus on individual conscience as the primary experience of God that is 
expressivist and non-traditional.6   Religion is still for Newman very much about a 
passion and a kind of life which makes sense.  In large part his objective in writing GA 
was to ‘show that there is a true philosophy of religion’ in the hopes of moving people 
to ‘a better sort of religious sentiment’.7  To this end he is fighting against the view, 
coming from Hume, that religious belief is akin to superstition and unsupportable in a 
modern, progressive and scientific world.  The approach taken by Newman is one 
which shows up the non-(scientifically) foundational nature of all that we believe and 
act upon on a daily basis.  Alongside the other activities of our lives, he secures a place 
for religious belief as a rational and life supporting process which supports the human 
being as we find him, historically located and endlessly and whole-heartedly 
committed to people and objects and ways of being in the world.  Newman shows that 
our certainty is built on assumptions which we justifiably make based on our 
experiences in all areas of life.  These consistent experiences in the contexts of lived 
life make further experiences fully rationally acceptable to us; this includes 
experiences of God and our response of commitment to religious belief and practice.  
Our Illative sense regularly converges on the point of God.  Our subjective experiences 
of God in the wonder we feel at the natural world and in the dialogue of conscience 
naturally prepare us for acceptance of the Christian kerygma and the tenets of 
revealed religion, in Newman’s account.8  The Gospels are in large part the fulfilment 
of the expectation of God which these experiences create.  On receiving the Christian 
message as believers we respond by seeing all things in a new light and living in a new 
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way.  This real (as opposed to purely notional or intellectual) response is what it is to 
believe for a Christian and it is sourced in real life experience of the reality of God.  
Newman is clear that the development of religious practice through to modern 
Christianity does not involve distancing ourselves from the practices of our more 
primitive ancestors: ‘the progress of which man’s nature is capable is a development, 
not a destruction of its original state; it must subserve the elements from which it 
proceeds, in order to be a true development and not a perversion.’9  Religious practice, 
ancient and modern, reflects something of our fundamental nature.  The seeming 
contradiction between ‘the religion of barbarism’ and current religious understanding 
is founded in a human nature which has been subject to ‘a one-sided progress of mind’ 
to the detriment of conscience and the experiences of passion and fear which conduct 
us from it to religious belief lived out in a life of ethical concern.10  GA seeks, in a way 
which can be understood by the prevailing rationalist mind-set, to correct this 
imbalance. 
             
In the case of Wittgenstein nothing is overt or traditional.  OC cannot be said to be a 
book specifically about religious belief or morality.  But it is consistent with a concept 
of the human being as an enquirer concerned with truth and meaning, and as one 
whose beliefs are shaped in community that we find in Wittgenstein’s other works.   
And, like the Lecture on Ethics, it does link the religious and the ethical.  As Bob Plant 
notes, OC 608-612 which uses as an example the contrast between consulting the 
propositions of physics or the guidance of an oracle in deciding something, discusses 
how, when it boils down to the links between truth and the framework principles of 
our different ways of seeing, all ways are equally deserving of our respect, though we 
may persuaded in favour of one or another.11  Furthermore, OC supports the view that 
even our most seemingly meta-physical pronouncements are grounded in some 
practice or other, thus manifesting an ethic that refuses to posit the human being as 
somehow less than he could be – a ‘hobbled angel’ to borrow from Fergus Kerr.12  By 
grounding the religious in this way Wittgenstein keeps it tied to the ethical and helps 
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us to see it as answering a genuine human need.13  For countless people belief in God 
facilitates the living of a meaningful life, even while our talk of God or of right and 
wrong may constantly have us running up against the logical boundaries of language.  
Wittgenstein, too, has a sense of the reality of God.  He tells us that ‘Life can educate 
us to a belief in God’ and that the Christian kerygma is ‘not a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that 
actually takes place in human life’ where ‘”consciousness of sin” is a real event and so 
are despair and salvation through faith.’14  Like Newman he makes a strong and anti-
Humean place for our primitive experience of God.  He is clear that historical attempts 
to explain religious practice have merely exhibited an anachronistic and false 
understanding of progress which leads us to apply in a universal way the one 
explanatory framework where it does not belong and cannot do justice to the human 
being.15  Science has always flourished alongside religious belief.  Hence the capacity of 
so-called primitive man to make the equipment needed to build houses, hunt animals, 
navigate the oceans and work the land.  Our rituals and our talk of God belong to a 
certain way of life and express in all times the effects of particular experiences of being 
in the world.  In fact, Wittgenstein sees much of religious practice as stemming from 
our expectative-fulfilment capacity.  Our rites most often exhibit gratitude for those 
things that are predictable in life; we dance because the rain is coming.   It is not about 
the attempt to control or explain but about our powerlessness and about our being 
safe despite it.  Our religious rites are centred on the most predictable, most ordinary 
(or awesome, depending on your framework) events of our lives; for example 
meals/eating, changing seasons, birth and new life, death and illness, transition from 
child to adult.  In the face of these things we can mostly just stand back and watch and 
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this is what makes it so awesome, that we expect certain things to happen in a certain 
way and that they do.  Our certitude is fulfilled in the certainties of life every day to 
put Newmanian language on it and we learn that we can be certain, that we can trust 
something.  The feelings of safety and the awe that come about in and through this 
experience point us to God, and are a source of both celebration and gravity as 
witnessed in the response that is our religious rituals.16  
 
One further point connecting OC to Wittgenstein’s views on religion:  the insistence, 
which OC warns against on seeing the world through ‘the lens of our ideals’ has a 
parallel in religious dogmatism.17  Wittgenstein sees this failure to see past our pre-
conceived and self-interested notions of how things should be as a kind of self-
imposed blindness where we insist on trying to move past the ‘veil of the sensible 
world’ to some transcendent, universally applicable position.  Although he admires the 
wholehearted commitment of the religious believer, this way of seeing is irreconcilable 
which his own personal position and contradicts the therapeutic view of philosophy 
which he advocates.  I think it is fair to say that Newman struggled often with this 
dogmatic element of the Catholic Church and at times wished for the flexibility that 
naturally accommodates the particular and the different. One cannot help but think 
here of the Gospel story of the blind man, or of parables such as that of the Good 
Samaritan which ask us to ‘look and look’ and see past those ideals which position and 
judge marginalised groups with a distinct loss of sight of our shared humanity and of 
the instability of any one position past this common level.  Also to be rejected as an 
object of comparison within religious belief in Wittgenstein’s terms, is the ideal of the 
purely rational/spiritual human being; the ‘I in the sight of God which ‘remains the 
paradigm for the self even where the theology has been abandoned.’18  This is an ideal 
by which we devalue ourselves and the good we can do.  Fergus Kerr’s comments on 
Wittgenstein’s approach could be applied to Newman also: 
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We are agents in practical intercourse with one another – not solitary 
observers gazing upwards to the celestial realm of the eternal forms, or 
inwards at the show in the mental theatre.  What constitutes us as human 
beings is the regular and patterned reactions that we have to one 
another…community is built into human action from the beginning.19  
 
Theological ideals which draw us away from our ethical responsibilities here and now 
must give way to the persistent voice of conscience which ever reminds us ‘that we are 
personally responsible for what we do; that we have no means of shifting our 
responsibility, and that dereliction of duty involves punishment;…’20   
 
5.3 Adopting a Framework  
The dependence of certain knowledge or truth on our frameworks, as explored in both 
GA and OC, is true of religious belief also, at least on a general level of understanding:  
Reflect for example on the following quotes: 
He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth us not; by this 
we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. (John, 4:6 quoted in GA, p 
323) 
 
I read: “No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost.” And it is 
true: I cannot call him Lord; because that says nothing to me…And it could say 
something to me, only if I lived completely differently. (C&V, 33) 
 
Religious belief needs to be understood from the perspective of the one living the life 
of the believer.  A logical analysis will fail to do justice to its ontological effects – again 
a failure of being to protrude into language.  The spirit of truth and the spirit of error 
belong to the spirit of the game.  It is not enough to barge into the game and demand 
to play.  One must first enter the spirit of the game and that is not achieved by 
deduction or inference but by a certain kind of desire.  The believer feels differently 
because, in Newmanian terms, God for him is an image rather than a notion.  Life has 
impressed him with a sense of the reality of God.  Mark Wynn makes a strong case for 
Newman’s project not being that of trying to provide evidence in support of religious 
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 GA, p 307.  See also here Bob Plant, 2004, The Wretchedness of Belief…., p 472 which refers to 
Emmanuel Levinas’ question as to whether it is time ‘for the good to be loved without promises’ .  This 
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belief as is commonly taken to be the case; rather in his view Newman is trying to give 
us a picture of what it is to perceive God.21  Wynn gives the example of someone who 
has slipped on the ice and suffered an injury.  While we all are aware at some level of 
the potential for slipping on ice, for this person it is more than a notion.  The real 
dimension brought by her experience of falling is carried through into her lived life; she 
acts differently because of it.  Wynn talks in terms of emotions, of feeling, rather than 
seeing but the point is the same.  In a similar way the experience of God is an affective 
reality.  It makes a difference to how one lives.  Wynn’s point reminds us that 
Newman’s discussion of Notional and Real apprehension should not be understood as 
one about two purely intellectual activities.  In Real apprehension we grasp something 
at an ontological, subjective level where it becomes part of the framework from out of 
which we see and do everything.22  At this level the individual has something unique to 
offer which goes beyond words into feeling and action.  One cannot help but think of 
Levinas here and of his resistance of the universalising rationale which ingests the 
‘other’ in its own terms and misses what this other can offer that is irreplaceable – his 
unique experience and view point.23  In religious belief, as elsewhere, Newman 
recognises the existential significance of the individual faith position and respects the 
contributions to wider understanding made possible by differences experienced at this 
personal level.  As he comments on Christianity: ‘It is not dreary matter of 
antiquarianism; we do not contemplate it in conclusions drawn from dumb documents 
and dead events, but by faith exercised in ever-living objects, and by the appropriation 
and use of ever-recurring gifts.’24  
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 Mark Wynn, ‘The Relationship of Religion and Ethics: A Comparison of Newman and Contemporary 
Philosophy of Religion’, in Heythrop Journal, 2005, XLVI, pps  435-449.  See here also I. Kerr, John Henry 
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Wittgenstein understands this difference only too well and is respectful of the gap in 
experience between the believer and the non-believer, often meriting accusations of 
fideism.25  As a form of religious solipsism it is difficult to accept that Wittgenstein 
advocated this in any form.  We can and do talk about God, atheist, agnostic and 
believer, so there is some framework crossover.26  This is founded in a religious 
naturalism which Wittgenstein exhibits; we have a natural capacity to ‘get’ God; the 
concept of the Divine or Absolute is not alien to us, believer or atheist.  But subjective 
experience brings a different level of understanding that cannot be explained but only 
witnessed in the lived response it elicits.  It is this lived response that enters us into the 
community of believers where the spirit of the game is defined and perpetuated.  
Here, God is a source, an end and a meaning which secures our way of life and affects 
everything we do.  For the believer, who makes ‘a passionate commitment to a system 
of reference’, God is the hinge proposition around which everything else turns. 27   For 
both Newman and Wittgenstein the religious believer is one for whom the reality of 
God has been ‘seized upon… believingly (i.e. lovingly)’.28  To the non-believer one 
wants to say ‘put that in your pipe and smoke it’!   
 
5.4 After Naturalism: The Way the Truth and the Life 
D.Z. Phillips notes how our explanations of religious belief, from those of the early 
anthropologists such as Fraser and Pritchard to Freud and his followers, to social 
theorists like Durkheim and those in the tradition of Feuerbach, all follow on from or 
sit on top of religious belief itself.29  These are ‘ways of seeing’ as opposed to causes 
and although we can, as Phillips does, examine and engage with these ways, in the end 
they leave religious belief and practice untouched.  Phillips includes a supporting quote 
from Simone Weil in this regard which I think is worth repeating here: 
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The French school of sociology is very nearly right in its social explanation of 
religion.  It only fails to explain one infinitely small thing; but this infinitely small 
thing is the grain of mustard seed, the buried pearl, the leaven, the salt.  This 
infinitely small thing is God; it is infinitely more than everything.30 
 
That small thing is experienced by believers as a reality not a theory and this is what 
the atheist most often fails to grasp.  The fact that we employ ways of explaining 
religious belief stems from the need for persuasion in a case of clashing reasons or 
world views.  Newman would agree: ‘Men become personal when logic fails; it is their 
mode of appealing to their own primary elements of thought, and their own illative 
sense, against the principles and the judgment of another.’31  Hume’s consignment to 
the flames is, in the end, merely his employment of a particular method of assessment 
of what is there.  The fact that such debate occurs highlights the presence of God in 
our world.  Phillips understanding here is a reflection of Wittgenstein’s.  The truth is in 
description; after that comes persuasion and conversion.  Our explanations operate on 
a mistaken conception of truth as holding across frameworks; either that or their 
proponents have a meta-physical conception of truth as transcendent and absolute, 
which is out of keeping with their fundamental objections to God!  Religious belief is 
not itself a world view or way of seeing but part of an experience of human life in all 
times and places, sitting alongside building homes, or having children or any number of 
other human activities.  As in OC, Wittgenstein’s approach to religion is to be primarily 
concerned with the description of what is there in religious practice and life.  He resists 
the desire to interject a ‘because’ that can amount to no more that the imposition of 
one framework on another.  What was happening in the Catholic Church in Newman’s 
time, Ultramontanism and the declaration of Papal Infallibility, show the dangers 
associated with the explanatory account.  We forget about the primacy of experience 
and the response to it and formalise the theoretical so that it becomes a law which is 
ultimately used to dominate and control. Wittgenstein uses the simile of a weight 
being attached to the foot in order to restrict freedom of movement.32  The individual 
experience becomes something to be feared, a threat to the established way.  In the 
church as well as out of it Newman struggled to show the worth of the individual 
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account.  It must be allowed to come forward and to pit itself against authority in what 
he called ‘the arena of truth’.33   
 
G. E. Anscombe pointed out how a conception of Divine law continues to underlie our 
ethical judgements even in a supposedly godless society, and much of modern ethical 
debate has concerned itself with the struggle to conceive of ethical values without the 
framework of some kind of absolute judgement or religious teleology. 34   What 
Newman and Wittgenstein add to this debate, through the concept of conscience as 
primary awareness of the Divine, overtly in GA and through the experience of guilt and 
the conception of judgement for Wittgenstein, is that the joining of religious and 
ethical spheres does not happen at a cultural level, within the frameworks of particular 
religions and their conceptions of divine law.  Rather, it is something that begins in 
each naturally Divine-conceiving human subject, through intuitions of judgement and 
responsibility, of awe and wonder and of grace.35  It is in this coming together of 
religious and ethical that life and meaning become conjoined, that life is seen to be 
value-laden.  From this point we gradually diverge in our various ways of assessing 
good/bad, right/wrong.  Our ways of seeing evolve and we adopt certain primary 
frameworks such as that of revealed religion, or science, or humanism, no one of 
which can be ultimately proved to be a better system of judgment than the other 
except by passionate persuasion.36   Newman confirms this when he says: ‘…I say 
plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert 
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discussion of the ‘process of persuasion’ which comes to the fore when giving reasons comes to an end. 
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others by it I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their 
hearts’37 while Wittgenstein admits that: 
…if I am to be REALLY saved, what I need is certainty – not wisdom, dreams or 
speculation – and this certainty is faith.  And faith is faith in what is needed by 
my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence.  For it is my soul with its 
passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be saved, not my 
abstract mind.’38 
 
 Hence passion, or ‘heart’ rather than logic is central to our deepest sense of value, and 
rhetoric, as ‘heart speaking to heart’ to quote Newman, is the natural vehicle of ethical 
and religious dialogue.  This kind of passion drives people to martyrdom or to an 
ascetic life and is witnessed in science for example by Galileo, or philosophy, by 
Socrates, as much as it is in the life of the religious believer who with his whole his 
heart believes Jesus the Nazarene to be the way, truth and life.  The point here is that 
there is a point where all ways move beyond epistemologies.  After epistemologies, 
ways of seeing, there begins the passionate quest for truth.   
 
5.5 Ways of Seeing God 
Newman’s way was to make religion the ‘integrative existential factor’ of his ‘own 
reality as [a] continuously thinking and morally growing person’39  Newman sees the 
revelation of Christianity to be the natural progression from this first position granted 
us by nature and this is where his passion leads him. Through his interest in the early 
church he follows the recorded experiences of the earliest witnesses and livers of the 
Christian life and in general embraces the theology that comes from this, although 
always with a wariness which appreciates the catachrestic margins of such talk and 
reserves a special place for individual experience.  As was discussed in An Essay on The 
Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman has a fluid and evolutionary 
understanding of Christian truth.   All theological positions have a part to play in 
bringing this truth to light, and this may involve the death of certain beliefs which were 
once so convincing.  Changing belief, which as GA shows has no bearing on our 
certitude in particular time and context, is as much a component of theology as the 
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fixedness offered by dogma.  That Newman felt like this is brought to light particularly 
in his approach to the question of Papal Infallibility where he resisted the attempts to 
petrify an authority that heretofore was accepted and responded to in a devotional 
way.40  But it is fair to say that Newman accepts Catholic theology and explanatory talk 
about the being of God, while retaining his indelible sense of the primacy of the 
individual’s experience over all dogma.  His investigation into his beliefs, carried out 
against the firm backdrop of belief in God, convince him that the Catholic Church is the 
bearer and protector of the true message of Christ and for the sake of this he accepts 
all that comes with adopting its framework.  As part of his commitment to the truth he 
‘submits to an authority’, something Wittgenstein also recognised as integral to a 
heartfelt belief.41  Newman notes: 
When once the mind is broken in, as it must be, to the belief of a Power above 
it, when once it understands that it is not itself the measure of all things in 
heaven and earth, it will have little difficulty in going forward…I say that, when 
once it believes in God, the great obstacle to faith has been taken away, a 
proud, self-sufficient spirit… 42 
 
Wittgenstein is recorded as both admiring and criticising Newman.43  It is clear that 
what he did admire about GA was its sincere style and its attempts to see further than 
traditional logic would permit in understanding belief.  What he criticised was in the 
main to do with Newman’s theology; for example, Bouwsma gives us an account of 
Wittgenstein’s critical assessment of Newman’s attempt to literally explain a recorded 
miracle involving Christian men who spoke after their tongues had been cut out.  It is 
precisely this type of explanation that goes against the devotional understanding of 
religious belief which is being discussed and while Newman gives us, in GA, a broader 
account of what is rational he is not always consistent himself in his separation of 
scientific and religious modes!  Drury recounts Wittgenstein’s expression of both his 
respect for Newman’s ‘sincerity’ and his dislike for the manner in which Newman 
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‘preached to his friends at Littlemore’.44  Kienzler concludes his article in part with the 
comment that ‘Wittgenstein fundamentally disagreed with Newman’s views on 
religion…’ and it would be hard to argue with this, however, it could perhaps be 
softened by the consideration that Wittgenstein would have understood and admired 
Newman’s commitment as a practicing Catholic.  Wittgenstein conceives of God in a 
way that permits him to enter a discussion on religious belief.45   However his 
approach, as Plant notes, is to protect the name of God in the Hebrew sense, rather 
than explain it away or make ineffability claims.46   Everything that can be said, can be 
said.  God can be said so there is no question of the failure of words here but God 
cannot be explained as another object in the world.  He can be related to and at best, 
the relationship described or witnessed through the responses of the believer.  As is 
supported by his writings elsewhere Wittgenstein’s remarks on the topic of certainty 
contribute to making his ethical and religious position manifest.  Taken in conjunction 
with other works they show his profound respect for the religious and devotional 
human being and for the commitments which guide him to live a meaningful life.  Just 
as he prefers the simple ‘huts’ of the Gospels to the ‘church’ to be found in the 
writings of St. Paul, Wittgenstein respectfully resists dogmatic religion and the 
accompanying over-explanation he sees in Christian theology.47  As he notes: ‘A 
theology which insists on the use of certain particular words and phrases, and outlaws 
others, does not make anything clearer.’48   Life, which brings us to the Divine in the 
first place, has the potential to lead us further into God and the (synonymous) good, 
without the necessity for transcendent descriptions or intellectual proofs.  As in OC, in 
the case of religious belief his focus remains on the life and the very real and relevant 
experiences of God that happen there.   
 
                                                          
44
 In ‘The Danger of Words…,’ (Bristol, 1996), p 130. 
45
 Bob Plant, 2004, ‘The Wretchedness of Belief…’, p 451, compares Wittgenstein’s religious position to 
that of Tolstoy who notes in dismay his lack of ‘relationship’ with God despite his ‘recognition of the 
existence of God’.  
46
 Ibid, p 462, reminds us that while both ‘Wittgenstein’s early work’ and its ‘appropriation by the Logical 
Positivists’ …’might be said to have placed God under erasure, for Wittgenstein such a “boundary 
line” …was not a mark of disavowal, but rather a way of protecting the term “God”.’  
47
 C&V, 1998, 35e 
48
 C&V, 97e.   
111 
 
What Wittgenstein is aware of is what Plant terms ‘the full existential weight’ of 
Christian belief.49  This is not to follow Feuerbach by positing God made in the image of 
man, but rather to refuse to evade the ethical demands following the experience of 
God by pursuing a process of intellectualisation which must remain on the level of the 
theoretical.  This is in keeping with his view of Philosophy as therapy.  Philosophy of 
religion in Wittgenstein’s picture, we might say, is a type of clarity-therapy, which asks 
us to recognise when our words don’t make anything clearer but our actions just 
might.  All that said, it is important to make clear here that theology is part of religious 
life and practice, contributing to the first principles or hinges around which religious 
life rotates.  It would be inaccurate to put religious belief and theology in opposition 
and Wittgenstein does not do this.  Once again, he reminds us to pay attention to our 
ideals, and to the formation of our rules.  They must be open to change from the 
ground up.  His objection, therefore, can be seen as similar to Newman’s regarding the 
Doctrine of Infallibility; it is an objection to petrification at the level of the rule.  There 
are timely warnings here for a church with a tendency to fear which shows itself in 
precisely this way.  Newman and Wittgenstein share a fluid and progressive 
understanding of truth which let us see that this kind of fear is the ontological opposite 
of truth.  
 
While they may share this view of truth, there is ultimately an unbridgeable divide in 
their approaches to God.  While Newman goes the way of revealed religion 
Wittgenstein’s path to God is still being beaten out.  Maurice O’Connor Drury makes 
an interesting comment to the effect that Wittgenstein and Simone Weil have been 
the two most profound influences on his life.50  What is shared by both of these 
philosophers is a profoundly ethical spirituality which refuses to be moved from its 
utter commitment to the intrinsic value of human life while yet being aware of this life 
as wholly gifted.  It is a spirituality that struggles internally against pride and externally 
against the effects of pride, the conquering ego.  There are those who see both 
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philosophers as mystics.51  For sure, Wittgenstein’s approach to God veers on the side 
of the Pseudo-Dionysian and apophatic.  He does not want us to try and say who God 
is, even if God is something we acknowledge as the outcome of an experience: ‘In 
short, one’s application of “the word” ‘God’ does not show whom you mean – but 
rather what you mean.’52   But while he talked about experiences of the Divine he was 
not interested in investigating this experience to arrive at knowledge of God, or to 
move somehow deeper into God.  He notes the fact that he did not have a personal 
relationship with God as a point of difference between himself and the religious 
believer.53  It seems that, apart from the ethical focus shared with Weil and maybe 
Kierkegaarde, without considerations of knowledge of God or communion with God, in 
terms of fitting into the tradition Wittgenstein stands ancestor-less in the realm of 
religion also.  If this is the case, he certainly has not stood useless, inspiring a wealth of 
discussion in both the philosophy of religion and in theology.  Perhaps in the end his 
very non-place within the tradition makes him a perfect instrument of the via negativa 
insofar as his words cast an illuminating darkness on all our ways of conceiving God.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Following Hume’s attack on religious belief and the enlightenment understanding of 
progress generally the idea was formed that we human beings could and should move 
beyond such superstition; that to look for explanation and proof was the only position 
suited to the rational human being.  The fact that the capacity for religious belief is 
within the sphere of what is reasonable for every human being is restored by the views 
of natural religious experience put forward by both Newman and Wittgenstein.  As 
both understand it, in the natural dialogue of conscience there arises simultaneously 
the awareness of God and the intuition of justice.  Through this awareness a sense of 
the potential value of all we do comes into play and ethics, religion and meaning are 
irrevocably bound together. That each understands religious belief to be something 
that has a real impact on how the believer lives his life, rather than submission to a set 
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of rules, supports the point about concern for the role of the ideal discussed in the 
previous chapter.  In the area of religious belief as in other areas of enquiry, an 
awareness of the dynamic and dialogic formation of our first principles is shown to be 
vital to ensuring that individual experience continues to impact on the progress toward 
truth.   Clearly then, the ethics of enquiry emerging from this thesis’ reading of GA and 
OC has elements of application to the enquiry into religious belief.  In terms of the 
tradition of talk about God in philosophy and theology, there remains a deep divide 
between the approach of Newman and that of Wittgenstein.  It is a divide which 
suggests that the encroaching of the secular and the divide between religion and 
spirituality has more to do with a resistance to naming God than to anything more 
fundamental.  This resistance may be a kind of caving in under positivistic peer 
pressure which results in the kind of sublimation of the religious which we experience 
in some twentieth century phenomenology.54  On the other hand it may be a genuine, 
cultural apophasis; an evolutionary clearing of obstacles as part of a striving toward a 
purer encounter with the radically Unknown; neither seems to fully capture 
Wittgenstein’s approach which leaves knowing out of the question altogether, instead 
trusting in the ethical life to make God manifest.  God is in the spirit in which we do; in 
us in the doing and in the world in what is done.  Certainly, the Newman-Wittgenstein 
divide on this point merits further discussion beyond the scope of this thesis and it 
seems clear that Wittgenstein’s unique perspective will continue to shed new light on 
the thought of Newman and other key figures within the tradition, both scholastic and 
contemporary, for some time to come.   
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Conclusion 
From its conception this thesis was ambitious in its scope and founded almost as much 
on instinct and a sense of adventure as on research evidence.  At this point therefore it 
is satisfying to be able to say that it has succeeded in its three main aims; firstly, by 
providing a pragmatic and organic account of the manner in which our beliefs are 
founded it has shifted the understanding of certainty from an epistemological to an 
ontological basis that more accurately reflects human life and practice.  Secondly by 
shining light on similarities in the thought of Newman and Wittgenstein it has 
evidenced Newman’s significance as a philosopher with a considerable amount to 
contribute to contemporary issues in epistemology and ethics,  whose thought 
encompasses many areas of philosophical tradition from scholasticism to pragmatism 
and through to phenomenology and hermeneutics.  The work done here has also 
acknowledged important links between the two philosophers and key figures in the 
continental tradition, more specifically Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas.  Worthwhile 
further research on this topic would most certainly include in the case of Newman at 
least, an expansion of these connections which could only be touched on here.  Thirdly, 
in its treatment of certainty and religious belief this thesis has explored the input of a 
religious mind-set to philosophical understanding and challenged a more rigid view of 
what comprises such a mind-set in a way that can only be beneficial in a post-modern 
world which strives to embrace natural variety and difference.  In addition this study 
has raised the question of the role and function of conscience both as a natural source 
of personal authority and as a pointer to something transcendent which can contribute 
significantly to the living out of a meaningful life.   
 
If these are the major conclusions there are several minor outcomes which also 
deserve to be mentioned here.  This work has successfully employed a bio-critical 
approach which has allowed for a more holistic interpretation of the key works.  The 
inclusion of biographical details has made a worthwhile contribution to the account of 
similarities between the two philosophers and has helped to promote the notion of 
congruence between life and thought which is an important focus of GA and OC.   
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Newman and Wittgenstein’s explorations of certainty taken together propose a broad 
and multifaceted account of reason which more aptly depicts the rational human being 
in all his many ‘forms of life’.  This view can stand against more universalising accounts 
which promote colonisation and inequality.  As discussed in the penultimate chapter 
the parallel reading of GA and OC undertaken here also witnesses the emergence of a 
methodology for ethical enquiry which is open to being used as a philosophical tool 
going forward.  It has the therapeutic value of retrieving us philosophers from the 
winding mazes of our own making and from the more fruitless sceptical anxieties into 
which they lead.  
 
Finally, this reading of Newman and Wittgenstein promotes a renewed sense of awe 
and wonder at us human beings, at our capacities and our ways of life.  Both 
philosophers remind us that our rational, emotional and devotional parts do not work 
in isolation and that our philosophical reflections need to be mindful of this unity.  
They appreciate our historical nature while reminding us to look and look and see life 
events in a way that neither diminishes nor tries to transcend their possibilities.  
Leading by example both philosophers stress the importance of continued questioning 
into our ways of life, our methods and assumptions, but in a way that supports rather 
than impedes what comes most naturally to us.  Our manner of trusting which has 
been brought to the fore in this research indicates that we are by nature made to use 
ourselves up rather than think ourselves up, an idea which calls Simone Weil’s notion 
of de-creation to mind.  This is not to dispute the value of philosophical contemplation 
but to stress that there are points, which we can become aware of, where it becomes 
useless.   
 
A final word on the topic of certainty:  what Newman and Wittgenstein together 
communicate through this study is that our certainty happens in the unified human life, 
where all the parts of the person which we separate upon reflection come together, 
where what we expect mostly happens and what we recognise mostly turns out to be 
what we require it to be.  Well before any question of justification our certainty is 
founded in the consistency and trust that comprises the biggest part of our daily lives. 
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